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BAD POLICY FOR GOOD POLICIES:
ARTICLE 9’S INSURANCE EXCLUSION
Andrew Verstein*
***
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code excludes from
its scope any transfer of an interest in a life insurance
policy. Thus, any lender whose security is a life insurance
policy may not look to the UCC to determine her rights.
This Article argues that the exclusion should be eliminated
because it leaves insurance governed by antiquated and
problematic law. Three specific problems are considered:
non-UCC law does not have a satisfactory alternative to
UCC perfection; non-UCC law is insufficient to prevent
lenders from abusively taking more than their share of
value from defaulted policies; and non-UCC law allows
insurance companies to hinder securitization through the
“reservation problem.” The result is that Americans
borrow $121 billion worth of policy loans, almost all of
which comes without serious competition. Eliminating the
life insurance exclusion will rationalize the law of lending
in this area, and improve prospects for a secondary
market.+#
***


*

Associate Research Scholar in Law and John R. Raben/Sullivan & Cromwell
Executive Director, Yale Law School Center for the Study of Corporate Law, Yale
Law School. The author would like to thank Eric Brunstad, Matthew Grieder,
Mitzi Huang, George Mullin and Debbie Cotton for their insightful comments. All
errors remain the author's own.
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BAD POLICY FOR GOOD POLICIES:
ARTICLE 9’S INSURANCE EXCLUSION
$100 billion worth of American life insurance policies are
“impaired,” meaning that the insured would realize more money by selling
the policy on the secondary market than by surrendering the policy to the
insurance company.1 Many consumers benefit from selling or surrendering
their life insurance policies, but selling one’s life insurance is a serious step
that many people later regret. Rather than selling her policy, an insured
could instead borrow against it, with less permanence and worry.
Borrowing is not without its own risks.2 Nevertheless, for many insureds,
borrowing is a better choice than selling.


1

Neil A. Doherty & Hal J. Singer, The Benefits of a Secondary Market for Life
Insurance Policies, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 449 (2003). See also DELOITTEUCONN ACTUARIAL CTR., DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP & THE UNIVERSITY OF
CONNECTICUT, THE LIFE SETTLEMENT MARKET: AN ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE ON
CONSUMER ECONOMIC VALUE (2005), available at http://www.quatloos.com/
uconn_deloitte_life_settlements.pdf.
2
Recent events in the financial markets have shown that improvident
borrowing and excessive indebtedness can lead to harms of all their own.
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Borrowing against life insurance is widespread. Americans
currently secure about $121 billion dollars worth of loans with their life
insurance policies.3 The vast majority of these loans were made by their
issuing insurance company and without any serious competition from other
lenders. This is in part because of difficulty and uncertainty in the law
governing the assignments of life insurance policies. Though it is legal to
sell or pledge a life insurance policy, life insurance policies may not serve
as security for the purposes of an Article 9 lien.
Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is governing
law for almost all security interest transactions in all states.4 The product of
extensive scholarly drafting and professional insights, the UCC is lauded
for its clarity, coherence and logic.5 Despite its potential benefits, Article 9
excludes from its scope transfers of interests in insurance policies.6 Forty-


Moreover, some insurance borrowing arrangements can be disadvantageous,
fraudulent, or predatory. See infra Part III.D.
3
FED. RES., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND
OUTSTANDING, FOURTH QUARTER 2009 32 (Mar. 11, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-1.pdf. 
4
U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1) (2000) ("[T]his Article applies to a transaction,
regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or
fixtures by contract.”).
5
See, e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based
Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV.
2021, 2021 (1994) (“In embarking upon the revision of what many consider the
most successful commercial statute ever . . . .”); Donald J. Rapson, Default and
Enforcement of Security Interests under Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
893, 893 (1999) ("Article 9 has been rightfully lauded as the 'jewel' of the Uniform
Commercial Code . . . ."); Edward L. Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed
Revisions of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 557 (1991) (“[T]he greatest
conceptual achievement in the field was Article 9 of the U.C.C. Its drafters,
Gilmore and Dunham, had unified the various forms of security instruments-chattel
mortgages, trust receipts, field warehouses, pledges and so forth-into a single
coherent framework with a new, generic terminology.”); Karl N. Llewellyn, Why
We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367, 379 (1957)
("[T]he whole of Article 9 brings into simplified and workable form the law of all
chattel security.").
6
U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(8) (2000) (“This article does not apply to . . . a transfer of
an interest in or an assignment of a claim under a policy of insurance, other than an
assignment by or to a health-care provider of a health-care-insurance receivable
and any subsequent assignment of the right to payment, but Sections 9-315 and 9322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds”). Notice an ad hoc
exception for health-care insurance receivables. See id. Moreover the code does
not exclude the proceeds of insurance policies from its scope. Id.; see also U.C.C.
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eight of the fifty states follow the UCC in excluding insurance policies
from the scope of their state’s version of Article 9. 7 A lender who accepts a
life insurance policy as collateral to secure a debt may not look to Article 9
to determine her rights and responsibilities. But as states adopted Article 9,
they repealed their other security statutes. So while the practice of


§§ 9-315, -322. But this inclusion is meant to allow secured parties whose
collateral is destroyed to maintain their interest in the subsequent insurance money.
See Peter Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REV. 477, 515 (1973).
Neither exception is relevant to the discussion at hand.
7
ALA. CODE § 7-9A-109 (D)(8) (LexisNexis 2006); ALASKA STAT. §
45.29.109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-9109 (West
2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2001); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 4-9-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-109
(West 2009); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 9-109 (2005); DC CODE § 28:9-109
(LexisNexis 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1091(4)(h) (West 2003); GA. CODE
ANN., § 11-9-109(d)(8) (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:9-109(d)(8) (2008);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-9-109(d)(8) (2001); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-109(d)(8)
(West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9.1-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2005); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 554.9109(4)(h) (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-109(d)(8)
(1996); KY. REV. STAT. § 355.9-109 (4)(h) (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. § 10:9109(d)(8) (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-1109(4)(h) (West Supp.
2010); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW, § 9-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2002); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.9109(h)(4) (LexisNexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
336.9-109(d)(8) (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-9-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis
1972); MO. ANN. STAT. § 400.9-109 (d)(8) (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 309A-109(4)(h) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-109(D)(8) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. §
104.9109(4)(h) (LexisNexis 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. § 382-A:9-109(d)(8)
(LexisNexis 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-109(d)(8) (West 2004); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 55-9-109 (d)(8) (West 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-9-109(d)(8)
(LexisNexis 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-09(4)(h) (LexisNexis 2001); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.109(d)(8) (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-9109(d)(8) (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 79.0109(4)(h) (2009); 13 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9109 (d)(8) (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-9-109(d)(8)
(LexisNexis 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-109(d)(8) (West 2003); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 57A-9-109(d)(8) (West 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-109(d)(8)
(LexisNexis 2001); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(d)(8) (West 2002);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9a-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2009); V.I. CODE ANN. tit.
11A, Art. 9 § 9-109(d)(8) (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 9-109(d)(8)
(LexisNexis 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2001); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9 A-109(d)(8) (West 2003); W. VA. CODE § 46-9-109
(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 409.109(4)(h) (West 2003); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 34.1-9-109 (d)(vii) (LexisNexis 2009). But see CAL. COM. CODE §
9109 (West 2002); LA. REV. STAT. § 10:9-109(d)(8) (West 2002).
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borrowing on insurance policies grows exponentially,8 there is less
statutory law than ever. In that absence of statutory law, the common law
governs from subterranean obscurity.
Article 9’s Official Comments rationalize the insurance policy
exclusion by stating, “Such transactions are often quite special, do not fit
easily under a general commercial statute and are adequately covered by
existing law.”9 However, by the late 1960s, the Drafting Committee was
criticizing the exclusion and the above-stated rationale:
It is hard to see where loans made by outsiders ‘are
adequately covered by existing law’ and why they did not
‘fit easily under a general commercial statute.’ Indeed, it
would appear that the law needs some rules to cover the
growing practice of insurance premium financing where
the loan by an outsider is always secured by a pledge of
the insurance policy.”10
This Article argues that security interests in life insurance policies can and
should be within a general commercial statute, the Uniform Commercial
Code’s Article 9 and its concomitant state enactments.
The law as it currently operates is woefully inadequate. This is
because the exclusion does more than decline UCC-specific legal
procedures. It causes interests in life insurance policies to tumble down the
rabbit hole into the pre-statutory common law. Economic innovation and
industry practice have far outpaced the law in this area, and that has


8

The target market for life settlements, a subset of the impaired policies most
attractive for a policy loan, is anticipated to grow at three times the rate of
population growth in the coming decades. See SUNEET KAMATH & TIMOTHY
SLEDGE, BERNSTEIN RESEARCH CALL, LIFE INSURANCE LONG VIEW – LIFE
SETTLEMENTS NEED NOT BE UNSETTLING 6 (Sanford C. Bernstein & Co.) (2005).
9
Uniform Commercial Code: 1962 Official Text with Comments (Article 3 to
End), 621 (1963), reprinted in XXIII Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, 401
(Comp., Elizabeth Slusser Kelly, 1984). The Comments to the current draft of the
UCC no longer explain the policy exclusion at all.
10
Homer Kripke, Associate Reporter of the Review Committee for Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, Memorandum Re: Problems of Inclusion and
Exclusion, 4-5 (Feb. 16, 1968). Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform
Commercial Code, Document No. 10 in VI Uniform Commercial Code:
Confidential Drafts, (Comp., Elizabeth Slusser Kelly & Ann Puckett, 1995).
Kripke’s comments were primarily directed at the exclusion of third party loans to
the insured. 
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potentially harsh consequences for the consumers whose finances are
impacted by the insurance industry.
Part I explains the basics of insurance financing transactions,
emphasizing the importance of policy loans and sales to insurance
customers, and how a vibrant secondary market serves those interests. Part
I gives the reader a sense of what is at stake.
Part II explains the trouble with UCC § 9-109(d)(8) by showing
three areas where the law is irregular, unfair, or at odds with modern
business practice. Section A considers the “perfection problem,” which are
those difficulties a party may experience in trying to perfect her security
interest in an insurance policy. The current law grants priority in an
uncertain and inefficient manner, to the detriment of secured parties,
insureds, and insurers alike. The perfection problem is well known to those
who follow these issues,11 though the growing importance of an efficient
secondary market makes it more important than ever.
Sections B and C present new problems with the exclusion. No
previous scholarship has noticed or addressed these issues. Section B, the
“surplus problem,” explains the law regarding the division of surplus from
sale, surrender, or maturity of the policy. An important question that
emerges in any insurance policy financing is “upon default, who gets
what?” The rise of the secondary market has seen a variety of creditors who
hope to receive the full maturity or resale value of the policy upon which
the loan is secured. Because the policy is often worth more than the loan it
secures, there is often a windfall to the creditors. These creditors are often
unjustly enriched, and the present legal regime is insufficient to deter them.
Section C explains how the secondary market is threatened by a
particularly bedeviling combination of draftsmanship and old law. Nearly
all existing insurance policies are assigned in a manner that impedes the
creditor’s ability to resell the policy. The resale is impeded as a result of a
reservation clause in the policy assignment, and so is referred to as “the
reservation problem.”
Each of these problems would be solved if security interests in life
insurance policies were included within the scope of Article 9 of the UCC.
Because interests in insurance policies are choses in action or things in


11

Gerald T. McLaughlin, “Seek but You May Not Find”: Non-UCC Recorded,
Unrecorded and Hidden Security Interests under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 953, 959 (1985); Stephen Knippenberg,
Insurance Policies as Collateral Under Article 9: Withdrawal of the Section 9104(g) Exclusion, in APPENDICES TO REPORT OF THE ARTICLE 9 STUDY
COMMITTEE OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE, 219 (1992).
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action,12 Article 9 would treat insurance policies as general intangibles.13
Security interests in general intangibles are perfected by filing with the
Secretary of State.14 They are subject to a well-understood foreclosure and
disposition regime.15 Contractual restrictions on assignment of interests in
general intangibles are invalid.16 These features of Article 9, in addition to
its general coherence and uniform treatment of other security interests,
promise substantial improvements to this area of financing.
Part III goes on to consider and reject objections to this proposal.
Five such objections are considered. Historical analysis shows that there
was never a compelling reason for the exclusion, and policy analysis shows
that exclusion is an inappropriate mechanism for protecting consumers or
the insurance industry. Part IV concludes by taking stock of the problem
and imagining the significance of this proposed solution for the broader
financial market.
I.

WHY PEOPLE BORROW AGAINST THEIR INSURANCE
POLICIES, AND WHY IT SHOULD BE EASIER.

Judge Crippin in St. John v. American Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
noted that “[W]ithout the right to assign, insurances on lives lose half their
usefulness.”17 An insured’s right to assign an insurance policy to a third
party is not seriously contested. The right was clearly recognized by the
Supreme Court of the United States in 1911.18 But the law may make it
difficult,19 and as a result compromise half the usefulness of an insurance
policy.
Many different rationales might motivate an individual to borrow
against her life insurance policy.20 Most simply, an insured may desire to
keep her insurance policy but be unable or unwilling to continue paying



See infra note 94.
U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(42) (2000). 
14
U.C.C. § 9-310 (2000). 
15
U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (2000).
16
U.C.C. § 9-408 (2000).
17
St. John v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 13 N.Y. 31, 39 (1855). In that case,
perhaps not by coincidence, the surrender value of the policy was approximately
half of the death benefit. 
18
Grigsby v. Russel, 222 U.S. 149 (1911). 
19
See infra Part II. 
20
Sachin Kohli, Pricing Death: Analyzing the Secondary Market for Life
Insurance Policies and its Regulatory Environment, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 279, 293-95
(2006) (listing manifold reasons policy owner may wish to part with it).
12
13
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premiums. Perhaps needs have changed, as would be the case if dependants
have grown up or passed away. Perhaps her current policy is under-funded
and she desires capital with which to invest in a better-suited life insurance
product.21 Perhaps she needs an emergency fund to finance current
expenses in the event of economic hardship.22 More than ever, our law
respects such transactions and understands life insurance policies as
instruments for planning for the aftermath of rapid declines in health other
than death,23 and as a financial asset more generally.
Recently, great attention has been directed towards so-called “life
settlements” or “viatical settlements.”24 In these transactions, insureds sell
their policies to investors who then pay the premiums and stand to collect
the death or “maturity” benefit. It is clear that some consumers benefit from
this novel way of liquidating their insurance assets, but the irreparable
quality of a sale increases the risk of fraudulent or unfair transactions.25


21

Perhaps 40% of life insurance policy sales result in the purchase of a
another financial product. Heather D. Mitchell, The Producer’s Role in a Life
Settlement, LIFE INS. SELLING, Feb. 1, 2004, (magazine), at 3 (statement of Scott
Butterworth).
22
Andre P. Liebenberg, James M. Carson & Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand for
Life Insurance Policy Loans, 77 J. RISK AND INSURANCE 651 (SEPT. 2010),
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653049.
23
Wayne M. Gazur, Death and Taxes: The Taxation of Accelerated Death
Benefits for the Terminally Ill, 11 VA. TAX REV. 263, 266 (1991) (“Arguably, an
income tax exclusion for accelerated death benefits . . . blur[s] the present
distinction between the income taxation of life insurance, which traditionally
emphasizes survivor protection, and the taxation of retirement, health, and longterm care requirements.”).
24
See Ffiona M. Jones, Note, The Viatical Settlement Industry: The
Regulatory Scheme and Its Implications for the Future of the Industry, 6 CONN.
INS. L.J. 477, 480 (2000). 
25
According to one study, the price paid by third parties for life insurance
policies tended to exceed surrender value, but amounted to only a small fraction of
the present value of the policy’s maturity payment. On average, insureds were
paid 20% of the face value of the policy, but the policies purchased were worth
64% of the face value to the purchaser who holds them to maturity. More
worryingly, it is not clear that insureds realize that this difference is so large since
many industry estimates downplay relevant expenses the insured will bear in a
policy sale. DELOITTE-UCONN ACTUARIAL CTR., DELOITTE CONSULTING & THE
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, THE LIFE SETTLEMENTS MARKET: AN ACTUARIAL
PERSPECTIVE ON CONSUMER ECONOMIC VALUE 8 (2005); see also Joy D.
Kosiewicz, Comment, Death for Sale: A Call to Regulate the Viatical Settlement
Industry, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 701 (1998) (describing potential abuses).
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Another way for a cash strapped consumer to deal with premium
payments is to borrow against the insurance policy for those same amounts.
Loans secured by life insurance mark a palatable halfway point between the
extremes of outright sale of the policy on the one hand and continued
premium payment (which may no longer be possible for some insureds) on
the other. Policy-secured loans allow an insured to monetize her valuable
asset without permanently losing her residual interest in her policy. If she
later regrets borrowing against her policy, she may be able to repay her
creditor and again own the proceeds in full.26 If the insured dies before
having borrowed much of her line of credit, the surplus value above the
debt belongs to her or her estate.27
Today many consumers borrow from their life insurance
companies. However, because the current legal regime discourages thirdparty creditors from making favorable bids, insureds must often borrow
from their insurance company without being able to consider competing
offers from other lenders.28 The bargaining power of the insured and the
lending insurance company is grossly unequal, and one may reasonably
deduce that this inequality harms consumers and generally discourages
consumers from borrowing against their insurance. Insurance statutes and
market competition only partially mitigate these harms.
If we improve the law, with the result being a freer market, what is
the benefit? This section addresses that question, explaining how the power
to liberally sell or borrow against a policy will tend to benefit consumers by
obtaining greater value for them than the transactions in which they
currently engage. A liberal secondary market involving securitization of
life insurance policies will also benefit investors, insurance companies, and
the market as a whole.


26

See 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 563 (2007).
See 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 562 (2007).
28
Insurance companies take steps to discourage insureds access to third-party
financing. See Lori Widmer, Life Settlement Regulation Makes It Harder to Avoid
the Market, AGENT SALES J., Feb. 2010 (“Many have gone so far as to ban the
mere mention of life settlements to policyholders, and a number of insurers include
contract stipulations that expressly prohibit agents from entering into such
discussions.”). Some insurance companies have restricted agents from informing
customers about third party assignability rights, while one insurance company has
added a “right of first refusal.” James C. Magner, What is Life Insurance? The
Evolution of Financial Products, 35 EST. PLAN 24, 30 (2008). Accumulator
Universal Life III offered by Phoenix Home Life Variable Insurance Company, a
Connecticut-domiciled affiliate of Phoenix Life Insurance. Id. at 30 n.55.0z.
27
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A. HOW CONSUMERS BENEFIT FROM A LIBERAL AND EFFICIENT
ASSIGNMENT REGIME
Insurance companies provide loans pursuant to the terms of the
particular insurance policy and applicable state laws. Insurance companies
will often lend up to the surrender value of an insurance policy, which is
the amount of cash the insurance company would pay to an insured who
chooses to discontinue the policy. For a term-life policy, the surrender
value is generally zero. For whole-life policies, which have an internal
savings component, the surrender value, or the maximum borrowing
amount, is generally no greater than the reserve set aside to fund the
anticipated payment upon maturity.29
It is, in any event, set by statute or by the contract at the time the
policy is originated.30 The surrender value at any given moment can be
called the ex ante value of the policy, because it represents the current
value as determined under a contract that does not account for intervening
changes in facts.
If third party lenders were unimpeded by difficult and confusing
laws, they would have incentives to provide better terms to some insureds
than insurance companies. This is because they have an incentive to lend
against the ex post value of the securing insurance policy, which accounts
for subsequent changes in circumstances, while insurance companies do
not have such an incentive.


29

Doherty & Singer, supra note 1, at 451 (explaining that “[i]n the case of the
lapse of a term-life policy, a policyholder who could no longer afford premium
payments simply lost his insurance coverage and received nothing. In the case of a
surrender of a universal, or whole-life policy, the predetermined schedule of
surrender values offered by the insurance company—representing at most the
reserve set aside to fund future insurance costs at standard rates—did not
compensate a policyholder for the full actuarial value of the impaired policy.”).
30
See ALASKA STAT. § 21.45.080(a) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201209(A) (2010); Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 2911(a) (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 3325-3(5) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2510(1) (2000); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 175, § 132 (1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.03(g) (West 2005); MONT.
CODE. ANN. § 33-20-131(1) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 688A.110(1)
(LexisNexis 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:25-8 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. §
743.186(1) (2009); 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 510(h)(2) (West 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. §
38-63-220(l) (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3731(7)(A) (2009); WASH. REV.
CODE. ANN. § 48.23.080(1)(b) (West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-13-8(a)
(LexisNexis 2006).
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History may illuminate the present: insurance companies used to
act as abusive monopolists when their customers wished to discontinue
premium payments. Professor Gazur recounts a story of the early abuses of
insurance company monopoly on the loan and surrender markets:
In London, [Elizur Wright] visited the insurance auctions
at the Royal Exchange. There he saw old men standing on
the life insurance auction block, their policies being
offered to the highest bidder at a fraction of their actual
worth. In one case a man had paid premiums for forty-four
years and could meet the payments no longer. "This was
done, I was told, because the companies made it a rule
never to buy their own policies," wrote Mr. Wright.31
Although the worst abuses have been long curtailed, insurance companies
still profit when their customers have fewer options in monetizing their
policies. In particular, there is a direct relationship between lapse rate and
profitability, and an inverse relationship between lapse rate and credit
availability.
Insurance companies will ordinarily lend up to the surrender value
of the policy, but no further. They may choose not to lend at all if the state
statute does not require it.32 An insured that is unable to get a policy loan


31

Wayne M. Gazur, Death and Taxes: The Taxation of Accelerated Death
Benefits for the Terminally Ill, 11 VA. TAX REV. 263, 273 (1991), citing ALBERT
W. ATWOOD, THE GREAT STEWARDSHIP 75 (1945).
32
5 PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 80:4 (3d. ed. 2005) (insureds right
to loan may be conditioned on having paid premiums on time for a prescribed
period of months or years); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 142(2) (1998)
(stating that “[a]fter premiums have been paid for at least three full years on any
policy of life insurance issued or delivered in the commonwealth by any life
company, the holder thereof, upon written application therefore to the company at
its home office and upon an assignment of the policy to the company, in a form
satisfactory to it, shall be entitled to a loan from the company of a sum not
exceeding its loan value, on the sole security of the policy.”); N.Y. INSURANCE
LAW § 3203(8)(A) (McKinney 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3915.05(G)
(LexisNexis 2010); Del Rio v. Prudential Ins. Co., 199 N.E. 32, 34 (1935) (insurer
was compelled to comply with a statute requiring the making of a loan after three
full years of premiums had been paid by insured); Umstattd v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 110 S.W.2d 342, 350 (1937); Gray v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 88,
156 S.W.2d 391, 393 (1941) (insured required to have paid a certain amount before
being eligible for policy loan); 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 354 (2007).
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sufficient to cover her premiums may surrender her policy or allow it to
lapse.
Insurance companies build a rate of lapse into their business
33
models. They assume that some insureds will stop paying the premiums
rather than wait to collect the full maturity sum, even when the maturity
amount is substantially greater than the premiums probably required to
service the policy. If insureds could borrow up to the true value of their
policy at a competitive rate, they could pay their premiums on credit and
avoid lapse, or borrow against their policies rather than use the surrender
option.
Primary markets for insurance products are largely competitive,34
so initial surrender prices should be actuarially fair at the time a consumer
begins coverage. Even without laws forbidding the abusive practices Gazur
reported, insurance companies have an incentive to offer ex ante reasonable
surrender options because it is one feature consumers may compare as they
decide which policy to select. Customers will pay less for an insurance
policy if they think that it will be subject to unfair borrowing or surrender
terms.
However insurers have no ex post incentive to update the surrender
value to become actuarially fair.35 The contract has been signed, and the
competitive pressure is gone. In particular an insurance company is
unlikely to improve the surrender or borrowing terms if an individual learns
that her health prospects have worsened.
Poor health means that the insurance contract is likely to pay
sooner than initially expected. Consequently, the insurance policy becomes
more valuable. The insured, now having a shorter life span than was
predicted by the insurer’s initial models, will pay fewer premiums and wait
a shorter time before her estate can collect. But this is true only if she holds
the policy until maturity. No extra value is realized if she surrenders the
policy or allows the policy to lapse.
If the surrender value represents the amount of money needed to
pay the maturity sum in the future, and the maturity date has moved sooner,
the surrender value should increase. But the insurance contract generally do


33

DOMINIQUE LEBEL, TOWERS PERRIN TILLINGHAST, PRESENTATION AT
SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES ANNUAL MEETING: PRICING LAPSE-SUPPORTED
PRODUCTS/LAPSE-SENSITIVE PRODUCTS (Oct. 16, 2006) (A lapse-supported
product is “a product where there would be a material decrease in profitability if, in
the pricing calculation, the ultimate lapse rates were set to zero (assuming all other
pricing parameters remain the same).”).
34
Doherty & Singer, supra note 1, at 468.
35
Id. at 462.
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not require such an increase, and insurance companies do not gratuitously
do so. Surrender values are generally not updated for new health
information, so they will remain low.
In the same way, if the insured wishes to borrow against the value
of the policy, the insurance company will lend an amount, and at an interest
rate, that reflects the initial contracting conditions. There will be no effort
to compensate for the changed health conditions of the insured. Policy
provisions36 and state statutes37 typically recognize no surrender value for
term life insurance against which to borrow, even if the insured is likely to
die within a year or two, and receive far more than the concomitant
premiums could ever equal. Insurance companies exploit these individuals
by offering loans with unnecessarily low credit limits and comparatively
unattractive terms, and so encourage lapse.
Third parties may be willing to lend greater amounts and at lower
rates, reflecting the updated longevity risk upon yield. In the short run,
competition from third-party lenders will give better options to insureds. In
the long run, competition will cause issuer insurance companies to issue
policies that more closely track the updated longevity of consumers,
granting greater and better ex post surrender values and borrowing terms to
consumers.38 In particular, consumers with the worst adverse health
conditions and least ability to service their premiums will be most helped
by increased competition in this market.
The outstanding value of life insurance policy loans in the US in
2009 exceeded $121 billion.39 The vast majority of these loans had no
serious competition, and it is reasonable to believe that more competition
among lenders would improve the secondary market. There are perhaps
$100 billion worth of impaired policies.40 Almost $12 billion of policy face
values were sold to investors in 2008, a number which could easily grow to


36

Francis v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 223 So. 2d 188, 192 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1969), application denied, 254 La. 781, 226 So. 2d 771 (1969).
37
See ALASKA STAT. § 21.45.080(b) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201209(B) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2911(c) (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 3325-3(12)(b) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2510(2) (2000); MONT.
CODE. ANN. § 33-20-131(2) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 688A.110(1)
(LexisNexis 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:25-8 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. §
743.186(4) (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-63-220(l) (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §
3731(7)(J) (2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-13-8(b) (LexisNexis 2006).
38
Doherty & Singer, supra note 1, at 472.
39
FED. RES., supra note 3, at 32.
40
Doherty & Singer, supra note 1, at 452-53.
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$90-140 billion by 2016.41 Every one of these policies has a resale value
larger than its surrender value and so is eligible for a larger policy loan or a
lower rate than the insurance company would offer.42 The target market for
life settlements, the sale of an insurance policy, is anticipated to grow at
three times the total population in the coming decades.43
There are clearly an enormous number of people who may be
interested in, or well served by, loans secured by their life insurance policy.
Competition from third party lenders will improve their prospects, as will a
robust secondary market with securitized insurance-linked assets.
The insurance business has a set of terms and practices all its own,
so it is fruitful to address some terminology. A collateral assignment44 is an
assignment of the policy as collateral. The creditor has no rights in the
policy until the borrower defaults, at which time the creditor’s interest in
the pledged collateral may be used to satisfy the debt. A transfer of the
entire interest in the insurance policy to a third party will be effected
through an absolute assignment.45An absolute assignment of a life
insurance policy is the irrevocable transfer of all of the owner’s rights in
the policy, typically made in order to give the policy away or to sell it.46 An


41

Conning Research and Consulting, Inc., Life Settlements: A Buyers’ Market
for Now, Oct. 8, 2009.
42
For example, a policy with a face value of $5 million may have a surrender
value of $1 million, reflecting the statutory or contractual conditions at the time the
policy was signed. If the insured discovers that she has two years to live, she may
find that the policy has a value on the secondary market of, say, $3 million.
Someone may be willing to pay her $3 million for the right to collect $5 million
when she dies. That purchaser will pay the premiums until she dies, too. Similar
math applies to borrowing. If the insured wishes to borrow, and absent new
competition, the insurance company will lend to her as though she has $1 million
collateral – the surrender value of the policy. A third party will be willing to lend
against $3 million, recognizing a greater resale value upon which to foreclose in
case of default. The third party may be willing to lend a larger amount, or at a more
attractive rate for a loan which is recognized as oversecured.
43
KAMATH & SLEDGE, supra note 8, at 1-2; see also Matthew Goldstein, Why
Death Bonds Look so Frail, Bus. Wk., Feb. 25, 2008 (putting the market for life
settlements at about $15 billion).
44
See, e.g., Example Assignment of Life Policy to Secure and Future Debts,
10 AM. JUR. Legal Forms 2D § 149:183 (2010).
45
See, e.g., 9 CHRISTOPHER GADSEN, Estate Planning, in WEST’S
PENNSYLVANIA FORMS § 14:7 (1995).
46
MURIEL L. CRAWFORD & WILLIAM T. BEADLES, LAW AND THE LIFE
INSURANCE CONTRACT 356 (6th ed. 1989).
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absolute assignment can also be used to secure a loan.47 A party may sign
an absolute assignment in favor of a lender, but the lender does not
presently gain the rights and privileges of ownership, nor will the lender
simply come to own the policy upon default by the borrower. A court will
treat the absolute assignment in form as a collateral assignment.
B. TOWARDS A THRIVING SECONDARY MARKET
Creditors will more readily lend against insurance policies if they
are able to efficiently dispose of policies upon default.48 If a dependable
legal framework is provided, the secondary market for insurance policies
should thrive and dramatically improve borrowing opportunities for
insureds.49 Arguments for robust secondary markets may seem naïve given
the unfolding of the financial crisis,50 nonetheless, it is generally accepted
that secondary markets in assets tend to raise the value of those assets.
Generally, a vibrant secondary market increases demand for
qualifying policies, conferring greater surplus to the seller or borrower
consumers. This is for three reasons. First, secondary markets allow
investors to sell their investments prior to maturity. Increased liquidity
attracts a much greater pool of investors with shorter time horizons, or who
anticipate that their portfolio needs may change. Without a liquid
secondary market, fewer lenders will value insurance as collateral. Those
who accept it will demand a proportionally higher return to compensate
them for risks and opportunity costs associated with a long-term
investment.
Second, a vibrant secondary market gives rise to greater
specialization of actors. It takes specialized skills to evaluate the risks and
return associated with a given policy. Where parties find it difficult to resell



Id. at 360. 
Even those opposed to Article 9 inclusion seem to accept this statement. See
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of
UCC Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1357, 1375
n.75 (1999). Consumer groups agreed with the Drafting Committee that nonArticle 9 law had the practical effect of making credit secured by insurance
policies much less available, but they did not see this as a good thing. 
49
See, e.g., Doherty & Singer, supra note 1, at 459; see also 35 Est. Plan. 24,
24 (“The most significant innovation the life insurance industry has experienced in
recent memory has been the development of the so-called secondary market”).
50
Doherty & Singer, supra note 1, at 459 (arguing that life insurance policy
securitization and marketing will have a similarly beneficial effect in reducing risk
as does mortgage securitization in its own market). 
47
48
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a policy, they must research policies for their own long-term holdings. But
where resale is possible, a savvy investor may dedicate resources to
evaluating policies. She may invest in far more policies than she would be
comfortable holding to maturity because she anticipates selling them to
investors lacking the specialized evaluating skills.51 More policies will be
funded and better investment research skills will be developed in a
specialized market with liquid secondary sales. Lenders may lend more on
insurance than they otherwise would, knowing that they will not have to
hold collateral to maturity.
Third, vibrant markets lead to price discovery, which allows nonspeculators to be comfortable investing in a given asset class. Fourth,
where policies are liberally sold and resold, they can be combined,
bundled, and securitized in a way that reduces risk. The benefits of
investing in pools, rather than in their individual underlying assets, are well
known. 52


51

It is also true that some investors may dedicate less resources to evaluating
assets when they know that they will be passed onto to less specialized secondary
purchasers. That is one key cause of the present financial crisis. Too many
investors or lenders allowed their internal controls to lapse because they knew that
they would not bear the costs of their errors, and too many secondary purchasers
trusted ratings agencies or bond insurers. However, the above point about the raise
of specialized investment evaluation skills remains valid. If it costs $10 to develop
a method for determining whether investment X is $1 more profitable than
investment Y, or vice versa, then few companies will develop that method. But if a
company can the sell their interest in X or Y to a third party, and then use the
proceeds to buy either X2 or Y2, that company can use the method again. The
more iterations, the greater the return on the knowledge investment. Capital is
better allocated when companies profitably invest in vetting and evaluation
methods. Doubtless, many companies failed to adequately evaluate the viability of
many subprime, exotic, or complex assets. But the few that did evaluate, and the
many more that could have, did so because of technology that only made sense in a
securitized market where primary investors didn’t have to buy and hold.
52
See LIFE SETTLEMENTS TASK FORCE, STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 6 (2010) (“the majority of investors in
today’s life settlements market are large institutional investors looking to acquire
pools of policies”). The benefits of pooled investments accrue only if the risks of
individual assets are not highly positively correlated. Pooled life insurance policies
will generally meet this condition. Mortality rates generally do not rise and fall in
tandem for geographically spread policy holders. The possibility for pooling is one
of the major enablers of an insurance industry. If one individual’s death was
strongly positively correlated with many other individuals, insurance companies
would not be able to reduce risk by holding a large portfolio.
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There is a growing interest in assets that have no correlation with
market forces,53 so secondary markets would serve a legitimate economic
need of investors who seek to hedge. Investors seeking a strong yield
without strong market exposure should find life insurance policies a
potentially attractive asset class. Major institutional investors like UBS,
Merrill Lynch, Citibank54 and Berkshire Hathaway55 have already entered
this market. Investors have always been able to gain partial exposure to this
asset by investing in insurance companies. But such investments are not
ideal for hedging because the risk is affected by the management of, and
investment portfolio held by, a particular insurance company. Moreover,
since beneficiary payments under life insurance policies constitute a
liability to insurance companies, the corresponding bet is actually to short
the insurance company.
There are risks to these assets. Investors in insurance policies
through intermediaries must trust that the company is truly investing their
money in assignments of life insurance policies. Not all such companies are
scrupulous agents for their investors. Some hide behind the opacity of their
investment to squirrel away funds.56 If investors are not to be disappointed
here as they were with housing securities, these securities must be
appropriately marketed and regulated. And securitized life insurance assets
are not immune to whatever forces precipitated the current financial


53

Id. (“Institutional investors reportedly view life settlements as an alternative
asset class that is not correlated to traditional asset classes because returns
principally are based on the death rates of the insured individuals rather than the
performance of financial instruments or the overall economy. Diversification to
uncorrelated assets is especially attractive to investors during periods of
unfavorable economic conditions”); see also Matthew Goldstein, Profiting from
Mortality, BUS. WK., July 30, 2007, at 44; Sam Rosenfeld, Life Settlements:
Signposts to a Principal Asset Class (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No.
09-20, 2009), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/09/0920.pdf.
54
See Harold G. Ingraham, Jr. & Sergio S. Salani, Life Settlements as a Viable
Option, J. FIN. SERV. PROFS. 72, 75 (2004). But see Matthew Goldstein, Goldman
Retreats from Life Settlements, REUTERS.COM, Dec. 18, 2009 2:27 PM EST,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1823436220091218
(“life
settlement
derivatives appears [sic] to be a casualty of the worst financial crisis since the
Great Depression”). 
55
John Hoogesteger, Berkshire Unit Lends $400M to Startup,
MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL BUS. J. (Feb. 3, 2002, 11 PM CST), available at
http://twincities.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2002/02/04/story1.html. 
56
PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 516, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)
(PCO executives converted all $89 million intended for viatical investment).
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crisis.57 But risks are no greater here than in any other area, and whichever
financial reforms are attempted will succeed or fail for securitization here
as elsewhere.58 Moreover, some of the most potentially worrying products
have been cancelled due to market forces.59
It should be clear that secondary markets in insurance increase the
demand for third-party creditors to lend to customer borrowers. It should
also be clear that this increased demand is to the benefit of borrowers.
What follows is an explanation of the current law of insurance-secured
financing. It will be shown that the law is confused and antiquated, and the
most logical reform proposal will virtuously liberalize the market for loans
as well.
II. WHERE EXCLUSION LEAVES INSURANCE
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs almost all
security interests transactions in all US jurisdictions. Although it is
preempted by any inconsistent state laws,60 most states have redacted any
prior inconsistent laws. The Code’s merits are well-recited and have only
grown as more states and more transactions have come under its scope.
Article 9, in particular, rationalized and reformed a truly confusing area of
the law.
As mentioned before, Article 9 excludes interests in and
assignments of insurance policies from its scope.61 Nearly every state


57

See, e.g., Rep. Collin C. Peterson Holds a Hearing on the Over-the-Counter
Derivatives Market: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong.
(2009) (Rep. Boswell asking, “does this securitization of life settlements not only
add another element of possible risk to an industry that is already in need of more
transparency and consumer safeguard, but is it something you -- we should even
allow?”).
58
The author acknowledges the intuitive worry that derivatives in the
insurance space have a worrying resonance to the fact that AIG’s non-insurance
activities threatened their core insurance business, and indeed, the entire economy.
However, the analogy should be resisted, owing to the difference between
securitization of insurance products, and securitization of non-insurance products
by insurance companies. 
59
Goldstein, supra note 53 (“The Wall Street company once had big plans to
sell derivatives pegged to the index [which tracks the life expectancy of a group of
people who have sold their life insurance policies to an investment pool] to
investors seeking exposure to the estimated $15 billion life settlements market.”). 
60
U.C.C. § 9-109(c)(1)-(3) (2011).
61
U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(8) (2011). But see CAL. COM. CODE § 9109 (Deering
2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(d)(8) (2011). Of course, there is an ad hoc
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follows the UCC in excluding insurance policies from their secured
transactions statute.62 Where a lien or assignment is not covered by the
UCC, the court must decide which other body of law to apply.
It would be natural to look to whichever statute governed security
interests before the UCC, but this is generally incorrect. Having adopted
the Uniform Commercial Code, many states repealed the statutes governing
chattel mortgages and pledges that had previously also governed interests
in, and assignments of, insurance policies. This repeal leaves something of
a statutory void for assignments of life insurance policies.63
For example, pre-code chattel security in Illinois came in through
six devices: the pledge, the chattel mortgage, the conditional sale, the trust
receipt, accounts receivable financing, and the factor’s lien in favor of
wholesalers.64 By 1962, all but one had been eliminated. The conditional
sale was a creature of the Uniform Sales Act,65 which was repealed
following the adoption of the UCC.66 The Uniform Trust Receipt Act was
repealed following the adoption of the UCC,67 as was the validating statute
for accounts receivable financing,68 chattel mortgages,69 and the factor’s
lien in favor of wholesalers.70 Only the common law pledge remained.
Similar stories can be told of every other state.71
The little statutory law that remains is not particularly appropriate
to insurance policy liens. For example, some states have reserved a


exception for health-care insurance receivables, see id., but this hardly relevant.
Moreover the code does not exclude the proceeds of insurance policies from its
scope. Id. at §§ 10:9-109, -315, -322. But this inclusion is meant to allow secured
parties whose collateral is destroyed to maintain their interest in the subsequent
insurance money. See Coogan, supra note 6, at 515.
62
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1091(4)(g) (LexisNexis 2011). 
63
See, e.g., ME. PUB. L. of 1963, c. 362 (1963).
64
2B Daniel R. Murray et al., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE WITH ILLINOIS
CODE COMMENTS 9 (2010 ed., 2010). 
65
Id.
66
810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-102 (2011) (repealing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121
1/2, ¶ 1 et seq.).
67
Id. (repealing ILL. REV. STAT. 121 1/2, ¶ 166 et seq.).
68
Id. (repealing ILL. REV. STAT. 121 1/2, ¶ 220 et seq.).
69
Id. (repealing ILL. REV. STAT. 95, ¶¶ 26-27).
70
Id. (repealing ILL. REV. STAT. 82, ¶ 102 et seq.).
71
See, e.g., 12A PA. STAT. ANN. § 10-102 (1953) (repealing Uniform
Conditional Sales Act, 69 PA. STAT. ANN. § 361 et seq. (1931); Uniform Trust
Receipts Act; 68 PA. STAT. ANN. § 551 et seq. (1953); a general chattel mortgage
statute, 21 PA. STAT. ANN. § 940.1 et seq. (1953); and a factor’s lien act, 6 PA.
STAT. ANN. § 221 et seq. (1953)).
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banker’s lien that gives bank loans a general lien on all assets.72 There are
cases in which this might accomplish the desired effect of allowing an
individual to borrow against her insurance policy, but it is a cumbersome
way to organize a loan. It may be better to say that there remains no
statutory law that directly governs insurance liens and assignments. Thus,
to a great degree, the governing pre-Code law is not just pre-Code statutory
law, but pre-statutory common law.73
Not only does this deny the insurance policy transactions the
benefits afforded by the UCC, it also forces insurance-based lending to rely
on law that has languished in isolation from growing case law and
reforming trends. Article 9 explains itself with nearly syllogistic clarity.74
Where clarification is required, the centralization of uniform law has
encouraged a comprehensive scholarly treatment that explores, reconciles,
and renews the law.75 No such commentary fixes similar attention to niche
subject of state-by-state case law on insurance-linked finance transactions.
The possibility of this problem was not lost on the Commenters for
the 1972 Article 9. Professor Peter Coogan, Consultant to the Review
Committee for Article 9, discussing the effect of the exclusion of bank
deposit accounts from Article 9 explained how “[t]his illustrates one of the
problems with respect to the exclusions generally, of section 9-104.”76 He


72

CAL. CIV. CODE § 3054 (Deering 2010); DuBrutz v. Bank of Visalia, 87 P.
467, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1906) (bank surrenders life insurance policy). Note,
however, that California transactions do not need to resort to these sorts of statutes,
since California’s Article 9 does not exclude life insurance loans. This example is
provided only illustratively.
73
Law Research Serv., Inc. v. Martin Lutz App. Printers, Inc., 498 F.2d 836,
840 (2d Cir. 1974).
74
See Timothy R. Zinnecker, Socrates, Syllogisms, and Sadistic Transactions:
Challenges to Mastering U.C.C. Article 9 Through Deductive Reasoning, 13 CHAP.
L. REV. 97, 136 (2009).
75
See, e.g., Bender UCC REPORTER-DIGEST; THE ABCS OF THE UCC
(American Bar Association); LARY LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE (WEST); HAWKLAND ET AL., HAWKLAND’S UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES (West); THOMAS M. QUINN, QUINN'S UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST (West); BRADFORD STONE &
KRISTEN DAVID ADAMS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN A NUTSHELL (West);
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(HORNBOOK SERIES) (West); UCC L.J.; Margit Livingston, Survey of Cases
Decided Under Revised Article 9: There's Not Much New Under the Sun., 2
DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 47 (2003) (surveying case law developments).
76
Program, Impact of 1972 Revisions On Secured Financing Transactions
Under UCC Article 9, 33 BUS. LAW. 2491, 2532 (1978).
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goes on to say “we have the awful problem that part of this was statutory
and those statutes have all been repealed, like the chattel mortgage, the
assignment of contracts, all that stuff, has been repealed, so that you go to
the pre-pre-statutes, and sometimes you cannot find it.”77
The insurance policy exception never enjoyed enthusiastic support
from the drafters of the UCC. The written reflections of the Reporters
indicate neither serious policy commitments to this exclusion, or even a
concerted industry opposition to its inclusion. Relatively mild opposition
from the insurance industry was persuasive in light of the Reporters’ sense
that this exclusion simplified the drafting process. Even taking that
conclusion for granted, the Reporters expressed reservations about
extending the insurance exclusion to third party interests as well as issuer
policy loans.
The problems with all exclusions are the same: the most recent
statutes were repealed in conjunction with the adoption of a new uniform
code. Article 9 does not apply to the excluded items, so they are orphans
left in the care of truly ancient law.
Professor Coogan asked Bill Davenport, General Counsel for First
Bank of Chicago, about the law applicable to bank deposit accounts, and
Davenport’s reply centered on case law so old that Coogan interrupted,
“We are now including a generation-some people may be of a generation
that does not remember [the case]. Would you just explain it.”78 An
exclusion from Article 9 does not just freeze the applicable law as that of
the early 1960’s. Exclusion kicks life insurance policies back a hundred
years to the common law operative before any legislative reforms at all.79
There was some hope among the drafters of Article 9 that the
common law on insurance pledges would come to resemble the Article 9
law and thus “the exclusion would be more formal than real.”80 Like so



Id. at 2533.
Id. at 2532 (discussing Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925) and prior,
related Illinois case law).
79
Despite the obvious problems with reverting to the law of substantially
different times, this is only one of many examples of the general phenomenon. See,
e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Colonialism without Colonies: On the Extraterritorial
Jurisprudence of the U.S. Court for China, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 223
(2008) (the U.S. Court for China, from 1906 to 1943, “was called on to ‘ascertain
the common or unwritten law in force in the colonies prior to the Declaration of
Independence and then to attempt to apply it to modern conditions in China’. . . .”)
(quoting a Shanghai lawyer).
80
1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 315
(photo. reprint 1999) (1965).
77
78
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many theories of legal convergence, that hope has not materialized.81 As a
result, the applicable common law remains splintered, inconsistent,
irregular, and generally ill-suited to the demands of modern finance.82 It
has failed to improve because all the other pledges and assignments were
plucked away to develop case law under the UCC.
The distance between growing UCC law and languishing non-UCC
laws leads to the distressing possibility that cross-jurisdiction transactions
might implicate different security rules. The Reporters acknowledged this
ambiguity under currently law:
It would be odd if a designation of applicable law by a
debtor and secured party were to control some of these
matters. Consider an example that may arise under current
law. Former 9-318(4) makes ineffective terms in certain
contracts that restrict assignments of the right to payment
under the contracts. Under California’s nonuniform
version of Article 9, security interests in most insurance
policies are within the scope of the article. Under New
York’s (and most states’) version, security interests in
insurance policies are excluded. If an insurance policy
provides that it is governed by the law of New York, it
would seems [sic] appropriate for New York’s law to
determine whether a term restricting assignment of the
policy is effective. Since New York’s Article 9 does not
cover an assignment of the policy, New York’s 9-318
would not appear to render ineffective the restriction on
assignment. Now assume that the owner of the policy, a
California resident, assigns it as security to a California
bank, and the security agreement provides that it is
governed by the law of California. Does California’s 9318(4) then render the restriction in the policy ineffective?


81

One of federalism’s early indulgences was the notion that federal common
law would come to influence and unify the various state common laws. But see
Erie R.R Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
82
Karl Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 687, 688 (1948) (the Chief Reporter for the Uniform Commercial Code
noting the inefficiencies created by the hodgepodge of older commercial laws:
"What is not minor is the price in complexity, inconvenience, and often in
unfairness which must be paid when legal patterns of happenstance origin are
taken in all their history-ridden detail as the basis for the doing of remodeling jobs
which are themselves piece-work”).
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We are inclined to think it should not, but the answer is
uncertain.83
Unheard of in other areas, conflicting security rules from state to state are
a reality for lawyers practicing law in this area. These issues would
evaporate if all policies were governed by the UCC,84 but because they are
not, life insurance policies remain tangled in the interstate conflicts of law
problems of a bygone era. The confusion and antiquation of that era gives
rise to three problems, each of which serves to frustrate those third party
lending, and secondary market trading, that would benefit consumers.
A. THE PERFECTION PROBLEM
The perfection problem refers to the difficulty in finding a rational,
coherent, and clear perfection equivalent in non-UCC law.85 Strictly
speaking, it is impossible for any party to perfect an interest in a life
insurance policy. This is because perfection is a concept introduced by the
UCC, but the UCC excludes life insurance policies from coverage. One
wishes that under the non-UCC regime, similar procedures could achieve
perfection’s goal: allowing parties to discover prior liens, and then establish
their own priority in a durable and just manner. However, conflicts
amongst assignees are common and messy under the non-Article 9 regimes.
This is because the law governing priority is not as firmly established as
might be inferred from industry practice. Subparts (1)-(3) show the places
where industry consensus lacks doctrinal support.
Moreover, even if accepted that non-UCC law speaks coherently
and with adequate approval of industry practice, industry practice remains
unjust and inefficient. Subpart (4) explains the public policy problems with
the status quo practice. The perfection problem thus indicates the gulf
between non-UCC reality and the clear and efficient perfection parties have
come to expect through Article 9. Under the UCC, notification would
follow the method of any general intangible: attachment plus notification.
With attachment plus notification, the problems of secret liens, private
notification, and doctrinal uncertainty would be much reduced. The status


83

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE art. 9, pt. 4: RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES
(Proposed Official Draft, Oct. 1996).
84
U.C.C. § 9-301 (1999). 
85
Other commentators have noticed the perfection problem in the past, though
none have used that title. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 959;
Knippenberg, supra note 11.
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quo exacerbates problems in a context of uncertainty by over-valuing
notification to insurers and under-valuing public notification.
1. Notice to Insurance Company
Industry practice is to assume that priority of security goes to the
assignee that first provides notice to the insurance company. Although
there is some doctrinal support for this state of affairs,86 the importance of
insurer notification is not always dispositive at common law.
Requirements of notice are for the benefit of insurance
companies.87 Courts often emphasize that the notice requirement is part of
the contract between the insured and the insurer, and cannot affect the
rights of third parties, such as the assignee.88 Thus, courts adjudicating
between non-insurer assignees often ignore notice to insurance companies,
deciding the case on other factors.89
A substantial minority rule allows priority to the first assignee,
regardless of notice to the insurer.90 This minority rule was recently


86

Patten v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 6 S.E.2d 26 (S.C. 1939); Richards v.
Griggs, 16 Mo. 416 (1852); Murdoch & Dickson v. Finney, 21 Mo. 138 (1855);
Houser v. Richardson, 90 Mo. App. 134 (1901); Klebba v. Struempf, 23 S.W.2d
205 (Mo. App. 1930).
87
See Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Mitchell, 248 Ill. App. 401, 404 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1927) (“It has been repeatedly held that provisions of a life insurance
policy requiring notice of an assignment to be given to the company are for the
benefit of the company and it alone may complain or object because of a failure to
comply with the terms of the policy.”). Note that this demonstrates an important
difference between UCC and non-UCC treatment of insurance companies. Notice
under the UCC is for the benefit of all creditors and potential creditors, not for the
benefit of one creditor or the notified party. 
88
See, e.g., Allhusen v. Caristo Const. Corp., 103 N.E.2d 891, 892 (N.Y.
1952); Herman v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 105 N.E. 450, 451 (Mass. 1914).
89
See Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City Nat’l. Bank, 95 F. Supp. 276, 282
(N.D. W. Va. 1950) (first-in-time assignee has priority). See also Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. Moore, 14 S.E.2d 307, 310 (Va. Ct. App. 1941) (case determined
on intent of the assignor). 
90
Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City Nat’l Bank, 95 F. Supp. 276, 282 (N.D.
W. Va. 1950); see also In re Leterman, Becher & Co., 260 F. 543, 547 (2d Cir.
1919); Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 212 N.Y.S. 473, 475 (N.Y. App. Div.
1925) (“By the first assignment, the rights of the assignor pass to the assignee . . . .
Notice of the assignment to the debtor adds nothing to the right or title
transferred.”). The insurance company should correspond to the “debtor” in each of
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affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rose v.
AmSouth Bank of Florida.91 There, the court overruled the district court’s
ruling that New York law required insurer notification in order for an
assignment to be valid against a subsequent assignee. Thus, the newest and
clearest ruling on priority gives the interest in an insurance policy to the
earliest assignee, rather than earliest notifying assignee, in contradiction of
industry practice.
2. Possession
The legal significance of possession of the original life insurance
policy is treated inconsistently. As a matter of commercial practice, life
insurance companies do not attribute legal significance to possession of a
sole “original” policy.92 Additionally, the requirement of possession is not
practical for interests in group life insurance policies.93
Nevertheless, insurance policies are choses in action at common
law,94 and the common law pledge provides a mechanism for perfecting an
interest in an insurance policy by possession.95 Until the early nineteenth
century, the only way to create a valid security interest in personal property


those cases. An assignee was due proceeds and assigned them twice, similar to an
insured who assigned the policy twice.
91
Rose v. AmSouth Bank, 391 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Salem Trust
Co. v. Manufacturers’ Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182, 198 (1924)) (noting that the
Salem court—which ruled on the basis of then-extant federal common law, and on
which the district court relied—specifically commented that under New York Law
the earlier assignee would have prevailed, notwithstanding its failure to take
possession or provide notice).
92
Louisiana Official Revision Comments to R.S. – 2001, § 10:9-107.1(b),
revised, 2004 (c) 2008.
93
James Stuckey, Lousiana’s Non-Uniform Variations in U.C.C. Chapter 9,
62 LA. L. REV. 793, 813 (2002). 
94
Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Langreder, 87 F.2d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1937);
U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 103 Ill. 305, 312 (Ill. 1882); Considine v. Considine,
7 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1938); Coleman v. Anderson, 82 S.W. 1057 (Tex. Civ. App.
1904), aff’d, 86 S.W. 730 (Tex. 1905).
95
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF SECURITY § 1 cmt. a (1941) (“Where a chose in
action is represented by an indispensable instrument, whether negotiable or nonnegotiable, the chose in action may be pledged.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
SECURITY § 1 cmt. e (1941) (“Indispensable instruments include . . . insurance
policies.”).
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was through physical possession by the pledgee.96 Non-possessory security
interests were presumptively fraudulent.97 Non-possessory security
interests found greater expression and acceptance in later years, but
development was neither linear nor logical. Rather, the “the law of personal
property security transactions [had come] to resemble the obscure wood in
which Dante once discovered the gates of hell.”98
There is substantial authority that assignments of insurance policies
may be perfected by physical delivery of the policy.99 In a case concerning
unearned premiums on a life insurance policy, the bankruptcy court
determined that Maine common law requires possession of the collateral as
prerequisite to the enforceability against third parties of pledge of
intangibles, and that “[A] pledge of insurance policies requires that the
pledgee maintain physical possession of the policies.”100 This result is by
no means unique.101 Some decisions have even specified that no written
assignment is necessary where the policy is delivered.102


96

Peter F. Coogan, Article 9 – An Agenda for the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J.
1012 (1978). See, e.g., Silverman v. McGrath, 10 Ill. App. 413 (1882) (possession
essential to a valid pledge); W.W. Kimball Co. v. Polakow, 190 Ill. App. 174
(1914) (At common law, all pledges of personal property void unless title and
possession went to pledgee.). 
97
See Griffen v. Henry, 99 Ill. App. 284 (1901) (At common law, transaction
was fraudulent per se and incapable of explanation where pledgor retained
possession.). See also Coogan, supra note 96, at 1012; JAMES ANGELL
MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 255-70 (West
Publishing 1956). 
98
GILMORE, supra note 80, at 27. See generally id. at 288-90. 
99
See McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 959.
100
See In re Maplewood Poultry Co., 2 B.R. 550, 554 & n. 5 (Bankr. Me.
1980) (internal citations omitted). 
101
In re Mile Hi Restaurants, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 936 (D. Colo. 1964); Taylor
v. S. Bank & Trust Co., 151 So. 357 (Ala. 1933) (life insurance policy); Puckhaber
v. Henry, 93 P. 114 (Cal. 1907) (assignment and delivery of life policy); Collins v.
Dawley, 4 Colo. 138 (1878) (life insurance policy); Helms v. First Nat. Bank, 28
So.2d 262 (Fla. 1946) (by implication; life insurance); Equitable Life Ins. Co. v.
Mitchell, 248 Ill. App. 401 (1927) (life insurance policy); Embry's Adm’r v.
Harris, 52 S.W. 958 (Ky. 1899) (life policy); Arrowood v. Duff, 152 S.W.2d 291
(Ky. 1941) (life insurance policy); Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45 So. 959
(La. 1908) (life insurance; dictum); Foote v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 173 So. 477 (La.
Ct. App. 1937) (dictum; life insurance policy); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Allen, 235 Mass. 187 (1920) (life insurance policy); Detroit Life Ins. Co. v.
Linsenmier, 217 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1928) (life policy); Palmer v. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
130 N.W. 250 (Minn. 1911) (life policy); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sheehan, 133
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This raises the troublesome possibility that security interest in life
insurance policies might be perfected by possession without notification.103
The common law pledge existed in every state prior to the Uniform
Commercial Code.104 While Article 9 controls formerly-pledged
transactions of other kinds, the life insurance carve-out puts these policies
squarely within the case law that has always governed pledges. As a result,
this case law has given great importance to physical possession of policies.
It should provide no comfort to note that not all jurisdictions follow
this rule, with some vindicating the industry practice of disregarding
physical possession.105 Opportunities for confusion and conflict abound.
Physical possession may matter in one state, but not in another, such that
the perfection regime is ruefully diverse.
Not only do jurisdictions differ from one another, intrajurisdictional variation is also substantial. It is often difficult to disentangle
judicial decisions interpreting the common law of pledges rather than the
statutory pledge act of a given state – only the latter being repealed in many
of the states that have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. The
portions of those decisions that interpret the common law, and the cases so


S.W.2d 1060 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939) (life insurance policy; no formal or written
assignment necessary); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Phillips, 68 A.2d 574, (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949) (by implication; life policy); MacQueen v. Dollar Sav.
Bank Co., 15 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1938) (life insurance, pledged by deposit without
written assignment); Woofter v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 78 P.2d 683 (Okla. 1938)
(insurance policy and benefit certificate); Page v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 11 Tenn.
App. 417 (1929) (life insurance policy); Sun Life Assur. Co. v.Weyen, 136 F.
Supp. 592 (D.C. Wash. 1955); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of
California, 60 P.2d 675 (Wa. 1936) (life policy). See 5 RUSS ET AL, COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 37:47 (3d ed. 2008).
102
See In re Bickford's Estate, 38 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1942) (no written assignment
necessary where policy is delivered); Woofter v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 78 P.2d 683
(Okla. 1938) (pledge did not require written assignment).
103
Shanklin v. Madison County, 21 Ohio St. 575 (1871) (A chose in action
may be equitably assigned without any written transfer). See also RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF SECURITY § 1, cmt. (e) (1941) (defining an insurance policy as an
“indispensable instrument,” an interest in which may secured by possession).
104
See 1 GILMORE, supra note 80, § 14.1.
105
See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Haack, 50 F. Supp. 55, 63-64 (W.D. La. 1943)
(stating that an insurance policy cannot be pledged by possession); Commercial
Nat’l. Bank v. Chapman, 206 F.2d 349, 349-51 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding that a
statute authorizing pledge by delivery without assignment was ineffective, so
creditor took no rights against beneficiaries of the policy).
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distant in time as to predate those repealed statutes, make an uneven sample
from which to rediscover the common law of choses.
3. Notification to Third Parties
Industry practice has it that insurers have no general duty of
notification to any actual or potential creditor, and the common law agrees
to some extent. As a result, important information may not be shared, to the
frustration of many parties.
It is clear that subsequent assignees have no right to the
information they need to determine whether their interest is
subordinated.106 The insurer has no general duty to notify assignees that the
insured has discontinued premium payments.107 Thus, an assignee may
become an unsecured creditor when she finds that the insurance policy has
lapsed for want of payment.
For this reason, it is generally incumbent upon assignees to
diligently request information from policy issuers and, when necessary, pay
premiums for the policies. But some statutes differ, reducing interjurisdictional uniformity and putting a burden on the issuing insurer.108
Moreover, actions or representations by the insurer may give rise to
estoppel,109 and the insurer’s knowledge of the terms of the assignment has
given rise to liability.110 Thus, “[t]he outcome in the lapse cases is by no
means a certitude either for the assignee or the insurer.”111 It becomes a



See discussion infra Part A.4.
See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 407 F.2d 1295, 1300-01 (5th
Cir. 1969); Sorenson v. Nat’l. Life Ins. Co., 201 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Wis. 1972);
Lewis State Bank v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 1344, 1346-48 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 74 S.W. 1066, 1070
(Ky. 1903).
108
See CAL. INS. CODE § 10173.2 (West 2005) (stating that notice is required);
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/234 (West 2000) (stating that notice is required);
N.Y. INS. LAW § 3211 (McKinney 2006) (stating that assignment may call for
notice that premiums are due).
109
Missouri Cattle Loan Co. v. Great S. Life Ins. Co., 52 S.W.2d 1, 10-11
(Mo. 1932) (holding that assignee relied on insurer’s promise to provide notice if
premiums were due).
110
Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 514, 517-23 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986) (the court looked to the contract of assignment and the policy
assigned to determine whether the insurer was obliged to provide notice to
assignee).
111
Knippenberg, supra note 11, at 7.
106
107
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complicated matter to determine which right of notice a secured party may
expect.
4. Public Policy
As described above, in subsection 1, industry practice assumes
priority is determined through a race-notification regime. Moreover, it is a
race to notify the insurance company, not the Secretary of State, as it would
be under the UCC. Even if this were as well-founded in law as it is in
practice, it is doubtful that this expresses defensible policy.112 Insurance
company notification constitutes a non-public system of filing, and it is
plagued by those problems endemic to non-public systems of security
interests.
Where insurers have received a notice of assignment, there is no
assurance that other creditors will be similarly notified. Insurance company
records are proprietary, private records. Even where insurers are required to
give notice to assignees of premium non-payment, insurers are under no
obligation to notify subsequent assignees of prior policy assignments, nor
even to respond to information requests by creditors.113
There is no reliable mechanism for creditors to determine whether
their claims are likely to be subordinated. A creditor who wishes to learn
about the encumbrances on a policy has no central public filing system to
consult. Indeed, an investigation with the Secretary of State of the debtor
may deceive some creditors into overestimating their security vis-à-vis a
borrower.114 Interests in life insurance policies will not be recorded there.
This multiplies the possibilities for secret liens and mischief, as
parties are induced to lend on terms implying higher degrees of security
than they may eventually receive. This leads to litigation, into which even


112

Immel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 N.E.2d 114, 117 (Ill. 1940) (“It is essential
to the prompt payment of losses that life insurance contracts be denied
negotiability, and prompt payment of losses has come to be one of the most
desirable of the attributes of such contracts. Life insurance is depended on for the
payment of estate taxes, for the education of children, for all forms of immediate
cash demands and for the very living of the family of the deceased policy-holder
pending administration . . . . [T]he companies, in good faith, may safely pay
promptly to those shown by their records to be entitled to payment.”).
113
See, e.g., Wells v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 149 Cal. Rptr. 171,
174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
114
McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 959.
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the insurance company may be drawn.115 And it ends in a reduction in
value offered to the insured. With secured lenders sliding into unsecured
status, life insurance policy interests will be traded in a market for
lemons.116 Increasingly, lenders will offer terms and interest rates
consistent with unsecured loans, rather than the preferable rate befitting
properly secured collateral.117
All of these problems multiply in the context of a securitized
secondary market for policies. Securitization requires policies that can be
combined without hindering the pool. Policies that carry litigation risks, or
the details of which are unclear because of an uncooperative issuer, will not
find an easy home. Rating agencies list legal risks and a dearth of
acceptable policies as two of the major impediments to the ratings needed
to create marketable securities out of life insurance policies.118 And the
difficulty of investigating policies creates a cost that will be paid with each
investigation – a cost that will be paid more often in a liquid secondary
market.119
Finally, it is distasteful for a private record to be maintained on the
terms of the most likely creditor. The issuer insurance company stands as a


115

See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bunt, 754 P.2d 993, 994-95 (Wash. 1988);
Am. W. Life Ins. Co. v. Hooker, 622 P.2d 775, 776-77 (Utah 1980); King v.
Vineyard, 477 P.2d 700, 701-03 (Okla. Civ. App. 1970); Stanfill v. Defenbach,
239 F.2d 685, 686 (9th Cir. 1957).
116
See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-94 (1970).
117
See generally James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal
Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473, 480-81 (1984); Alan Schwartz, The
Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1060-62 (1984);
Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of
Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 951-55 (1985).
118
See, e.g., WINSTON CHANG & GARY MARTUCCI, STANDARD & POOR’S,
CREDIT FAQ: UNCOVERING THE CHALLENGES IN RATING LIFE SETTLEMENT
SECURITIZATIONS, (2009); DBRS INC., METHODOLOGY – RATING U.S. LIFE
SETTLEMENT
SECURITIZATIONS,
(2008),
available
at
http://www.dbrs.com/research/218570 (follow “Rating U.S. Life Settlement
Securitizations” hyperlink under “Related Research”).
See also LIFE
SETTLEMENTS TASK FORCE, supra note 52, at 16-17 (stating that market
participants agree that ratings will be required to make viable securities); 5 RUSS &
SEGALLA, supra note 101, § 77:45.
119
LIFE SETTLEMENTS TASK FORCE, supra note 52, at 16 (stating that market
participants agree that the cost of investigating and warranting policies in the pool
against legal risks are impractical burdens).
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potential lender under the policy as a matter of state law.120 Further, the
issuer stands to profit from the lapse of a policy when the insured is unable
to obtain adequate financing. Insurance companies may face temptations to
err in favor of their role as creditor and business, rather than in their role as
a filing place for other lenders.
Even if insurance companies faithfully discharge all of their duties,
there will be an appearance of impropriety to a creditor who finds that the
private registration has not worked in his favor. Consider Rose again,121
where an assignee-plaintiff claimed to have sent written notification to the
insurer, but the insurer claimed to have no record of it. The Court of
Appeals found that plaintiff had notified the insurance company.122 And
yet, the district court had ruled for the defendant, crediting an estoppel
claim that plaintiff had not done enough to confirm that the insurance
company recorded their assignment and informed subsequent assignees.123
In another jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals could have affirmed the
district court on the matters of law and the Roses would have lost their
priority because of the insurance company’s error.
Moreover, even as the case was resolved, the subsequent assignee
may be legitimately aggrieved. They requested information from the
insurer as to prior liens and were told that there were none.124 They were
deceived as to their priority by insurance company error. Either way, the
insurance company’s error determined the rights between rival claimants.
Disappointing as this error may be, it would be scandalous if one of
the litigant creditors were the insurance company itself. As it stands,
insurance companies profit from increased lapse, and lapse increases if
creditors, aware of their precarious position with respect to non-public
filing, are discouraged from providing alternative financing. It would be far
better if the parties were to register their liens with the Secretary of State.125



5 RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 101, § 77:45.
Rose v. AmSouth Bank, 296 F. Supp. 2d 383 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d, Rose
v. AmSouth Bank of Florida, 391 F.3d 63, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2004). Though reversed,
the lower court is still instructive here because jurisdictions differ, and some follow
the priority rules of the district court. In this instance, the Court of Appeals
reversed as a matter of law because it applied New York Law. 
122
Rose, 391 F.3d at 66-67.
123
Rose, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 395.
124
Rose, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
125
Another advantage of Article 9 is that is includes provisions for many types
of errors arising from filing with the appropriate filling agency. 
120
121
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5. UCC Solution
As described above, industry practice has it that interests in
insurance policies are perfected by notification to the insurance company,
with physical possession of the policy having no legal effect. However, as
also described above, the non-UCC law provides ample examples where
the law contradicts insurance industry practice. Regardless of whether Rose
can be distinguished in one jurisdiction or another,126 the law here is a field
of brambles, much underestimated in its propensity to entangle otherwise
benign transactions. Professor Knippenberg summarizes the non-UCC law
in this way:
The long and short of it is, there are risks and costs both to
lenders seeking to secure a debt through an assignment of
life insurance, and to insurers who are driven to
interpleader actions or, not infrequently, forced to justify as
defendants the payment of proceeds to one or another of
multiple claimants. These risks and costs are of the sort
that are predictably generated where, for lack of thorough
statutory treatment, there is room left by uncertainty for
argument.127
He concludes that “the law governing assignment, then, is sufficiently
flaccid, incomplete and non-uniform to suggest insurers and assignees alike
would benefit from . . . Article 9.”128 A fundamental policy of Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code is to discourage secret liens,129 and it could
be applied here to give parties greater comfort in their security.
The UCC should be amended to remove the life insurance
exclusion and treat life insurance policy interests as general intangibles,
while still acknowledging the realities of the insurer’s special role. Issuer
loans against policies should be treated as purchase money security
interests under § 9-107. Such loans should be automatically perfected for a
period of time, and then achieve super priority if perfected through notice.
Short term financing for an insured who is late in an insurance premium
payment may never need to be filed. Nor would an insurance company be
forced to file at a moment of great inconvenience, merely because of the


Rose v. AmSouth Bank of Florida, 391 F.3d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2004). 
Knippenberg, supra note 11, at 8.
128
Id. at 9. 
129
See In re Cushman Baking, 526 F.2d 23, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1975).
126
127
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time that the insured requires a loan. But in a timely manner, all liens on a
policy must soon be disclosed. Setting a time limit for filing of liens will
ensure that potential lenders know how long they must wait in order to
discover all potential claimants.
Purchase Money Security Interest status is appropriate for two
reasons. First, it is recognition that such loans often finance premiums that
permit the continued life of the policy.130 Second, such status acknowledges
the insurers’ other statutory responsibilities. Issuing insurance companies
are required to offer policy loans by insurance statutes in most states.131
Without purchase money secured status, even a perfected security interest
could take second priority on a loan whose value had long been promised
as security to others. No party should be required by statute to lend, as a
second lien, on an over-promised asset. Of course, the power of the
insurance company to “jump the queue” with purchase money security
interest priority will upset some other creditors. But they can be expected to
protect themselves with indentures in the agreement with the borrower.
B. SURPLUS PROBLEM
The surplus problem refers to distribution of value of a defaulted
security-policy above the value of the debt. When an insured defaults on


130

See Knippenberg, supra note 11, at 232-33. See generally Kripke, supra
note 117, at 951-57 (describing how PMSI creditors enable the insured to obtain
new collateral, so they are not really disadvantaging prior creditors.); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 880-902 (1996) (generally discussing efficiency
and incentives for priority); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's
Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1947-63 (1994) (discussing "three theories and one
not so bad" in support of subordination).
131
See ALASKA STAT. § 21.45.080(a) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 201208(A), 20-1209(A) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 2911(a) (1999); GA. CODE
ANN. § 33-25-3(5) (West 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2510(1)
(2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 132 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
61A.03(g) (West 2005); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 33-20-131(1) (2009); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 44-502(8) (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 688A.110(1) (LexisNexis
2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:25-8 (West 2006); N.Y. INSURANCE LAW §
3203(8)(A) (McKinney 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3915.05(G) (LexisNexis
2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.186(1) (2009); 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 510(h) (West
1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-63-220(l) (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-1515 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3731(7) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §
48.23.080(1) (West 2010); W. VA. CODE § 33-13-8(a) (2006). See also Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724, 729 (1985).
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his debt obligations to a collateral assignee, a number of questions emerge:
(1) may the creditor exercise the surrender option of the policy to satisfy
the debt; (2) may the creditor wait until the policy matures and collect the
proceeds; (3) may the creditor sell the policy to a third party, and under
what conditions; and (3) may that third party surrender, wait to collect, or
resell? At some stage, one of these options may produce cash in excess of
the debt as of yet unsatisfied, provoking the most important question of all:
who can keep this surplus of cash above the borrower’s remaining debt?
There is a gulf between what the law permits and what is industry
practice. Generally, lenders expect to keep the surplus from the policy, or
else to sell the policy to a buyer who will someday get to keep the surplus.
The borrower often loses more than the initial bargain contemplated, and
the law generally regards surplus as the property of the borrower. Statutory
treatment is desperately required to curtail the most abusive practices
currently extant, as well as to clarify creditors’ and third parties’ rights to
the benefits of their bargains.
As with the previous section considering the perfection problem, it
makes sense to look at what third-party lenders believe and what they do.
In many cases, lenders’ actions are based on wrong assumptions, and
increase their own risks needlessly. Lenders will generally lend an amount
that falls somewhere between the policy’s surrender value and the maturity
proceeds. Lenders reason that if the insured defaults, they can surrender the
policy with no risk and satisfy the remaining debt. Or, if they have the
appetite and sufficient patience, they can pay the premiums until the policy
matures and then collect the death benefit. Or they may sell the policy on
the secondary market.
These various actions by lenders are based on their understandings
(sometimes misunderstanding) of their rights. Creditors believe they have
the right to surrender the insurance policy. Most lenders believe that they
can foreclose on their security with minimal process or protection for the
debtor and sell the policy to a third party, who takes the policy free and
clear and may receive the full proceeds.
Some lenders believe that they may keep the full balance paid by
the purchasing third party, or paid upon maturity by the insurance
company, even if it exceeds the value of the defaulted debt, with no need to
return the surplus to the debtor or beneficiaries.132 Other lenders believe it


132

This belief is perpetuated in part by the widespread practice of executing
security assignments using absolute assignment forms. Thus, the paperwork
already looks like the creditor has been given the whole policy, without regard to
specific obligations. 
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is necessary for the debtor to consent to signing over his remaining rights in
the policy, or designate the creditor as the beneficiary, and they make a
practice of obtaining this consent from the insured in satisfaction of the
debt.
Notwithstanding creditor optimism, there is substantial authority
for all of the following contrary propositions: (a) the lender may not
exercise the surrender option;133 (b) the lender may not resell the policy to a
third party;134 (c) the lender may keep the amount of the debt owed, plus
interest and premiums paid, but the borrower’s estate or beneficiaries are
due any surplus.135 Each of these precedents implies potential litigation and
impediments to insurance financing transactions.
Most crucially, (c) is well-supported and contrasts with widespread
industry practice. Industry practice has galloped ahead of the law in this
area.136 There is little legal support for the widespread practice of creditor
windfall, wherein a creditor is able to keep the surplus above the
indebtedness amount, and it smacks of exploitation.
While curtailing exploitation, some provision must be made to
allow creditors a reasonable return on their investment. The law should
make creditors’ rights clearer, and allow creditors to then charge a rate of
interest that adequately compensates them for their risk, or else clarify that
they intend to purchase the policy, surplus and all, rather than merely lend
against it.
1. Windfall From Sale
Notwithstanding industry practice, numerous courts have adopted
the view that a creditor who retains more than the amount of the
indebtedness will have been unjustly enriched.137 The clear majority


133

See, e.g., Brown v. New York Life Ins. Co., 22 F. Supp. 82, 88-89
(W.D.S.C. 1938).
134
See, e.g., Salvidge v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 191 N.W. 862, 863
(Iowa 1923); 5 RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 101, § 37:68.
135
See, e.g., Luxton v. United States, 340 F.3d 659, 653 (8th Cir. 2003);
Westchester Enters., Inc. v. Swartwout (In re Swartwout), 123 B.R. 794, 799-800
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991); Succession of Goudeau, 480 So. 2d 806, 808 (La. Ct.
App. 1985).
136
Cf. Kenneth Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents, 29 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1553, 1632 (2008) (stating that securitization has grown immensely over the
past twenty years despite shaky doctrinal foundations).
137
Albrent v. Spencer, 88 N.W.2d 333, 335-36 (Wis. 1958) (“If the amount
received is greater than the debt, there is an ‘unjust enrichment’ with liability for
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position is that a creditor-assignee may only take the remaining
indebtedness, plus expenses such as payments made to keep the policy
alive.138 Many states have statutes to this effect, patterned off of the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code.139 In the vast majority of cases, courts
construe the assignment so as to reserve to the non-creditor beneficiaries
any excess of proceeds over indebtedness.140 The burden is on the creditor
to establish what he is due under the indebtedness.141
Arguments in favor of a creditor’s right of windfall are usually
limited in their scope. For example, the assignee of a policy of insurance,
assigned by way of security, is sometimes said to occupy the same status as
the insured with respect to the rights and liabilities under that particular
policy that the insured occupied.142 In allowing a creditor to foreclose upon
and sell an insurance policy, the Florida Supreme Court’s Moon v. Williams
seems to advocate for this view:
The assignee of a policy of insurance, such as life
insurance, assigned by way of security, in general,
occupies the same status with respect to the rights and
liabilities under the policy that the insured occupied, to the


the amount exceeding the amount of the debt plus interest.”); Rattray v. Banks, 121
S.E. 516 (Ga. Ct. App. 1924); First Nat’l Bank v. Sec. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 222 S.W.
832 (Mo. 1920); Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Manthei, 189 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1945). 
138
William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Right of Creditor Beneficiary or
Assignee of Insurance Policy on Life of Debtor to Excess Proceeds Over Amount
Owed on Debt, 6 A.L.R.6th 391 § 5 (2005).
139
UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (1974) § 4.105(2) (1974) (creditor must
pay to the consumer or his or her estate all proceeds received by the creditor in
excess of the amount to which the creditor is entitled within 10 days after receipt of
the proceeds).
140
Danne, supra note 138. See, e.g., Luxton v. United States, 340 F.3d 659,
662 (8th Cir. 2003). (“[A] collateral assignment transfers only those rights
necessary to secure the assignor’s debt and extinguishes the named beneficiary’s
interest only to the extent of the assignor’s debt to the assignee.”).
141
See, e.g., Floyd v. Victory Sav. Bank, 189 S.E. 462, 467 (S.C. 1937).
142
45 C.J.S. Insurance § 757 (2007) (note, however that this passage reads in
full “The assignee of a policy of insurance, such as life insurance, assigned by way
of security, in general, occupies the same status with respect to the rights and
liabilities under the policy which the insured occupied, to the extent of the
indebtedness for which the policy was assigned as collateral.”). 
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extent of the indebtedness for which the policy was
assigned as collateral.143
The court goes on to say that the assignee may sell the policy by order of
court and that the purchaser
would stand in the position of the insured as to the right to
exercise options under the policy, and therefore would
thereby acquire the right to surrender the policy for its cash
surrender value, or make such other settlement with the
company in regard to the policy as could have been made
by the insured, had the policy not been assigned.144
Although Moon does authorize some creditor activity, the Moon court is
careful to include the limiting phrase “to the extent of the indebtedness.”145
The court does not explain what would happen if the court-ordered sale
price exceeded the indebtedness, and it cites to Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. O’Brien, a case in which the creditor’s recovery is limited by the
debtor’s indebtedness.146
A similar argument emerges from the fact that most courts have
held that a creditor, holding a policy as collateral, may surrender the policy
to the insurance company upon the insured’s default.147 An assigneecreditor has the power to terminate the contract for insurance and end any



Moon v. Williams, 135 So. 555, 557 (Fla. 1931).
Id.
145
Id. at 556.
146
52 N.W. 1012, 1013-14 (Mich. 1892) (“Creditors, however, hold only what
is necessary for their indemnity for the debt, and the representatives of the insured
will be entitled to the balance.”) . 
147
Bush v. Block, 187 S.W. 153, 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916) (Assignee of life
policy taken as security loan, which then comes into default, may convert the
policy into a paid-up policy upon notice to the insured); Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co.
v. First Nat’l Bank, 169 S.W. 1028, 1034 (Ky. 1914) (creditor to whom life policy
assigned may surrender the policy); Higgins v. Helmbold, 48 App. D.C. 50 (1918);
Bank of Idana v. Ill. Life Ins. Co., 9 P.2d 629 (Kan. 1932); McGimpsey v. Sec.
BIdg. & Loan Ass'n, 157 A. 441 (N.J. 1931); Wilson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 187 A.
251 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936); See Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Fraventhal & Schwarz,
101 S. W.2d 953, 954 (Ark. 1937).
143
144
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future growth in the policy principal. Some creditors may reason a fortiori
that power of surrender entails the existence of equal or lesser rights.148
In Citizens’ Bank v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., a bank purchased
a life insurance policy sold in foreclosure by a collateral assignee.149 The
bank sought to have itself listed as a beneficiary under the policy.150 The
court ruled for the bank, analogizing the power of appointment to the right
of surrender: “Rights with respect to loans and surrender clauses in a policy
are rights of the same nature and character as the one to change beneficiary,
and we can think of no reason why the purchaser of the policy in this case
should not enjoy the same right . . . .”151
Similarly, if the power to destroy the policy is theirs, then any
value in surplus of the surrender value persists due solely to their benign
neglect of that power. And any premiums paid from that point forward goes
to grow the principal and increase the chance that the principal will be
realized rather than the surrender value.
There is a sense in which the surplus is created through the
creditors’ actions alone and so they are entitled to it. But it proves difficult
to find a case where the surplus-taker did not acquire the policy after the
appropriate judicial sale. No such case validates the right of the creditor to
hold a maturity or resale balance in excess of the debt and costs. The most
this reasoning proves is that if a party takes the policy after court-ordered
sale, they may be able to keep whatever proceeds are later liberated – but it
says nothing about the proceeds of the judicial sale itself, which surplus
may be properly allocated to the insured.
Perhaps sensitive to unfavorable law, industry practice has it that a
creditor who is owed less than the maturity payment will persuade a
defaulted debtor to list the creditor as beneficiary on the policy and sign
away his residual rights in the insurance in satisfaction of the debt. In this
way, the creditor obtains an amount of money greater than the nominal
value of the debt and the debtor retains no rights to any residual.
The transaction then acquires the character of a wager contract,
with all the worrisome policy implications of the creditor hoping for the
early demise of the insured.152 These surplus allocations are more



ͳͶͺAccord, FRANK HERBERT, DUNE 462 (2005) (“The power to destroy a thing
is the absolute control over it”).
149
141 So. 481 (La. Ct. App. 1932).
150
Id.
151
Id. at 482. 
152
See Anthony Alt, Note, SPIN-Life Insurance Policies: A Dizzying Effect on
Human Dignity and the Death of Life Insurance, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 605 (2009).
See also infra III.D.



2011

BAD POLICY FOR GOOD POLICIES

325

distasteful than a simple policy purchase. This seems like an unjust
windfall for the creditor who loaned money on security and now gets to
keep the full value of the collateral. This could not have been part of the
initial agreement since the insured has a right to decline such an
assignment. Most likely, creditors are squeezing a debtor for an intangible
asset during a time of difficulty.
In addition to being distasteful, these conclusions to the lending
relationship are legally problematic. Industry practice is to structure the
transaction so that it does involve consideration, perhaps by varying the
terms of the agreement. But it remains true that if the insured has a right to
satisfy the debt from sale of the security, the insured loses economic value
for nothing in return when the insured signs away the security in total.
Moreover, courts look to the relationship between the insured and the
creditor-beneficiary in determining the controlling intention of the policy
assignment.
Where courts allow the creditor to take an amount greater than the
debt, they emphasize that the assignment was not as security for a loan,153
that the creditor was a friend154 or relative.155The only cases where creditors
seem to be able to take the entirety of the proceeds are where the creditor
procured the policy.156
For all of the forgoing issues, authority can be found for nearly any
position, few rules are clear, and jurisdictions tend to differ. Doubtless,
some creditors may have found comfort in their ability to take surplus on a
given set of facts, with a given contract, and under a certain reading of the
case law. But even such a creditor will may have to anticipate ample
litigation and difficulty in securitizing her acquired policies. As Professor
Knippenberg put it, “These risks and costs are of the sort that are
predictably generated where, for lack of statutory treatment, there is room
left by uncertainty for argument.”157 Even if reform might limit creditors’


153

Am. Cas. Co. v. Rose, 340 F.2d 469, 471 (10th Cir. 1964); Zolintakis v.
Orfanos, 119 F.2d 571 574-75 (10th Cir. 1941) (probably a loan, but doubtful that
that creditor-beneficiary could have collected the sums advanced). 
154
Am. Cas. Co., 340 F.2d at 471 n.4; Forster v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 311
P.2d 700, 702 (Colo. 1957).
155
Wages v. Wages, 42 S.E.2d 481, 482 (Ga. 1947).
156
Central Nat’l Bank v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195 (1888); Fitzgerald v. Rawlings
Implement Co., 79 A. 915 (Md. 1911); Haberfeld v. Mayer, 100 A. 587 (Pa. 1917);
Watson v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1943) cert. denied
322 U.S. 746 (1944); WILLIAN R. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE,
739-40 (Buist M. Anderson ed., 3rd ed. 1951). 
157
Knippenberg, supra note 11, at 226-27. 
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ability to take the surplus from the insured, creditors will benefit from
greater legal certainty and reduced litigation.
2. UCC Solution
The surplus problem involves confusion as to the treatment of
surplus proceeds and facilitates predatory behavior by creditors. Inclusion
in Article 9 is the appropriate remedy. It is not enough to simply clarify in
statute that the creditor may not keep surplus unless clearly specified.158
This clarification is appropriate, and a truthful depiction of the law as best
as can be construed, but it creates bad incentives if adopted alone.
Imagine a creditor in possession of a policy with a maturity value
of $1,000,000, a surrender value of $100,000 and a resale value, reflecting
the expected value of the policy given premium and maturity date, of
$200,000. Imagine, further, that the creditor is owed $100,000. Under
current industry practice, the creditor is likely to resell the policy for
$200,000 to a purchaser willing to wait for maturity. The creditor will keep
all $200,000, representing $100,000 of debt and a $100,000 surplus. The
better result is that the creditor keeps $100,000 and returns $100,000 to the
debtor insured.
But if the law were amended to clarify that the $100,000 belonged
to the debtor, this better result will not obtain. Stripped of any potential
surplus, the creditor would simply surrender the policy for $100,000. Why?
Surrender is always easier than more complex commercial transactions,
which are risky in terms of their value, and which require the seller to pay
the insurance premiums until disposition.
Surrender also reduces litigation risks. If the debtor has an interest
in the surplus, the debtor may litigate if he feels the creditor made unwise
choices in selling. He may claim that the creditor made a hasty sale, or a
sale to a friend on unfair terms, resulting in a cognizable harm to the
debtor’s interest. There is no incentive for the creditor to bear those risks.
As long as resale has risk but no benefit, and as long as surrender remains a
legal option, value will be lost to the debtor-insured.


158

There is nothing wrong, per se, in allowing an assignee to take the whole
surplus. But such transaction is really a sale of the policy, in consideration for a
loan, with the seller’s right to repurchase for the loan principal plus interest.
Presumably the loan offered is at a below market interest rate, as the lender expects
to make their real gain on the surplus. But such a transaction should be clearly
labeled as such, and not sprung upon a borrower.
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Inclusion of interests in insurance policies within the UCC would
subject the decision to resell or surrender to Article 9’s standard foreclosure
provisions. Upon default by the debtor, a secured creditor has a right to
dispose of the collateral.159 The creditor may come to own the collateral,
should she wish, by purchasing it in a judicially administered sale.160 But
the disposition need not be judicially administered, nor need it even be a
sale,161 so long as it is commercially reasonable.162 Dispositions in
conformity with reasonable commercial practices are deemed to be
commercially reasonable.163
Creditors have hitherto had undue freedom with regard to liberal
surrender. Surrender should properly be regarded as one of the many
options potentially available to the foreclosing creditor. Sometimes
surrender would be regarded as a commercially reasonable option, such as
where the surrender amount is likely to equal the resale amount. But under
the UCC, creditors would no longer be allowed a general safe harbor for
surrenders where surplus-creating resales may be possible. So the creditor
from the example above would be required to sell the policy for greater
value, and share the surplus, less expenses, with the debtor.
Conversely, some creditors have failed to surrender to the
detriment of the borrower. In one case, a pledgee held policies with a
surrender value sufficient to satisfy its claims, but instead allowed the
policies to decrease in value for years until they could no longer satisfy the
claims. The court found for the pledgee, allowing it to recover the
unsatisfied debt from the pledgor. The court reasoned that the Article 9
statutory obligation of "reasonable care in the custody and preservation of
collateral" is inapplicable to interests in life insurance policies.164 This is an
appalling and inefficient result. Inclusion in Article 9 would mean that
surrender would sometimes be required as part of the reasonable
preservation and disposition of collateral. The legal duties imposed by
Article 9 are crucial components to the correction of the surplus problem.


U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (2000).
Id. at § 9-610(f). 
161
Id. at § 9-610(a) (“a secured party may sell, lease, license, or otherwise
dispose of any or all of the collateral. . . .”).
162
Id. at § 9-610(b). 
163
Id. at § 9-627(b)(3). There is no recognized market for life insurance
policies, though there may someday be a market for the securitized bundles of
them. Thus the other methods of reasonable disposition will not work. § 9627(b)(1)-(2).
164
Poultry Processing, Inc. v. Mendelson, 584 A.2d 659, 662 (Me. 1991).
159
160
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Where creditors lend a substantial proportion of the value, this
change will not be burdensome. Only where creditors have loaned a small
fraction of the value, and yet still expect the whole maturity payment, will
this reform decrease the gain to creditors. These transactions are not
sympathetic or efficient.
Eliminating the option to simply surrender the policy upon
foreclosure will decrease some of the flexibility and security associated
with lending on insurance policies. But there are two reasons to think that
this change will not substantially harm the availability of credit to
borrowers. First, insofar as creditors have expected to keep the windfall
surplus, their practice has been to sell, not surrender, the most valuable
policies. Under current lending practices, only the least valuable policies
are rapidly surrendered – a practice which Article 9 would still respect as a
commercial reasonable disposition.
Moreover, since Article 9 invalidates limits on assignment, parties
will be free to draft complex hybrid credit/purchase agreements.165
Consumers may be given an amount near the secondary market value of a
policy in exchange for an absolute assignment, with some kind of right of
redemption if the insured wishes to restore her interest at a later time. Such
transactions would track the windfall benefit currently enjoyed by
creditors, but it would make the transaction clear to consumers, as well as
ensure them a fair price for losing their investment. It is also reasonable to
assume that more transparency and fair prices would encourage consumers
to borrow more, thus enlarging the market and opportunities for lenders.
C. THE RESERVATION PROBLEM
The “reservation problem” refers to a subtle problem emerging
from drafting practices and non-UCC law, which disrupts the growth of a
secondary market around foreclosed collateral assignments. The vast
majority of collateral assignments have been executed in a manner that
reserves to the assignor certain rights that the assignee needs for flexible
resale.
Collateral assignments are performed using standard forms
drafted by insurance companies. The considerable uniformity of forms was
in part a deliberate effort of the insurance industry.166 Insurance companies
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U.C.C. § 9-408 (2000).
See John F. Handy, Assistant Counsel, Why Uniformity in Collateral
Assignment Blanks?, 5 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF LIFE INSURANCE
166
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have for years standardized contracts for the benefit of the insured.167
Collaboration between bankers and insurance companies resulted in a
standardized assignment form in 1938.168 These uniform forms were used
almost universally in the following years.169
By controlling the means of assignment, and limiting them to
finite, boilerplate clauses, insurance companies can prevent creditors from
taking advantage of their clients. On the other hand, those same standard
contracts can also discourage creditors from accepting insurance policies as
collateral for loans.170
Standard assignment forms reserve to the assignor the right to
designate or change beneficiaries, often called the power of appointment.171
That is, even once the insured individual gives her policy as collateral for a
debt, she still has the sole right to decide who is to be paid when she dies.
This reservation exists to prevent the beneficiary from limiting the
insured’s power to assign the policy.172 But this reservation casts a cloud
over the salability of the policy. It is difficult for a creditor to effectively
sell his interest in a policy missing this incident of ownership.
Parties cannot draft around this problem because assignments are
only valid on the terms of the insurance policy,173 which will invariably
require the use of standard assignment forms. Many states have codified
the requirement that policies are assignable or not assignable on the terms
of the insurance contract.174 Insurance companies will not be expected to


COUNSEL 307 (1932) (suggesting collaboration with the American Bankers
Association). 
167
Comment, The Assignment of Life Insurance as Collateral Security for
Bank Loans, 58 YALE L.J. 743, 754 (1949). 
168
See id. at 755.
169
Id. at 756 nn.81-82.
170
See, e.g., Neil A. Doherty and Hal J. Singer, Regulating the Secondary
Market for Life Insurance Policies, 21 J. INS. REG. 63 (2003). See also supra note
30.
171
See 10 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D § 149:184 (2010) (“The following
specific rights, so long as the policy has not been surrendered, do not pass by virtue
of this assignment: . . .(b) The right to designate and change the beneficiary.”).
172
See infra II.C.1.
173
See, e.g., Immel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ill.
1940) (citing 31 CORPUS JURIS, 430; 2 ROGER W. COOLEY, BRIEFS ON THE
LAW OF INSURANCE 1829 (1905)). 
174
See ALA. CODE § 27-14-21(a) (2011); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 21.42.270
(West 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1122 (2011) (West); ARK. CODE ANN. §
23-79-124(a) (West 2011); CAL. INS. CODE § 10130 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18, § 2720 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-17 (West 2011); HAW. REV.
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alleviative this problem, in part because they tend to benefit when third
party interests are impaired.
1. Origin in the Vested Beneficiary Problem.
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, courts began to restrict
the ability of insureds to assign their policies.175 They did so on the theory
that the beneficiary under the policy had a vested interest in the proceeds
that could not be divested without his permission. It seemed unjust and
problematic that a breadwinner could procure a policy to give peace of
mind to her dependants and then secretly assign the policy to a bank. The
beneficiary may have come to rely on the benefit. It was also argued that
the insured had given the beneficiary a beneficial interest at the time of
taking out the policy and was not at liberty to unilaterally divest the
beneficiary.
The protection of the vested interest of a beneficiary became the
law in all states but Wisconsin,176 and life insurance policies became de
facto unassignable. Such restrictions reduced the value of insurance
policies to insureds, who were forced to accept whatever price the
insurance company saw fit to offer for a policy loan or surrender.
Insurance contracts were soon drafted to reserve the insured’s right
to change beneficiaries.177 This reservation clause limited the beneficiary’s
interest to a mere expectancy and freed the insured’s hand to make
assignments. A policy that was assigned absolutely would carry with it the


STAT. § 431:10-228(a) (West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1826 (West 2011);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-250(1) (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24A, § 2420(1) (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-414(1) (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 26.1-33-33 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3624 (West 2011);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512 (West 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-6.1
(2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3111 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
48.18.360 (West 2011).
175
See Lewis D. Asper, Ownership and Transfer of Interests in Life Insurance
Policies, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1177. For more on the origin of this theory, see
William Reynolds Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest In A Life Insurance Policy, 31
YALE L.J. 343, 347-48 (1922).
176
See 4 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 27:56 (2d ed.
1960). See also Ellison v. Straw, 92 N.W. 1094 (1902); Clark v. Durand, 12 Wis.
223 (1860).
177
See e.g., Asper, supra note 175, at 1179; Grimm v. Grimm, 157 P.2d 841,
842 (Cal. 1945); Morrison v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 P.2d 963, 965 (Cal. 1940);
Davis v. Modern Indus. Bank, 18 N.E.2d 639, 643 (N.Y. 1939).
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power to select beneficiaries. Thus, be it assignor or assignee, someone
always had the power to change beneficiaries, and so beneficiary rights
would not vest. Thus, reservation clauses were originally drafted to
empower insureds vis-à-vis their beneficiaries.
2. Reservation of Selection of Beneficiary Amounts to the
Reservation of a Substantial Incident of Ownership.
The power of appointment of beneficiaries is a significant incident
of ownership and a crucially important one for the creditor who hopes to
sell the policy to a third party purchaser. Incidents of ownership are the
economic benefits of owning a policy178 and are constituent elements of
ownership. Regardless of what labels the parties may apply, a transaction
that fails to give enough incidents of ownership to the assignee may be
contested as less than a transfer of ownership. If an insured purports to
assign a policy, but a court finds that the insured has retained for herself too
much of the power associated with the policy, the insured will still be
deemed the owner. Questions of whether the insured has “really” assigned
the policy can become important if, for example, other creditors of the
insured seek to foreclose on the policy.
Lists of the incidents of ownership of life policies are inconsistent
and contradictory, shifting somewhat from court to court.179 But it may be
helpful to look to an area of the law that, though convoluted, at least speaks
with one voice: federal taxation. If an assignee lacks all the incidents of
ownership, a life insurance policy may remain in the gross estate of the
assignor.180 The federal estate tax sets rules to determine whether an
insurance policy is includable in an individual’s gross estate. It lists the
following incidents of ownership:
the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel
the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to
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26. C.F.R. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (2010).
Asper, supra note 175, at 1183 (“This is due in part to the nature of the
interests and in part to the fact that few transfers of interest in property are
conducted at a higher level of ignorance and inattentiveness.”).
180
4 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 63:41 (3d. ed.
2010) (“An insured's reservation of the right to change beneficiaries under a life
insurance policy is an ‘incident of ownership’ sufficient to cause inclusion of the
policy proceeds in the insured/decedent's gross estate….”).
179



332

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 17.2

pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a
loan against the surrender value of the policy, etc.181
Reservation of the power to change beneficiaries is by itself sufficient
“incident of ownership” to cause inclusion of the policy proceeds in the
insured’s gross estate.182 Conversely, an assignor who has exercised the
surrender option of a policy can still have effectively removed the policy
from his gross estate.183
In a standard collateral assignment, an insured does not grant the
insurer access to the power of appointment, or otherwise put that power at
risk. It is difficult for a foreclosing creditor to persuade an insurance
company to list him as the owner when such a large portion of the
ownership has been reserved.
It is also difficult for a creditor to persuade a subsequent purchaser
that he owns the policy if he is not listed as the owner. As a matter of
industry practice, investors in life insurance policies expect to purchase
policies with all the relevant rights attached. They designate themselves as
beneficiary so that they can take the full proceeds, and they expect to be
able to sell the policy on the secondary market, allowing the next purchaser
to designate herself as the new beneficiary. Purchasers may wish to
securitize policies for resale, requiring them to all be complete and
possessing the full incidents of ownership.
Thus, the current drafting regime creates a difference between
policies obtained by absolute assignment and collateral assignment. The
former policies, assigned as consideration in sale, will come without strings
attached. The latter, assigned as collateral, will lack important features that
investors expect and desire.


26. C.F.R. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (2010). 
See Comm’r v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 682 (1965) (flight insurance
policy where insured possessed right to change beneficiary and right to assign
policy). See also Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 832 F.2d 1032 (7th
Cir. 1987) (despite apparent assigning of policy to spouse); Terriberry v. United
States, 517 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1975); Brown v. Comm’r, 95 F.2d 184 (6th Cir.
1938) (as to policy assigned to decedent, who then reserved right to change
beneficiary); COUCH, supra note 180. 
183
Insurance Excluded Despite Withdrawal of Cash Value, 52 Prac. Tax.
Strategies 182, 182 (Mar. 1994) (citing Estate of O'Daniel v. United States, F.3d
321 (5th Cir. 1993)).
181
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3. Harms of the Reservation Problem
As just discussed, investors in life insurance policies demand all
the rights provided for in the policy. However, when life insurance is used
as collateral, the only valid documentation of assignment will not assign all
of the rights. This makes the policies less useful to the first investor,
probably a foreclosing creditor, and unsuitable for securitization. The
failure of law and practice to match the realities of a robust secondary
market acts as a friction, or worse – a time bomb.
At the same time as the fact of these reserved rights could result in
judgments against insurance policy creditors status as policy owner, they
are footnotes and asterisks that impair securitization and resale. Legal
uncertainty is particularly damning in the life insurance secondary market.
Unlike, say, real estate investors, life insurance investors take the
ultimate value of the investment as known.184 That is, investors demand
certainty about the ultimate value of life insurance policies and will be
unlikely to accept securitized assets which have risk litigation or difficulty
in receiving maturity benefits. In the history of the United States, no
insurance policy has ever failed to pay upon maturity. And there have been
only three instances of the downgrading of an insurance company
security.185 Every online lecture listed by ILIAM lecture emphasizes
certainty as one of the core distinguishing values of insurance linked
assets.186
A robust secondary market must come to rely on securitization,
since institutional investors will not wish to purchase individual policies. 187
But securitized policies must be clean of legal nettles. Investors will pass
over policies that may be subject to litigation, or are comprised of irregular
bundles of incidents of ownership. The secondary market will be stunted if
it carries only purchased, rather than foreclosed, insurance policies. And
the market for loans on life insurance policies may segregate from the
greater market for insurance policies, stunting the value proposition for
investors in, and borrowers against, life insurance policies.


184

Greg Schmitt, Trends in Insurance Linked Assets – Part 1, LIFE SOLUTIONS
INT’L (Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.lifesolutionsint.com/news-resources.aspx
(follow “Feb. 10 ILIAM – Trends in Insurance-Linked Assets – Part 1”).
185
Id.
186
See
ILIAM,
LIFE
SOLUTIONS
INT’L
(2011)
http://www.lifesolutionsint.com/iliam.aspx. ILIAM is the Insurance-Linked
Investment Awareness Month, an annual lecture series and conference sponsored
by Life Solutions International, one of the leading companies in this industry. Id. 
187
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 6. 
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4. Solving the Reservation Problem
Inclusion of life insurance policies under Article 9 will empower
parties to solve the reservation problem. Consider first why the problem
cannot be drafted away under the current legal regime. A beneficiary’s
interest does not vest if the insured always retains the power of
appointment, and so collateral assignment invariably reserves that right to
the insured.188 But there are other ways to keep the beneficiaries’ interest
from vesting.
Absolute assignments keep the expectancy from vesting by
granting to the assignee the power of appointment. 189 Similarly, the insured
could grant the collateral assignee the right to select beneficiaries. This
would keep the beneficiary’s interest contingent while conveying to the
creditor an important right he will want upon foreclosure. But the insured
probably doesn’t want a mere creditor to have the right to select the
beneficiary, at least not until a default occurs. And even if a default occurs,
the insured will want the excess of the proceeds to go to her own choice of
beneficiaries, rather than granting a windfall to the creditor.
Where the parties intend for the creditor to have access to the full
proceeds in the event of default, or to be able to resell with all the incidents
of ownership, the vesting problem could be solved through drafting a
springing appointment clause. The assignor could grant the assignee a
contingent right of appointment that vests only in the event of default. But
these clauses are unheard of. Insurance companies have not seen fit to add
them to the set of available options, perhaps because of the ease with which
securitization might then follow.190
The industry practice discussed in Section III is for insureds and
their assignees to give notice of assignment to the insurance company on
forms issued by the insurance company. Insurance companies do not
include springing beneficiary clauses in those forms, so springing
beneficiary clauses are not used in collateral assignments and the power of
appointing beneficiaries remains reserved in the insured. In this case, the



Janesville State Bank v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 274 N.W. 232, 233 (1937).
See, e.g., 9 WEST’S PA FORMS § 14:7 (1995) (“I . . . assign . . . all
incidents of ownership with respect to, life insurance policy number ________
issued on my life by [name of life insurance company]. The incidents of ownership
hereby assigned include, but are not limited to, the right to designate the
beneficiary or beneficiaries of the policy….”). 
190
See infra Part III.E, explaining why some insurance companies have
discouraged securization.
188
189
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standard form potentially endangers a secondary market because such a
market is intolerant of archaic title disputes.
By contrast, Article 9 invalidates any clause that restricts the
assignment of security interests in general intangibles.191 If life insurance
policies were included in Article 9, parties would be enabled to draft
springing appointment clauses rather than picking assignment forms from
the insurance company’s limited menu. Insurance contract provisions
limiting assignment except where conducted through designated
documentation would be invalid. This would render the reservation
problem moot.
III.

OBJECTIONS
A. CONSUMER PROTECTION

It may be argued that the exclusion of life insurance policies from
UCC Article 9 is necessary to protect consumers from unwisely using their
policies as collateral.192 Consumer protection is a worthy goal, and there are
serious risks to consumers from insurance policy credit transactions. For
example, an impaired life insurance policy could “cut off any interest of the
debtor's beneficiaries under the policy if at the debtor's death an
outstanding debt existed.”193 Moreover, insureds that lose their policy in
default may find themselves unable to obtain a new policy, either because
they are now too old or otherwise unattractive to insurers, or because
insurers will not issue policies to individuals on whom an active policy
exists, though now in the hands of the creditor.
Such arguments should not impede inclusion of life insurance.
First, consumers tend to benefit when they can liberally monetize their
assets.194 Second, whatever risks are posed by policy lending, they are less
than outright sales. An efficient borrowing and resale regime will give
consumers another alternative to life settlements.



U.C.C. § 9-408(a) (2010).
Ettinger v. Central Penn Nat’l Bank, 2 B.R. 385 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev’d on
other grounds, 634 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980) (“This was obviously done to prevent
debtors from foolishly or capriciously utilizing their life insurance policies as
collateral”) (citing I.G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
315 (1965); Ray D. Henson, Insurance Proceeds as “Proceeds” Under Article 9,
18 CATH. U. L. REV. 453, 456 (1969)). 
193
Id. 
194
See infra Part I. 
191
192
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Third, UCC exclusion amounts to the least efficient point of
regulation for consumer protection. The law currently allows consumers to
borrow against their policies, wisely or not, from anyone they please. True,
UCC inclusion would likely increase insurance policy borrowing; nonUCC law has the side effect of discouraging would-be creditors from
becoming competitors to the presumptive monopoly of the insurer. But it is
rare that the best way to help consumer is to frustrate and raise costs on an
otherwise legal transaction. If third-party lending posed a threat to
consumers, regulations can be promulgated to address those threats
directly, rather than by increasing legal uncertainty and cost. Insureds and
creditors should not have their rights frustrated in transactions that have
long been allowed.
More interesting consumer protections arguments address
compromises in medical privacy.195 Some life insurance financing
agreements require the insured to open her health files to the creditor, or
submit to periodic medical examinations. Creditors and investors are
interested in the longevity risk associated with their interest in the policy.
When financial commitments and health become intermingled, policy
tradeoffs must be made between consumer privacy, transparency, and other
values.
For example, without deciding the issue, a Florida Court
questioned whether a right to medical privacy exists where a medical
condition has become an essential condition of a commercial transaction.196
Such arguments bear consideration. They should be evaluated against the
benefits accrued to consumers from ready alienability of their policies.
Statutes like HIPAA still apply197 and will no doubt require more careful
attention in the coming years. But the best consumer protections will be
targeted to help insureds both keep their privacy and avoid exploitation.
The worst solution is to protect consumers by using outdated, unclear law
to discourage fair competition between creditors.
A similar response is appropriate to the problem of frauds against
consumers, and other exploitative practices. It can be difficult for an
individual to procure a new life insurance policy after selling hers or losing
it through foreclosure. Individuals may be persuaded to part with an asset


195

See Andrew Spurrier, Note, The Death of Death Futures?: The Effects of
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 on the Insurance
and Viatical Settlement Industries, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 807, 836 (1998).
196
State v. Viatical Servs., Inc., 741 So. 2d 560, 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999). See also Life Partners v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 295-96 (4th Cir. 2007). 
197
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§
201 et seq.
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that they would prefer to keep, or may later regret giving up.198 And the tax
implications of such a transfer can sometimes be surprising.199 These
legitimate concerns may require disclosure and regulatory oversight.200 Yet
our approval of assignments indicates a confidence that these problems can
be addressed. It is of independent value that the law be orderly and that
consumers get the best possible price for their policies.
B. STATUS QUO AND THE ORIGIN OF THE CODE
This section treats the general conservative objection that the
Drafters of the Code knew what they were doing, and we should not amend
their work without knowing why they set things up the way they did.
Indeed, since most of the problems explained in the preceding sections are
not new, it would be strange, if not hubristic, to amend the Code without
wondering what the drafters thought of these problems. 201
It will be shown in this section that this general objection is not
persuasive here. The origin of the exclusion lies not in the drafters’
thoughtful understanding of subtle economic and legal realities so much as
bowing to the pressure of an industry that feared change. As ambitious as
Article 9 may have been, the drafters made compromises in order to ease
its passage.202


198

J. Alan Jensen and Stephan R. Leimberg, Stranger-Owned Life Insurance:
A Point/Counterpoint Discussion, 33 ACTEC J. 110, 113 (2009) (“therefore, it will
reduce the ability of the insured to buy additional coverage throughout his life. . .
.”).
199
Rev. Rul. 2009-13, 2009-21 I.R.B. 1029 (explaining that individuals who
sell their insurance policies may owe taxes on the amount received, less premiums
paid. Thus, settlement income does not receive the same tax advantage for the
insured as maturity proceeds. Note, however, that tax implications of a policy loan
are unlikely to be as surprising and adverse.). 
200
See generally Miriam R. Albert, The Howey Test Turns 64: Are the Courts
Grading this Test on A Curve? 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 39-50 (2011)
(statutes and regulations regulating viatical settlements).
201
Notwithstanding the growing importance of secondary markets. See infra
Part I.B.
202
Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L. R. 321, 327 (1962) (“The draftsmen and the
members of the sponsor organizations knew that to draft a dead-letter bill would
accomplish nothing. The Code had to be enacted.”).
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1. Early Exclusion in Article 9
The first draft of the Uniform Commercial Code, promulgated in
1952, did not exclude insurance policies from the scope of Article 9.203
Article 9 was first adopted in Pennsylvania without any exclusion,204 but
the integrity of the Code was soon threatened by a seeming drafting error.
The confusion arose from an apparent conflict between the text of
the Code and its comments. Comment 4 to Section 9-105 of the 1952 UCC
stated:
‘Instrument’ (subsection (1)(g)): the term as defined
includes not only negotiable instruments and investment
securities but also other intangibles which are evidenced by
writings which are in ordinary course of business
transferred by delivery, for example, insurance policies.205
This Comment clearly indicates the desire of the drafters to classify
insurance policies as instruments.
However, the statutory text of the definition does not mention
insurance as an instrument, and indeed, implies the contrary: “‘Instrument’
means . . . [a writing] which evidences a right to payment of money and is
of a type which is the ordinary course of business transferred by
delivery.”206 To be an instrument, insurance policies must have been
transferred by delivery in the ordinary course of business, but the extant
commercial practice required more than mere delivery to transfer insurance
policies.207 Life insurance policies were ordinarily transferred by delivery
and by a written agreement of transfer, not mere delivery. If not an
instrument, life insurance policies would seem to have been left out of the
Code notwithstanding the drafters’ intentions.
There were a number of ways to potentially square the drafters’
intentions with the text, but none proved satisfactory. For example, if the
commercial practice of delivery was a necessary condition, but not
sufficient, then life insurance policies might still fit the definition as


See U.C.C. § 9-104 (1952). 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-101 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1953).
205
U.C.C. § 9-105, Comment 4 (1952).
206
Id. § 9-105.
207
Carl W. Funk, Problems of Classification Under Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 709 (1954).
203
204
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instruments. But many lawyers were unwilling to make this interpretive
leap without guidance.208
An alternative interpretation might have fitted insurance policies
into another category of collateral. It could have been argued that insurance
policies qualified as chattel paper, the definition of which read “of a type
which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with
appropriate endorsement or assignment.”209 But a consensus did not form
around this interpretation either. The Comments clearly placed insurance in
the mutually exclusive “instruments” group. It was impossible to square the
text of the statute with the commercial reality of insurance policy transfer,
regardless of what the Comments did to keep policies out of other
categories. It became necessary to draft an amendment.
In resolving this confusion, the Drafting Committee bowed to
industry pressure, and simply excluded life insurance policies. Even the
revered Drafting Committee had to consider the political realities of getting
legislatures to accept their proposal, as drafter Fairfax Leary explains:
All along there were other indirect pressures on the
draftsmen from special interests. These pressures were felt
through various and sundry people who got the
information from their contacts and passed it on. There was
great pressure to produce an adoptable Code, and,
therefore, certain interests who might oppose the Code had
to be pacified . . . . [One] was the insurance industry and
sure enough you'll find their exemption in 9-104.210
Other drafters have made similar remarks and calls for reform.211


208

Id. at 709-10.
U.C.C. § 9-105(b) (1954).
210
Fairfax Leary, Reflections of a Drafter: Fairfax Leary, 43 OHIO ST. L.J.
557, 558 (1982). See also Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism,
and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial
Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 101 (1993) (“[C]ar-trusts and insurance were
exempted from Article 9 coverage to pacify, respectively, the railroad interests and
the insurance industry.”); Soia Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code: An
Experiment in Democracy in Drafting, 36 A.B.A. J. 419 (1950) (describing
extensive interaction with interest groups); WILLIAM TWINNING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 330 (1973) (describing Llewellyn’s
commitment to a draft which would be adopted, even if it meant excluding areas
that should logically be included, like insurance).
211
Coogan, supra note 96, at 1054. 
209
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At first, the insurance industry suggested several solutions,
including simply expanding the definition of instruments to more clearly
cover life insurance policies.212 Later insurance industry lawyers demanded
exclusion from the Code rather than disambiguation.213
Resistance came from resistance to relatively small concessions.
For example, there was a difference in commercial practice between
insurance companies and third party creditors, and insurers did not wish for
a Code that would require them to change their practice. Third party
creditors were in the habit of taking possession of collaterally assigned
policies, while insurance companies tended not to take possession of the
collaterally assigned policy. Insurance companies were afraid that they
might have had to change their lending practices slightly to be on par with
third party lenders.214 Although this would have increased uniformity and
certainty, insurance companies preferred to maintain the status quo. They
would have found a policy possession requirement an “inconvenience.” 215
According to one account, insurance companies had no opposition
to Article 9 more substantial than that the status quo was adequate enough,
and so change should be resisted simply because it constituted change. This
is the opinion of Professor Grant Gilmore, Co-Reporter for Article 9: “If
[my] personal recollection may be relied on, the attitude of counsel [for the
insurance companies] was not that any provision of the Article was
incorrect, harmful, or disadvantageous to their client, but was rather that
they were disinclined to flee the evils that they knew not of.”216 Professor
Coognan, Dean of Commenters on the 1972 revision of Article 9, shared
Gilmore’s perspective:


212

Funk, supra note 207, at 711 (citing Willis H. Satterthwaite, Assignments
of Life Insurance Policies Under the Uniform Commercial Code (May 2, 1953)
(unpublished manuscript) (suggesting that Section 9-105(g) be amended to read:
“(g) ‘Instrument’ means ... or any other writing ... which evidences a right to the
payment of money and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business
transferred by delivery or by delivery with appropriate indorsement [sic] or
assignment”)).
213
Robert Dechert, The Uniform Commercial Code and its Impact Upon the
Life Insurance Business, in 47 PROCEEDINGS OF THE LEGAL SECTION OF THE
AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION 48, 60 (1954). 
214
J.C. Vance, Annotation, Right of Life Insurance Beneficiary Against Estate
of Insured Who Used Policy as Collateral, 91 A.L.R. 2d 496 (1963); Funk, supra
note 207, at 710-11.
215
Dechert, supra note 213, at 60.
214
2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 10.7, at
315 (1965). 
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Then there are other exemptions or exclusions which were
based solely upon the fact that some group had a big club,
and would say that if you were going to leave those in,
then we will have to learn a new set of laws and we are just
not going to do it. We do not know whether it is good or
bad, but we do not want to take the time to learn. The
insurance people were one group who got such a
consideration.217
As Article 9 has proved reliable and stable, other groups that had lobbied
for exclusion, like the railroads, voluntarily gave up them up.218 The
insurance industry has grown to enjoy its exclusion and has not expressed
any desire to give it up.
The Pennsylvania legislature thus added an insurance exclusion
only three months after adopting Article 9.219 The Drafters of the Code
added the exclusion as well. Their decision to resolve the ambiguity in this
way was a direct result of insurance company pressure. 220
2. Exclusion in Revised Article 9
The exclusion was almost eliminated in Revised Article 9.221
California has a non-uniform version of the Code with respect to interests
in insurance, and the Committee was interested in California’s choice to
remain non-uniform.222 California first adopted a uniform version of Article


217

Comm. On. Unif. Commercial Code, Program, Impact of 1972 Revisions
on Secured Financing Transactions Under UCC Article 9, 33 BUS. LAW. 2491,
2533 (1978). 
218
Id. (“When we asked the railroads, in 1972, whether they really wanted to
continue to exclude the equipment trusts from the operation of Article 9, nobody
could remember why they did it. So the exclusion of equipment trusts from Article
9 has now been eliminated. Thank God.”).
219
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-104(g) (Purdon Supp. 1954); see also Funk,
supra note 207, at 711.
220
Gilmore, supra note 80, at 315. (“This exclusion, like that of railroad
equipment trust under subsection (e), was politically inspired.”). 
221
See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS. AM.
LAW INST. DRAFT UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVISED ARTICLE 9. SECURED
TRANSACTIONS; SALES OF ACCOUNTS AND CHATTEL PAPER (1995).
222
Louisiana also chose to exclude policies of insurance from their U.C.C., but
it is not clear that the Committee took account of their practices. Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code first took effect in Louisiana on January 1, 1990, 9
years before The American Law Institute’s promulgation of Revised Article 9. For
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9 with respect to insurance, and later narrowed the exclusion of life
insurance policies. The revision treated insurance policy loans differently
from other loans largely because of insurance company lobbying.223
California also accepted that loans from an issuing insurance company
“essentially involve a set-off,” and are not really loans.224 Thus,
California’s Section 9 now excludes “[a]ny loan made by an insurance
company pursuant to the provisions of a policy or contract issued by it and
upon the sole security of the policy or contract.”225 Loans by third parties
are not excluded from the UCC.
The drafters preferred the California approach. Professor Homer
Kripke, Associate Reporter for the Review Committee, concurred with
Gilmore’s reflection that the exclusion existed less for good public policy
reasons than because of the insurance industry’s sense that it was perfectly
happy with the status quo:
We have thus had a clear-cut issue as to the approach of
this Committee. The California position seems (at least to
the writer) to be more sound theoretically than the existing
Code. On the other hand, we seem not to have had any real


a discussion of Louisiana’s non-uniform treatment of Article 9, see James A.
Stuckley, Louisiana’s Non-Uniform Variations in U.C.C. Chapter 9, 62 LA. L.
REV. 793 (2002). There is only one glaring problem with the Louisiana approach
for the present purposes. Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Code does not adequately
protect the rights of those with interests in insurance policies to assign them. By
excluding insurance policies from the definition of “general intangible,” Louisiana
was able to conveniently draft separate provisions specific to insurance, such as the
perfection by control provision. Id. at 842. But life insurance policies were thereby
removed from the scope of U.C.C. § 9-408 which rendered ineffective restrictions
on alienability of general intangibles. With no clause protecting the alienability of
life insurance policies, the reservation problem still plagues Louisiana. 
223
See, e.g., Further Comments on Chapter 9: Comments on Memoranda of
Subcommittees of State Bar Committee an California Bankers Committee, Further
Comments of State Bar. (“Therefore, we think that the amendment proposed by the
California Bankers Committee is a sound modification of the rule of the Official
Draft and will avoid unnecessary opposition from life insurance companies. . . .”).
224
The Uniform Commercial Code, A Special Report by the California State
Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, 37 J. ST. B. CAL. 119, 200 (1962). But
see infra.
225
CAL. COM. CODE § 9109(d)(8) (West 2009).
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trouble with the existing Code and a change would
certainly create some opposition.226
The superiority of the California approach was thus weighed against
resistance from industry groups.
The Drafting Committee met with insurance industry
representatives to vet their opposition to ending the life insurance
exclusion. Nearly all of their expressed concerns focused on the difficulties
incumbent on the obligor of an account that is subject to transfer. The
Drafting Committee deemed some of these concerns unwarranted.227
Others, if warranted, could be solved through some kind of in-Code
accommodation.228 At the end of a June 1996 meeting, the Drafting
Committee voted, three to five, in favor of ending the exclusion.
Notwithstanding the arguments and votes against the exclusion, the
Drafting Committee ultimately retained it.229 They opted for the lowhanging fruit of eliminating the exclusion of health-care-insurance
receivables. To the degree that the insurance exclusion is supported by
simple incumbency, it should be clear that the status quo was not the result
desired by those most thoughtfully involved in the drafting. The exclusion
has serious negative effects for consumers and makes life insurance
products less attractive, very likely harming the insurance industry in
general. Acquiescence to change-averse industry lobbyists can no longer
justify the life insurance exclusion.


226

5.

227

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS, supra note 10, at 4-

Harris & Mooney, supra note 48, at 1374-75 (“e.g., the concern that an
insurer would need to consult the UCC filings before deciding whom to pay”).
This concern is not warranted because the code allows such an obligor to pay the
presumed obligee unless notice has been given of assignment.
228
Id. at 1375 (“e.g., the concern that the insurer would be obligated to pay the
secured party upon receipt of a notification of assignment”).
229
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’R ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, REVISION OF
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 (1997) (“The Drafting Committee
recognizes that insurance policies can be important items of collateral in many
other business contexts and that the “cash” or “loan” value of life insurance
policies also can be a useful source of collateral for borrowing by individuals.
Nevertheless, it decided that other law should continue to govern security interests
in insurance policies.”).
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C. “SPECIAL” TRANSFERS OF INTEREST
Although an insurance exception was created in light of political
pressures, the avowed purpose of the exclusion was given in the Official
Comments. “Such transactions are often quite special, do not fit easily
under a general commercial statute and are adequately covered by existing
law.”230
In what ways these transactions are special, and why they do not
fit, is not explained by the Commenters.231 Subsequent treatises have
accepted the Comment without elaboration.232 Although every transaction
is no doubt quite special, in the same sense as every child is above
average,233 there is no good reason to credit this comment.
Some resistance to creating parity between insurance-backed loans
and other loans is based on the once popular theory that issuer-policy loans
from the insurer were not loans at all, merely advances on the proceeds.234
This view holds that a policy loan carries no obligation on the part of the
insured to repay the amount borrowed, but the insurer can cancel the policy
if the loan value ever exceeds the cash value of the policy.235
Two textual considerations show why this idea of “advances
against life insurance policy proceeds” cannot justify the policy exclusion.
First, party-specific explications cannot defend a transaction-specific
exclusion. As the Comments make clear, “transfer[s] of interests in . . . a


230

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS,
reprinted in XXIII UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 401 (Elizabeth Slusser
Kelly ed., 1984). The Comments to the current draft of the U.C.C. do not explain
the life insurance policy exclusion. 
231
Indeed, it is clear they had no idea either. See infra Part II.B.. 
232
See, e.g., 11 Lary Lawrence, Lawrence’s Anderson on the Uniform
Commercial Code § 9-109:29 (3d. ed. 2010).
233
See GARRISON KEILLOR, LAKE WOBEGON DAYS (1985).
234
See, e.g., Ford v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 13 So.2d 45 (Miss. 1943); COUCH,
supra note 32, § 80:1; VANCE, supra note 156, at 645.
235
VANCE, supra note 156, at 652. Yet this view warrants skepticism. It
would imply that insurers violate no lending statutes when offering misleading
terms and usurious interest rates, or loan money in a racially discriminating
manner. Second, if a policy loan creates no obligation in the insured, then loan
repayments constitute payments without obligation. As a result, the insurance
company ought to pay taxes on income that did not constitute obligated loan
repayments. Third, if policy loans constituted an advance on proceeds, the loan
principal ought to be out of the reach of ordinary creditors, receiving the same
immunity as the proceeds would. But insureds cannot draw down their insurance
policies to live at a high standard while remaining judgment proof.
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policy of insurance” are excluded because “such transactions” are special,
not because the transactions’ participants are quite special. Nor does the
exclusion mention or emphasize the relationship between the transferor and
the transferee.
Neither the text of the UCC nor the Comments intimate that the
specialness is any greater or lesser when the creditor is the policy issuer.
No explanation that defends the exclusion in terms of the relationship
between the insured and the insurer, as opposed to a third party, can make
sense of the text or its application in decades of transactions. Even if it
could, it would only justify an exclusion of transfers from insured to
insurer, partially validating the reform proposal advocated in this article.236
Second, the question of whether a loan from an issuer is really a
loan, as opposed to some other transaction, takes away focus from the real
problem – bad, non-uniform law – and cannot justify keeping the exclusion
as it currently exists. The Article 9 exclusion does not distinguish between
loans and “advances” or “setoffs.” Instead, it applies to any “transfer of an
interest in” of a policy of insurance. A given transfer may be a setoff and
not a loan, but simply being a setoff does not make the transaction
“special” and unable to fit within the general security statute. Article 9
makes adequate provisions for setoffs in deposit accounts.237
If insurance companies deserve special treatment by virtue their
identity or the nature of the transaction, there is room to acknowledge these
differences in the Code without exclusion. Consider the creditor-bank that
doubles as the holder of a deposit account. Like an insurance company, it is
in a privileged position to monitor the customer. Also like the insurance
company, it has a dual role as creditor and debtor, mirroring the insurance
company’s role as policy loan-creditor and “debtor” of the ultimate
proceeds.
The Code allows the bank to perfect interests in the deposit
accounts by control.238 Banks are afforded special treatment in virtue of
their special role, but they still join the general structure of the Code. The


236

Even if the insurer’s relationship is different enough to warrant an
alternative perfection and assignment scheme, third parties would still deserve an
efficient system vis-à-vis one another. The Code is so wholly superior to existing
law that third parties must be allowed to avail themselves even if the text were
somehow construed to allow a coherent account of insurance companies’
specialness.
237
U.C.C. §§ 9-109(d)(10)(A), 9-340 (2000) (including set-off rights in scope
of Article 9). 
238
Id. at § 9-314. See generally Willa E. Gibson, Banks Reign Supreme Under
Revised Article 9 Deposit Account Rules, 30 DEL J. CORP. L. 819 (2005).
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Code acknowledges the dual role of the creditor-bank well enough without
an exclusion, and it could do the same for insurance policies.
California has enshrined insurer’s privilege, but done so within the
ambit of the UCC.239 There are flaws with the California approach that are
severe enough to make the California approach inferior to full inclusion.
California excludes only issuer loans, and third party interests in loans
perfect only upon written notification to the insurer. Notwithstanding such
problems, both California’s approach and the UCC’s treatment of deposit
accounts show that UCC-inclusion can be accomplished a number of ways,
not all of which should seem a radical departure. Either would be a marked
improvement upon the status quo since either solution would eliminate the
uncertainty about how security interests are granted and perfected.
D. STOLI
It may be mistakenly thought that this proposal will facilitate
stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI, as it is often called). In a typical
STOLI transaction, a speculator persuades a consumer to obtain a policy of
insurance. The speculator will typically offer to pay the premiums for a
period of time. In some STOLI transactions, the premium payments
constitute a loan that will be secured by the policy, and the speculator
becomes the owner of the policy after a period of time.240 The consumer
will either be promised some payment for their participation, or else be
enticed by the offer of “free insurance,” enjoyed in the years prior to
transferring the policy to the speculator.
STOLI transactions are thought to be worrisome for a variety of
reasons.241 First, by enabling speculators to treat insurance as a mere
investment, STOLI transactions misuse public subsidy of insurance.
Incentives to hold insurance are intended to promote the core survivorprotection function of insurance, because society benefits when insurance


239

CAL. COM. CODE § 9312(b)(4) (West 2009) (“[S]ecurity interest in, or
claim in or under, any policy of insurance, including unearned premiums, may be
perfected only by giving written notice of the security interest or claim to the
insurer.”); id. 9310(b)(11). 
240
Absent other concerns, the period will usually be the contestability period.
After that period, the insurance company must generally honor the policy.
241
Eryn Mathews, Note, STOLI on the Rocks: Why States Should Eliminate
the Abusive Practice of Stranger-Owned Life Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 521
(2008). See also Anita Huslin, Wealthy Engage in Controversial Re-Selling of Life
Insurance Policies, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2007, at D1. (Larry King victimized in
a STOLI arrangement).
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products replace lost incomes and relieve the government of burdens.242
STOLI speculators enjoy these subsidies without any party contemplating
income replacement.
Second, STOLI transactions are often marketed without adequate
disclosure of their downsides to insureds, including taxes, fees, reduced
eligibility for Medicaid and other programs, and difficulty obtaining new
insurance policies after the transaction.243 Third, they are intended to
circumvent insurable interest law.244 The law has found it worrisome what
strangers might do with a financial interest in the insured’s passing; even
family members murder one another enough for insurance proceeds.245
Perhaps more important was the general distastefulness of gambling on
another person’s life.246 As a result, many legislatures passed statutes
recognizing the common law requirement that only those with appropriate
interests in the insured living could own insurance against her dying.247


242

Tax Treatment of Single-Premium Life Ins. Before the Subcomm. on Tax'n
and Debt Mgmt. of the Senate Comm. on Fin., 100th Cong. 118 (1988) (statement
of Dennis E. Ross, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the
Treasury) (“In certain cases, life insurance may enable the surviving spouse and
minor children to avoid becoming dependent on governmental assistance, thereby
relieving the government of an obligation it otherwise would have to assume.”).
243
Bob Lotane, STOLI – It’s Not Dead Yet, FLORIDA UNDERWRITERS
MAGAZINE, Feb. 2010.
244
See generally, 28 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE §
174.02 (2d ed. 2009) (“The requirement that a person purchasing a life policy must
have some interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the continued life of the insured. . .
.”).
245
Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1999)
(wife murders husband).
246
GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 24:117 (2d ed.
1984) (“The reason given for such rule is that a contract made [devoid of an
insurable interest] is against public policy on the theory that the beneficiary would
be more interested in the early death of the insured than in the prolongation of his
life. The purpose . . . is to prevent wagering contracts on the life of another by one
having no insurable interest therein”); see also Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149,
156 (1911) (“[T]he ground of the objection to life insurance without interest in the
earlier English cases was not the temptation to murder but the fact that such wagers
came to be regarded as a mischievous kind of gaming.”).
247
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103(c)(1) to (2) (West 2009) ("In the
case of individuals related closely by blood or by law, a substantial interest
engendered by love and affection [and i]n the case of other persons, . . . a lawful
and substantial economic interest in having the life . . . of the individual insured
continue . . . ."). 
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STOLI policies contemplate circumventing these statutes to whatever
degree possible.
This article should not be taken to endorse or ease the creation of
STOLI transactions. Article 9’s freedom of assignment will not invalidate
efforts to prevent STOLI transactions. True, Article 9 will not abide policy
provisions limiting transfers of the policy to third parties.248 However,
insurance policies may be rescinded for fraud, and almost all policy
applications ask questions about intentions to transfer the policy to a third
party. Insurers will be free to rescind policies that appear to have been
fraudulently obtained, particularly during the contestability period.249 And
Article 9 is explicit that its assignment facilitation clause250 will control
only for the creation of security interests.251 STOLI transactions involve
absolute assignments of the entire policy; hence other statutes252 and
contract provisions can constrain these transfers. It is possible to
distinguish STOLI from reform of life insurance securitization.253 Many
states have already taken action to bar STOLI254 without taking a stand


248

Franklin L. Best, Jr., Securitization Of Life Insurance Policies, 44 TORT
TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 911, 929-30 (2009) (discussing drafting of policies to
allow rescission). 
249
See 29 APPLEMAN, supra note 244, at § 178.03 (insurance statutes set a
period of years after which insurance companies may generally not contest a
policy’s validity for reasons of fraud in acquisition).
250
U.C.C. § 9-408 (2010). 
251
Id. comment 3. 
252
Section 9 of the NAIC Viatical Settlements Model Act provides that
"[p]rior to the initiation of a plan, transaction or series of transactions, a viatical
settlement broker or viatical settlement provider shall fully disclose to an insurer a
plan, transaction or series of transactions, to which the viatical settlement broker or
viatical settlement provider is a party, to originate, renew, continue or finance a life
insurance policy with the insurer for the purpose of engaging in the business of
viatical settlements at any time prior to, or during the first five (5) years after,
issuance of the policy." NAIC VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 9.
253
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 12. See also Life Settlements and the
Need for Regulatory Transparency Before the S. Special Comm. On Aging, 111th
Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Mary Beth Senkewicz, Deputy Ins. Comm’r, Florida
Office of Ins. Reg.); Cory Chmelka, Premium Financing: The Time Is Now, CPA J.
(Sept. 2009); Christina Pellett, Life Settlements Poised for ‘Natural Growth,’: But
Producers Still Lacking in Education, AGENT’S SALES J. (Feb. 2010) (“While the
two are often tied together in media coverage, life settlements are not the same
as STOLI - though some STOLI arrangements do involve life settlements.”).
254
Best, supra note 248, at 917-27.
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against life insurance related financial products, and even the life
settlement industry generally opposes STOLI.255
E. INSURANCE INDUSTRY VITALITY
Any reform proposal must take into account the vitality of the
insurance industry as a whole. As described above, increasing credit to
insureds will reduce lapse.256 The reduction in lapse will tend to be among
the impaired policies, resulting in adverse selection (from the insurance
company’s perspective).257 One may speculate that a general reduction in
lapses by policyholders could lead to more payouts to insurance
beneficiaries, and consequently increased costs for insurance companies.
Insurance companies might pass on costs to other consumers,258 or face a
risk of insolvency.259 Such results would decrease the utility of a
competitive credit regime.


255

Life Settlement Industry Opposes Stranger-Originated Annuities,
MARKETWIRE (May 5, 2010), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/LifeSettlement-Industry-Opposes-Stranger-Originated-Annuities-1160433.htm. 
256
See LeBel & Tillinghast, supra note 33. See also Jim Connolly, New
Persistency Study Shows Lapse Rates Have Generally Declined, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH (May 4, 2008). 
257
Best, supra note 245, at 915. 
258
Hanming Fang & Edward Kung, How Does Life Settlement Affect the
Primary Life Insurance Market? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15761, 2010), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/5329 (“[L]ife
insurance companies, as represented by the Deloitte Report (2005), claim that the
life settlement market, by denying them the return on lapsing or surrendered
policies, increases the costs of providing policies in the primary market. They
allege that these costs will have to be passed on to consumers, which would
ultimately make the consumers worse off.”).
259
Perhaps this is why most life insurance companies oppose securitization of
policies. Press Release, Am. Council of Life Insurers, Statement of the ACLI
Regarding Securitization of Life Settlements (Feb. 3, 2010), available at
http://www.secondaryinsurancemarketblog.com/files/aclipolicy.pdf. Statement of
the ACLI Regarding Securitization of Life Settlements (Feb. 3, 2010) (“ACLI
Statement”), available at http://www.acli.com/NR/rdonlyres/972B2B38-89F04683-B236-A01360544A9F/23344/STOLI_SecuritizationPolicyFinal_020310.pdf
(The American Council of Life Insurers are a trade group for life insurance
companies. They mainly oppose securitization out of fear that it will increase
demand for fraudulent STOLI policies); But see Press Release, Institutional Life
Markets Ass’n, ACLI Mixes “Apples and Oranges” to Mislead Customers (Feb. 4,
2010), available at
http://www.lifemarketsassociation.org/documents/PR-
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However, the SEC Life Settlements Task Force was not persuaded
that lapse-reduction threatens the industry.260 The Task Force noted that
prudent pricing models involve conservative lapse rate assumptions.261 At
worst, certain insurance companies will suffer, but the industry as a whole
will remain healthy.262
Moreover, reforms to the law of assignment are likely to be to the
benefit of the insurance industry, for at least four reasons. First, these
proposals are efficiency increasing, and insurance companies should be
able to obtain some compensating share of the surplus. For example, legal
reform will reduce costly litigation and confusion that currently is a cost for
insurers too.263
Second, whatever wealth is transferred from insurance companies
to creditors and investors is likely to find its way back to insurance
companies anyway. Insurance companies are the ones with the best
actuarial information and they are, theoretically and actually, the most
likely third-party creditors against other insurance company’s policies.


%20ACLI%20misleads.pdf; Press Release, Life Insurance Settlement Association,
Life Insurance Settlement Association Responds to Misleading ACLI Position on
Life
Settlements,
MARKETWIRE
(Feb.
5,
2010),
available
at
http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/Life-Insurance-Settlement-AssociationResponds-Misleading-ACLI-Position-on-Life-Settlements-1113175.htm.
260
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 20 (“the Task Force was told that the
extent of this impact is likely to be small.”) (citing Telephone Interview with Scott
Hawkins, Conning Research & Consulting (Mar. 30, 2010); Michael Shumrak, Life
Settlements—A Window Of Opportunity For The Life Insurance Industry?, REINS.
NEWS, Feb. 2010, at 14 (only about 1% of life policies have been settled)). 
261
SEC, STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 20 (citing Christian Kendrick,
Special Report: Return of Premium Products, TRANSAMERICA REINS. (Jul. 13,
2007), available at http://www.transamericareinsurance.com/Media/media_
associateArticle.aspx?id=295); see also DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP & THE UNIV.
OF CONN., THE LIFE SETTLEMENT MARKET: AN ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE ON
CONSUMER
ECONOMIC
VALUE
12
(2005),
available
at
http://www.quatloos.com/uconn_deloitte_life_settlements.pdf (a life settlements
transaction “generally has minimal or no impact on the anticipated profitability of
a life insurance contract because the persistency of an unhealthy policyholder is
precisely what is assumed at the time of original pricing.”). 
262
SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 20. 
263
See Knippenberg, supra note 11, at 226 (“The long and the short of it is,
there are risk and costs. . . to insurers who are driven to interpleader actions or, not
infrequently, forced to justify as defendants the payment of proceeds to one or
another of multiple claimants.”) (citing Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Brown
Schools, 757 S.W.2d. 411, 414 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)). 
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Much of what insurers lose in lapse-reduction will really represent a
transfer from one insurance company to another, with the consumer as the
incidental beneficiary.
Third, insurers may sometimes be pleased that their customers turn
to third parties for credit. Policy loans disrupt insurer cash flow, and so
their dynamics are of vital interest to insurers.264 Since insurers may be
required by law to offer policy loans265 and may be limited by law in their
ability to charge market interest rates, there may be times where insurers
would prefer not to serve their customers’ financing needs.
This result may be exacerbated by the inverse relationship between
an insurer’s ability to lend to their customers, and their customers’ need for
loans: policy borrowing is largely driven by emergencies,266 so catastrophic
events both induce borrowing and also accelerate maturity payments.
Insureds resort to policy loans more often when other forms of credit are
difficult to obtain, regardless of the market interest rate.267 Rendering
alternative financing more accessible may induce some insureds to borrow
elsewhere. This will reduce unanticipated draws on the insurance
company’s balance sheet, even when statutory interest rate compares
favorably with the market interest rate.
Fourth, a liberal secondary market allows insurance companies
new ways to hedge risk. Actuarial technology gives insurers great power to


264

Andre P. Liebenberg, James M. Carson, & Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand
for Life Insurance Policy Loans, 77 J. RISK & INS. 651, 651 (2010). 
265
See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 21.45.080(a) (West 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-1208(A) (2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1209(A) (2011); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 2911(a) (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-25-3(5) (West
2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2510(1.) (2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 175, § 132(7) (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.03(g) (West
2011); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 33-20-131(1) (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44502(8) (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 688A.110(1) (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17B:25-8 (West 2011); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3203(8)(A) (McKinney 2011); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3915.05(G) (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 743.186(1)
(West 2011); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 510(h) (West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. §
38-63-220(k)(1) (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-15-15 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 8, § 3731(7) (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 48.23.080(1) (West
2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-13-8(a) (West 2011). See also Metro. Life Ins. Co.
v. Mass. Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724, 728, (1985).
266
Liebenberg, Carson & Hoyt supra note 264.
267
A. Edward Day & Patric H. Hendershott, Household Demand for Policy,
44 J. RISK & INS. 441 (1977). But see J. David Cummins, An Econometric Model
of the Life Insurance Sector of the U.S. Economy, 40 J. RISK & INS. 533 (1973)
(arguing for both market interest rate and alternative funds hypotheses).
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predict the time and extent of their liabilities, but insurers currently can do
nothing to meet expected and liabilities except altering their asset mix. An
insurance company that recruited heavily in the past may be able to predict
substantial liabilities in a decade or so. But it faces the possibility that its
cash-out date will be a depressed period for the investment market; an
insurance company with significant fixed liabilities maturing in 2008 may
have had more difficulty paying than one paying the same liabilities in
1998.
As it stands, an insurance company can respond to such risks by
shifting from risky, illiquid assets (that may earn higher returns) into
comparatively safer, liquid assets (that may earn less attractive returns).
This is a method of mitigating risk, but it is a crude method and it sacrifices
returns.
Insurance companies would do better if they could periodically
update their inter-temporal diversification.268 With a robust secondary
market, an insurance company could buy policies due to mature at the same
time as those they have issued. Then they would be due payments at the
same time their own liabilities matured. Put simply, insurers could make
sure that cash was flowing in to match the cash that was flowing out. The
more robust the secondary market, and the easier to pool insurance-linked
assets, the easier and cheaper for insurance companies to rebalance their
portfolios. It is perhaps no wonder that the largest insurance policy
securitization to date, and the only rated securitization, was internal to an
insurance company.269
IV.

CONCLUSION

The advantages of having a single commercial law govern secured
transactions in every state were known to the drafters of the Code and have
since been demonstrated to practitioners who may have been initially
skeptical. Life insurance policies were excluded from the scope of Article 9
because of industry resistance, but that resistance rested on skepticism
about the merits of Article 9.


268

See IAN AYRES & BARY NALEBUFF, LIFECYCLE INVESTING (2010)
(describing the Samuelson Share, and methods for investors to achieve
intertemporal diversification). 
269
Meg Green, AIG Files First Rated Life Settlement Securitization,
BESTWEEK, Apr. 16, 2009 ($8.4 billion transaction internal to an AIG subsidiary);
see also SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 15-16 (discussing securitizations).
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The time for skepticism is over. Importantly, the legal morass of
the common law has become more of a problem since the time when the
code was contemplated. Removing almost all other secured transactions to
the Code has left insurance alone to develop the case law, leaving industry
practices to exist in uncertain tension with the throwback common law.
The law governing perfection and surplus allocation is unclear and
at odds with creditors’ expectations. The reservation problem, too, stands
as an impediment on securitization and resale, and a source of potential
litigation.
All these problems would be solved by bringing interests in life
insurance policies into the scope of the UCC. The nature of the inclusion
can be debated. The simplest, clearest solution is for life insurance policies
to be treated as general intangibles, but even if they are given their own
rules within the UCC, as they are in California and Louisiana, the system
will be much improved.
The path leading away from exclusion has ramifications for reform
projects generally. In reform projects, compromises may sometimes be
struck. But the transactions left unchanged because they are “good
enough,” do not remain good enough as the market grows in response to
the reform.
Perhaps if Article 9 had not created a unified security regime, the
disparate types of security agreements would have grown together
organically, jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with life insurance policies lending
among them. But the growth of non-UCC securitization has been isolated
and localized life insurance policy collateral, stunting the growth and
rationalization of the law of insurance-backed-lending.
Moreover, the success of Article 9 security agreements in other
areas has led to a rise in successful securitizations. The market expects that
assets can be used in sophisticated financing agreements and
securitizations. Article 9 has created an expectation of, and appetite for, a
high standard of efficiency and predictability in financing transaction. As it
stands, life insurance policies cannot satisfy that appetite. Every reform
compromise carries with it the possibility of regression, making the
unreformed law even worse than before. For the life insurance policy
exclusion, and other opportunities for reform, fuller reform is the better
policy.
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INTRODUCTION

Sexual offenders constitute a grave social problem in contemporary
American society.1 For a quarter century, sexual abuse claims have been
brought against an increasing number of Roman Catholic dioceses and
priests,2 and against members of other religious denominations as well.3
1

See, e.g., MySpace Pulls 90,000 Sex Offenders From Site, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH, Feb. 4, 2009, at A3 (noting that this figure was nearly double what
MySpace officials had originally reported the previous year).
2
See, e.g., Scott Glover & Jack Leonard, Cardinal Mahony Under Federal
Fraud Probe Over Abusive Priests, Sources Say, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009
(reporting that Cardinal Mahony “was accused of transferring priests who molested
children to other parishes rather than removing them from the priesthood and
alerting authorities.”); see also David L. Gregory, Some Reflections on Labor and
Employment Ramifications of Diocesan Bankruptcy Filings, 47 J. CATH. LEGAL
STUD. 97 (2008) (discussing the significance of Roman Catholic dioceses filing for
bankruptcy in the wake of clergy sexual abuse scandals, and making significant
mention of liability insurers proactively filing declaratory judgment actions to
avoid coverage in clergy sexual abuse claims). Clergy sexual abuse claims have
not been limited to the United States, and high profile clergy sexual abuse claims
also have been reported in a number of other countries as well, including Australia,
Brazil, Britain, Ireland, France, Italy, Germany, and Belgium. See, e.g., Henry
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Sexual predators who abuse minor children should be prosecuted to
the fullest extent of the law, and face serious criminal and civil liability for
their detestable acts. But should these sexual abuse claims, including
clergy sexual abuse, be covered under liability insurance policies, which
commonly exclude acts that are “expected or intended from the viewpoint
of the insured”? The courts have been far from uniform in addressing this
and other related issues arising under liability insurance policies.4
Beginning with the earliest claims for insurance for sexual abuse,
liability insurers typically have denied coverage for such claims under
standard liability insurance policies. Insurers long have contended that the

Chu, Cardinal Asked Victim to Keep Silent, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2010 (“The
former head of Belgium’s Roman Catholic Church acknowledged Monday that he
was wrong to have urged a sexual abuse victim to stay quiet until after the bishop
who repeatedly molested him over a span of 13 years could retire.”).
3
See, e.g., Carolyn Peirce, Jewish Coalition Want Abuse Victims to Speak Out,
WASH. EXAMINER, Jan. 25, 2009, available at http://washingtonexaminer.com
/local/jewish-coalition-want-abuse-victims-speak-out (reporting on an Orthodox
Jewish cantor who had previously participated in an international child
pornography ring. “It’s like the Catholic Church all over, but not as large,” one
coalition member stated.); see also Charles Toutant, Mormon Church Sued on
Charges of Sexual Abuse by Youth Leader, 185 N.J. L.J. 475 (2006) (reporting that
a Mormon bishop from Provo, Utah notified the child abuser’s new ward, or
congregation, about his previous criminal sexual offenses in Utah and Wisconsin,
but the ward still put him in positions working with children in Dallas, Texas, and
later working with children in Ledgewood, New Jersey).
4
See, e.g., STEVEN PLITT, DANIEL MALDONADO & JOSHUA D. ROGERS,
COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D §§ 127:24-127:28 (2008 rev. ed.) [hereinafter COUCH
ON INSURANCE]; JERRET E. SALE & LINDA M. BOLDUAN, Insurance Coverage for
Sexual Molestation, in 3 Rowland H. Long, The Law Of Liability Insurance Ch.
11C (Matthew Bender ed. 2010) [hereinafter LONG ON LIABILITY INSURANCE]; see
also Jesse J. Cooke, Book Note, Beyond an Unfortunate “Occurrence”: Insurance
Coverage and the Equitable Redress of Victims of Sexual Predator Priests, 36
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1039 (2004); Barron L. Weinstein, Sexual Misconduct Claims: A
Policyholder’s Perspective of Key Coverage Issues, 38 THE BRIEF 49 (2009);
James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of Provisions
of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by
Insured, 31 A.L.R. 4th 957 (1984); Joseph Conder, Annotation, Liability of Church
or Religious Society for Sexual Misconduct of Clergy, 5 A.L.R. 5th 530 (1992),
superseded in part by Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Liability of Church or
Religious Organization for Negligent Hiring, Retention, or Supervision of Priest,
Minister, or Other Clergy Based on Sexual Misconduct, 101 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2002).
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standard general liability policy was not intended to cover intentional acts,
including sexual abuse.5
At the same time, the insurance industry has made available a
special “sexual abuse” coverage endorsement to add coverage specifically
for sexual abuse. When the sexual abuse endorsement is purchased,
liability coverage for sexual abuse is expressly afforded.6 However, most
insureds have not purchased this add-on coverage.
Because insurance generally exists only to provide indemnity for
fortuitous, unexpected, and accidental loss, and because insurance
generally does not provide coverage for intentional acts, liability insurers
usually except from coverage intentional acts, or “expected or intended”
injury.7 Indeed, the underlying public policy rationale against insurance
indemnification for intended loss is so strong that the courts will in some
circumstances forbid payment of insurance benefits, even if the insurance
policy is silent on this particular point. However, the states differ markedly
on the type of intentional conduct that is sufficiently volitional in nature to
bar coverage.8
Over the last decade, a number of policyholders facing sexual
abuse claims, including clergy sexual abuse, have taken the position that
even if a sexual offender’s acts arguably were “expected or intended,” and
therefore excluded from coverage under a liability insurance policy’s
“expected or intended” provision, the sexual offender’s employer,
supervisor, or religious order might still come within policy coverage under
the legal doctrine of negligent supervision, negligent hiring, negligent

5

See, e.g., Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158, 158-59 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Altena v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 422 N.W.2d 485, 490
(Iowa 1988); Rodriguez ex rel. Brennan v. Williams, 713 P.2d 135, 137-38 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1986) (“The average person purchasing homeowner’s insurance would
cringe at the very suggestion” that the person was paying for coverage for sexual
abuse, “[a]nd certainly [the person] would not want to share that type of risk with
other homeowner’s policy holders.”).
6
See, e.g., Jane D. v. Ordinary Mut., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995); Dobbs v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 773 N.E.2d 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
7
See generally ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 63C (4th ed. 2007); JEFFREY R. STEMPEL,
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS §§ 1.06[B], 1.08[2] (3d ed., rev. vol. 2010).
8
See generally EMERIC FISCHER, PETER N. SWISHER & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL,
PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 58-68 (3d rev. ed. 2006).
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retention, or under similar doctrines based upon negligence principles
rather than based on intentional acts by the insured.9
This article addresses issues that arise when a policyholder under a
standard general liability insurance policy, not containing an express sexual
abuse coverage endorsement (or an express sexual abuse exclusion), seeks
insurance coverage for sexual abuse claims. Such cases continue to
increase in frequency as the legacy of sexual abuse and molestation
generates an unrelenting deluge of insurance coverage claims.
The purpose of this article is to explore and analyze the case law
and various legal theories supporting and rejecting liability insurance
coverage claims involving institutional sexual abuse allegations. This
article concludes by recommending a better-reasoned objective concurrent
causation legal doctrine that would bring a realistic, and more uniform,
judicial approach to the liability insurance interpretive conundrum
involving clergy sexual abuse coverage disputes. The article also
synthesizes the law concerning other prominent coverage issues in the
rapidly developing area of sexual abuse insurance claims.
A. CIVIL ACTIONS TO RECOVER FOR SEXUAL ABUSE.
Until the 1980s, civil actions for sexual abuse were uncommon,
although examples dating back more than fifty years can be found.10
Certainly, in the United States there were far fewer reports of clergy sexual
abuse in earlier years, and almost certainly fewer instances of sexual abuse

9

See, e.g., Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 169 F.3d
947 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying Illinois law) (holding that the negligent training and
supervision of a minister was covered, even though the minister’s sexual assault
was not covered); Mfrs. & Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 498 S.E.2d 222 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a claim of negligent entrustment was covered,
although sexual molestation of minors by the insured was not covered). But see
Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (10th Cir. 1996)
(applying Minnesota law) (holding that negligent and reckless supervision claims
involving a priest child molester were not covered since the Archdiocese knew or
should have known that personal injury from child sexual abuse was highly likely
to occur); Am. Commerce Ins. Co. v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185 (R.I. 2002) (holding
that a separate negligent supervision claim was not covered since it causally
resulted in the sexual molestation of a child).
10
See, e.g., McLeod v. Grant Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360 (Wash.
1953) (student who allegedly was raped at school claimed school was negligent in
leaving students unsupervised and allowing access to darkened area).
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in general.11 However, by the late 1970s, reports of sexual abuse of
children had sharply increased,12 and claims seeking financial
compensation for sexual molestation increased rapidly.
In recent decades, assorted youth organizations have been sued for
sexual molestation, although in many cases the courts have held such
sexual abuse was not foreseeable.13 In some of these cases, plaintiffs have
alleged prior knowledge on the part of a responsible parent or supervisor.
However, allegations concerning pervasive knowledge and deliberate
tolerance of sexual abuse – and even conspiracies to allow it or to conceal
it – are rarely pled in suits against lay organizations, although they have
became a staple of clergy sexual abuse lawsuits during the last two
decades, as discussed below.
Adults sued for sexual abuse occurring within their own home also
have been held subject to liability under principles set forth in Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 316 (Duty of Parent to Control Conduct of Child).14
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 provides that parents are obligated to
prevent their children from creating a risk of bodily harm to others if the
parent “(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control
his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity
for exercising such control.”15
Similarly, one may be subject to liability for sexual offenses
committed by one’s spouse. “[W]hen a spouse has actual knowledge or
special reason to know of the likelihood of his or her spouse engaging in
sexually abusive behavior against a particular person or persons, a spouse
has a duty of care to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the harm . .
11

See THE NAT’L REVIEW BD. FOR THE PROT. OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG
PEOPLE, A REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE UNITED
STATES 22-25 (2004).
12
Id. at 23.
13
See, e.g., Doe v. Goff, 716 N.E.2d 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that the
Boy Scouts of America could not be held liable for failure to prevent the sexual
assault of a Boy Scout because it was unforeseeable); H.B. ex rel. Clark v.
Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1996) (holding that a trailer park manager
did not have a duty to warn or protect children whom she knew were being
sexually abused by a resident); Montgomery v. YMCA of Cincinnati, 531 N.E.2d
731 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
14
See, e.g., Gritzner v. Michael R., 611 N.W.2d 906 (Wis. 2000).
15
Id. Likewise, there is a duty to control the conduct of a third person as to
prevent him from causing physical harm to another if a “special relationship”
exists between the actor and the other person that gives to the other a right of
protection. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(a)–(b) (2010).
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. [and] breach of such a duty constitutes a proximate cause of the resultant
injury, the sexual abuse of the victim.”16 For example, a wife who invited
children to visit her house, when she knew her husband had molested
women and children in the past, was subject to liability in negligence.17
Even a grandmother was held subject to liability for failing to protect her
granddaughter from a known risk of sexual abuse by the grandfather.18
Such actions, however, rarely compare to clergy sexual abuse
litigation in terms of the alleged degree of institutional knowledge and
culture of tolerance of sexual abuse. It is largely these features that
generate profound questions whether general liability policies afford
coverage in regard to clergy sexual abuse actions.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS AND ORDERS
Public knowledge of sexual abuse by Roman Catholic clergy
became widespread in 1984 with the well-publicized revelations
concerning Father Gilbert Gauthe in Lafayette, Louisiana. Prior to 1984,
the Catholic Church, like many organizations that minister to minors, long
had been troubled by pedophilia and similar abuse by its employees and
agents.19 In 1957, a Church expert in treating offenders reportedly had
advised one or more archbishops that: “Experience has taught us these men
are too dangerous to the children of the parish and the neighborhood” to
16

J.S. ex rel. C.S. v. B.J.H., 714 A.2d 924, 935 (N.J. 2000).
Pamela L. v. Farmer, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). See also Big
Brother/Big Sister of Metro Atlanta, Inc. v. Terrell, 359 S.E.2d 241 (Ga. Ct. App.
1987) (social service organization); Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 843 P.2d 154 (Idaho
1982) (wife’s “acts or failure to act . . . may have created or contributed to the
environment which permitted her ex-husband’s [molestation],” but did not
constitute an occurrence under insurance policy because it was not the conduct that
caused the injury); Metro. Prop. & Cas Ins. Co. v. Miller, 589 N.W.2d 297, 300
(Minn. 1999) (suing wife for her “alleged failure to warn of or prevent the abuse”
where husband molested minor child).
18
Doe v. Franklin, 930 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App. 1996). But see, e.g., T.A. ex
rel. Kramer v. Allen, 669 A.2d 360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (holding that stepgrandparent did not owe any special duty to step-grandchildren to control her
husband’s conduct, and was thus not liable for her husband’s abuse under
negligence theory).
19
See generally Rev. Thomas Doyle, A Very Short History of Clergy Sexual
Abuse in the Catholic Church, CRUSADE AGAINST CLERGY ABUSE,
http:\\www.crusadeagainstclergysbuse.com/htm/AShortHistory.htm (last visited
Feb. 22, 2011).
17
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continue in their current ministries.20 By 1971, there allegedly were
discussions at the bishopric level concerning clergy sexual abuse.21
The perceived institutional character of the sexual abuse problem
(particularly pedophilia) in religious organizations helps explain why civil
complaints frequently allege facts indicating such organizations possessed
a high degree of knowledge that minor laity were in jeopardy of abuse by
priests. For example, complaints not uncommonly allege the failure of the
religious organization to report prior known instances of child abuse.22
Allegations of prior knowledge are alleged with distinct conviction. A
representative complaint alleges:
Although [defendant order of friars] knew Father Posey
was unsuitable for his position, they failed to review and
monitor his performance, to confront him, and to sanction
him about “known irregularities in his employment,” e.g.,
taking young children on trips and to his home.23
Civil conspiracy claims also frequently accompany claims of
clergy sexual assault or abuse.24 A typical complaint alleges that school
administrators:
agreed or otherwise conspired to cover up incidents of
sexual abuse of minors by Salesian priests and/or
educators and to prevent disclosure, prosecution and civil
litigation including, but not limited to: failure to report
incidents of abuse to law enforcement or child protection
agencies; denial of abuse [they] had substantiated; aiding
criminal child molesters in evading detection, arrest and
prosecution; allowing criminal child molesters to cross
state and international borders for purposes of gaining
access to uninformed parents whose innocent children
could be sexually abused; failure to warn; and failure to

20

Id.
Id.
22
See, e.g., Nunnery v. Salesian Missions, Inc., No. 07-2091, 2008 WL
1743436, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2008).
23
John Doe CS v. Capuchin Franciscan Friars, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130
(E.D. Mo. 2007).
24
See Nunnery, 2008 WL 1743436.
21
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seek out and redress the injuries its priests and / or
educators had caused.25
In litigation against Capuchin Franciscan Friars, it was
alleged:
Defendants knowingly failed to disclose Father Posey’s
sexual misconduct. … Defendant[s] and the Roman
Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis and the Archbishop of
the Archdiocese of St. Louis, in concert with one another,
and with the intent to conceal and defraud, conspired and
came to a meeting of the minds whereby they would
misrepresent, conceal, or fail to disclose information
relating to the sexual misconduct of Defendant[s]’ agents.
By so concealing, Defendant[s] committed at least one act
in furtherance of the conspiracy.26
Such allegations, it has been held, are premised on factual assertions and
thus “cannot be characterized as . . . ‘bald assertions’ and ‘legal
conclusions draped in the guise of factual allegations …“allegations.’”27
In sum, complaints against clergy and religious institutions are
often distinguished by (1) allegations of specific facts constituting prior
knowledge, and (2) allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and other similar
schemes. These alleged fact patterns form the predicate for an expanding
body of law concerning insurance coverage for clergy sexual abuse.28
Liability insurance policyholders who would be barred from
coverage for acts of sexual misconduct that are expected or intended from
25

Id. at *7.
Capuchin Friars, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1129.
27
Nunnery, 2008 WL 1743436 at *7.
28
Moreover, since a number of sexual abuse “occurrences” have taken place
over a period of many decades, and since some states have suspended otherwise
applicable statutes of limitation, and now allow plaintiffs in sexual abuse cases to
bring previously barred claims, the possibility of multiple liability insurers and
“lost policies” over many years may constitute another real problem. See, e.g., City
of Sharonville v. Am. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 833 (Ohio 2006) (holding that
when a liability insurance policy has been lost or destroyed, the existence of
coverage may be proved by secondary evidence other than the policy itself,
including circumstantial evidence of payment records, renewal letters,
miscellaneous correspondence, or prior claim files, unless the record contains
evidence that the policy was lost or destroyed in bad faith).
26
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the viewpoint of the sexual molester,29 are increasingly bringing coverage
claims they assert are predicated upon negligence-based claims against the
sexual molester’s employer, supervisor, religious organization, or another
co-insured. These underlying claims typically are based upon claims of
negligent supervision, negligent employment, negligent retention, and other
negligence principles involving vicarious liability. The courts have been
far from uniform in how they treat such claims.30
Although many courts have not recognized vicarious sexual abuse
liability claims based upon agency principles31 or based upon the doctrine
of respondeat superior,32 nevertheless the courts are deeply divided on the
29

See generally infra Part II (discussing and analyzing the Intentional Acts
Exclusion).
30
See generally COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 4, § 127:27; LONG ON
LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 4, ch. 11C.02[8]; Cooke, supra note 4;
Weinstein, supra note 4; Conder, supra note 4; Shields, supra note 4.
31
See, e.g., Capuchin Friars, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (holding that sexual
misconduct by a Roman Catholic priest toward his student did not fall within the
scope of the priest’s employment under Missouri law, and therefore a religious
order could not be held liable for the priest’s actions under an agency theory); Gray
v. Ward, 950 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (similar holding); Eckler v. Gen.
Council of Assemblies of God, 784 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. App. 1990) (summary
judgment granted to defendant church based on an agency theory alleged by the
plaintiff).
32
See, e.g., Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church, 869 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. La.
1993), aff’d, 32 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Roman Catholic church
was not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the alleged illicit
sexual acts of a Roman Catholic priest, where such acts were not in furtherance of
the priest’s duties and did not advance church doctrine, and where there was no
evidence that the church authorized the priest’s illicit sexual acts in advance, or
ratified them afterwards); Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles,
79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the doctrine of respondeat
superior was not available to impose liability on a religious institution based upon
allegations of childhood sexual abuse by a priest, since this sexual abuse was
outside the scope of the cleric’s employment); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic
Diocese, 909 A.2d 983 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that a bishop, monsignor,
and the church were not vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior for sexual assaults committed by a priest on a minor since it was contrary
to the teachings of the church, and the priest’s sexual assaults on the minor were
repugnant to his employer’s business and in contravention to the employer’s aims
and rules); Elders v. United Methodist Church, 793 So.2d 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001) (holding that the local church, the church conference, and church district
superintendents were not liable to a member of the congregation for alleged sexual
misconduct by a pastor under the doctrine of respondeat superior, since the sexual
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issue of whether a church or other religious organization should be held
liable for the negligent hiring, the negligent retention, or the negligent
supervision of a priest, minister, or other clergy member based upon
allegations of sexual misconduct.
A number of courts have recognized such claims based upon
vicarious liability principles of negligent hiring, negligent retention, or
negligent supervision of a priest or other clergy member.33 Other courts,
misconduct of the pastor was for personal motives, and not to further the interests
of the church); Olinger v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 521 F. Supp. 2d 577 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (holding that the church
could not be vicariously liable under Kentucky law for a missionary’s alleged
sexual molestation of a minor child, since there was no evidence that the
missionary or anyone else believed that he was acting to further the interest of the
church at the time of the alleged sexual misconduct, and such sexual molestation
was clearly outside the scope of the missionary’s employment). But see Doe v.
Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (plaintiff’s respondeat superior
claim survived motion to dismiss on basis that church knew or should have known
about past misconduct and mental disease or defect made misconduct a realistic
threat, but noting that this was a “remarkably tenuous” basis for imposing
respondeat superior liability); Parks v. Kownacki, 711 N.E.2d 1208 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999) (holding that questions of material fact as to whether a parish priest was a
child abuser or not, and whether the church or diocese which appointed the priest
knew, or should have known, of his tendencies precluded the dismissal of a lawsuit
against the church and the diocese based on the doctrine of respondeat superior),
rev’d, 737 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. 2000).
33
See, e.g., Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 56 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.
Conn. 1999) (applying Conn. law) (holding that the Roman Catholic Marianist
Society had actual or constructive knowledge of the priest’s grossly inappropriate
sexual misconduct toward the plaintiffs); Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 1077-78
(applying Iowa law) (holding that a parishioner’s allegation that the church,
diocese, and bishop knew of a priest’s “mental disease or defect” and the threat
posed to parishioners was sufficient to state a claim for negligent supervision
arising out of the priest’s sexual assault of the parishioner); Mark K., 79 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 78 (holding that in an action for negligent supervision and retention of a
priest who sexually molested a child, the archdiocese had failed to warn the victim
of the priest’s known propensity for engaging in sexual misconduct with boys);
Fortin v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208 (Maine 2005)
(stating there were sufficient facts to hold the diocese liable for negligent
supervision of a priest who sexually abused a parochial school student and altar
boy); Hutchison ex rel. Hutchinson v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999) (finding
that the Roman Catholic Church, bishop, and diocese negligently hired, supervised,
and retained a priest, despite knowledge of his pedophilic disposition, when the
priest later molested a minor in a motel room).

366

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 17.2

however, have not recognized these vicarious liability claims sounding in
negligence.34 Still other courts have split in holding that the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution may—or may not—bar a
legal action against a church or other religious organization for the
negligent retention or supervision of a clergy member who engaged in
sexual misconduct.35
34

See, e.g., Wilson v. Diocese of N.Y. of the Episcopal Church, No. 96 Civ.
2400, 1998 WL 82921 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1998) (applying N.Y. law) (holding that
an Episcopal diocese and individual church were not liable for the negligent
supervision or training of a priest who allegedly sexually assaulted the plaintiff,
where there was no evidence that the diocese knew, or should have known, of any
alleged propensity on the priest’s part to commit sexual assault); Beach v. Jean,
746 A.2d 228 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that defendant Roman Catholic
diocese and church could not foresee the specific sexual harm alleged by the
plaintiff, and did not know or suspect that the pastor posed a risk to minors);
Iglesia Cristiana La Casa Del Señor, Inc. v. L.M., 783 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that the church did not have actual or constructive notice of
the pastor’s sexual misconduct); Pachulski v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Grand
Rapids, No. 205293, 1999 WL 33441139 (Mich. Ct. App. June 18, 1999) (holding
that the diocese and the diocese’s bishop had no actual knowledge of the priest’s
sexual misconduct with a minor); C.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Evangelical Lutheran Church
in Am., 726 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that church entities were
not liable for the minister’s sexual abuse of a minor under the theory of negligent
supervision, since there was no evidence that the church was put on notice of the
minister’s sexual abuse); N.H. v. Presbyterian Church, 998 P.2d 592 (Okla. 1999)
(holding that the critical element for recovery under a negligent hiring, retention,
or supervision theory is the employer’s prior knowledge of an employee’s
propensity to commit the harm, and the national organization had no notice of any
previous act or incident that would have alerted it to the fact that the minister was a
pedophile, and was sexually abusing children); Eckler, 784 S.W.2d at 941 (holding
that in order for an act of negligence to be a proximate cause of the injury, it must
be a cause in fact of the injury, and the injury must be reasonably foreseeable. The
court noted that the general church council had not been notified of any complaints
against the local church or a youth minister who had allegedly sexually abused
children, and therefore it had no duty to supervise or investigate the local church
and its ministers); Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 700 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 2005)
(holding the archdiocese was not liable under a negligent supervision claim, since
there was no evidence that the archdiocese knew or should have known of the
priest’s abusive tendencies at or before the time the minor was sexually abused).
35
See, e.g., Ehrens v. Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d 328
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(purportedly applying New York law); Gray, 950 S.W.2d 232; Mars v. Diocese of
Rochester, 763 N.Y.S.2d 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563
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When the religious organization is subject to liability, the
organization almost invariably looks to its insurer to defend it and to pay
claims. We now analyze and discuss the developing law concerning
insurance coverage for sexual abuse claims.
II.

THE DEVELOPING LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
COVERAGE FOR SEXUAL ABUSE CLAIMS
A. OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES

Modern standard general liability policies condition insurance
coverage on whether there has been an “occurrence.” These policies
typically define “occurrence” as:
An accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
general conditions, resulting in bodily injury or property
damages neither expected nor intended from the standpoint
of the insured.
Also, standard general liability policies often include the following
exclusion:
We will not provide insurance:
2. For personal injury or property damage:
a. which is either expected or intended by you;
This is known as the “intentional act exclusion.”
In light of the afore-cited and similar provisions, many sexual
abuse coverage disputes have turned upon: (1) whether sexual molestation
falls within the policy’s intentional act exclusion, or (2) whether sexual
molestation meets the “occurrence” definition in the policy. The decisions
usually analyze whether bodily injury was “expected” or “intended” by the
insured. In addition, some courts ask a threshold question: whether sexual
abuse itself can be an “accident.”
N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1997). But see Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d 1121 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995); Fortin, 871 A.2d 1208; Olson v. First Church of the Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d
254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn,
654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (App. Div. 1997); Christopher B. v. Schoeneck, No. 99-0450,
1999 WL 1102901 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 1999), review denied, 2000 Wisc.
LEXIS 305 (Feb. 22, 2000).
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The “expected or intended” question must be addressed even when
the policy does not contain an “intentional act” exclusion. This is because
the “occurrence” definition, contained in the vast majority of standard
general liability policies, affords coverage only for bodily injury that is
“neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.” It has
been held that this “neither expected nor intended” clause in the
“occurrence” definition is the equivalent of the intentional act exclusion.36
Accordingly, decisions applying the intentional act exclusion, as discussed
infra § IIB, frequently provide guidance regarding the “occurrence”
question.
B. THE “EXPECTED” OR “INTENDED” ISSUE UNDER GENERAL
LIABILITY POLICIES
An “occurrence” in homeowners and commercial general liability
insurance generally is limited to unexpected, unintended, and accidental
loss.37 Also, many liability insurance policies contain an “intentional act
exclusion” providing that coverage is excluded for “bodily injury or
property damage that is expected or intended by the insured.”38 The
underlying public policy rationale of this “intentional act exclusion” in
liability insurance is that it would defeat the purpose of insurance and
encourage “moral hazard” if a policyholder could be compensated for
losses he intentionally brings about, knowing that the insurer would be
liable for any resulting damages or personal injury.39
But how have the courts decided which acts are “expected or
intended by the insured”? There are currently three major judicial
36

W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 492 (W. Va. 2004)
(citing Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 891 (Me. 1981)).
37
See generally STEMPEL, supra note 7, at § 1.06[B][1].
38
See 1 SUSAN J. MILLER & PHILLIP LEFEBVRE, MILLER’S STANDARD
INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 214, 409, 414 (4th ed. 1995) (citing to the
Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) Forms HO 00 03 04 91 (Homeowners
Insurance) and CG 00 01 10 93 (Commercial General Liability Insurance)); see,
e.g., Transamerica Ins. Grp. v. Meere, 694 P.2d 181, 186 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc)
(holding that there is a strong underlying public policy that forbids insurers from
indemnifying persons against loss resulting from their own willful wrongdoing.
The intentional act exclusion therefore “is designed to prevent an insured from
acting wrongfully with the security of knowing that his insurance company will
‘pay the piper’ for the damages”).
39
See, e.g., W. Nat’l Assurance Co. v. Hecker, 719 P.2d 954, 959-60 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1986).
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approaches for interpreting the “expected” or “intended” question under
liability insurance policies involving sexual abuse claims: (1) the
“objective” or “classic tort” standard for determining acts that are intended
or expected from the viewpoint of the insured; (2) the “subjective” or
“particular insured” standard for determining acts that are intended or
expected from the viewpoint of the insured; and (3) the “inferred intent”
standard as applied to child sexual abuse cases.40
1. The “Objective” or “Classic Tort” Standard for
Determining Intentional Acts in Liability Insurance
Coverage Disputes
Under an “objective” or “classic tort” standard, a court will look at
the natural and probable consequences of the insured’s deliberate act in
order to determine the insured’s intent.41 If an intentional act by the
insured results in injuries that are, in an objective sense, the natural,
foreseeable, and probable result of the insured’s intentional act, such loss is
excluded from coverage under the liability insurance intentional acts
exclusion.42 Commentators have differed, however, on whether this

40

See, e.g., Peter C. Haley, Paradigms of Proximate Cause, 36 TORT & INS.
L.J. 147, 149 (2000) (“Proximate cause is a factor in all three types of civil actions
seeking damages: common law torts, common law contract, and statutory.
However, tort actions have been the subject of most of the judicial and scholarly
attention devoted to proximate cause.”).
41
See, e.g., CNA Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 666 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Ark. 1984)
(sexual assault of a minor); see also Truck Ins. Exch. v. Pickering, 642 S.W.2d
113, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (involving an intentional wrongful death action and
holding that “one is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of
his acts and conduct.”); Mutual Serv. Cas. Co. v. McGehee, 711 P.2d 826, 827-28
(Mont. 1985) (action for battery); Fuisz v. Selective Ins. Co. of America, 61 F.3d
238 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying Va. law) (defamation action). But see also Rodriguez
v. Williams, 729 P.2d 627, 629-30 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (criticizing this
“objective” or “classic tort” standard in an insurance law context). See also infra
note 43 (citing additional authority).
42
See, e.g., COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 4, at § 127:2d (“A majority of
courts utilize an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intentional.
Accordingly, sexual abuse is considered an intentional act when the injury is the
natural and probable consequence of the insured’s conduct.”) (citing to a number
of cases arguably supporting this proposition, including B.B. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 8
F.3d 1288, 2195 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Mo. law); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v.
Fore, 785 F. Supp. 947, 956 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Troy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 789 F.
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traditional “objective” or “classic tort” standard applied to cases of rape,
sexual assault, and sexual molestation is the majority view,43 or a minority
view.44
2. The “Subjective” or “Particular Insured” Standard for
Determining Intentional Acts in Liability Insurance
Coverage Disputes
Under a “subjective” or “particular insured” standard, the court
must find not only that the insured intended a specific act, but also that the
insured intended a specific harm.45 The “subjective” standard—that the
insured must have intended both the conduct in question, and the insured
must have intended some type of injury,46 or a particular type of injury,47 is
the majority approach today48 involving most intentional acts committed by
Supp. 1134, 1136 (D. Kan. 1992); Fernandez v. Strand, 63 F. Supp. 2d 949, 956
(E.D. Wis. 1999)).
42
See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 439-69 (commenting that the
“classic tort” or “objective” standard is a minority approach); LONG ON LIABILITY,
supra note 4, at § 11C.02[1][c][i] (same).
43
See, e.g., MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166, 1167 (N.H.
1984) (concerning battery and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
arising out of the alleged sexual abuse of a minor); N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Stanhope,
No. 09-078, 2010 WL 3934335, at *5 (Vt. 2010).
44
See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 439-69 (commenting that the
“classic tort” or “objective” standard is a minority approach); LONG ON LIABILITY,
supra note 4, at § 11C.02[1][c][i] (same).
45
See, e.g., MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166, 1167 (N.H.
1984) (concerning battery and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
arising out of the alleged sexual abuse of a minor); N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Stanhope,
No. 09-078, 2010 WL 3934335, at *5 (Vt. 2010);
46
See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 816 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1991)
(assault and battery claims); Amco Ins. Co. v. Haht, 490 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1992)
(alleged battery and wrongful death claim caused by a thrown baseball); Tenn.
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 814 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. 1991) (alleged arson of
property).
47
See, e.g., Providence Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 638 A.2d 1246 (N.H. 1994)
(personal injury from a BB gun); Columbia Cas. Co. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 617
S.E.2d 797 (W.Va. 2005) (suicide deaths of inmates). But see also FISCHER,
SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 8, at 62 (“The specific intent view errs too greatly
in favor of the policyholder by insulating him or her from the financial
consequences of antisocial conduct.”).
48
But see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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an insured in liability insurance coverage disputes other than child sexual
abuse cases.49
A growing number of courts have questioned whether this majority
“subjective” standard approach is appropriate in liability insurance claims
involving child sexual abuse allegations. Although an insured seeking
coverage for injuries arising out of sexual misconduct and sexual abuse
may argue that he or she had no subjective intent to “harm” the minor
child,50 most courts have characterized these subjective assertions made by
adult sexual molesters that they did not subjectively intend to harm their
child sexual abuse victims as “absurd” and “irrational”51 For example, the
California Supreme Court in the case of J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance
Co. v. M.K.,52 observed that the insurer contended coverage was excluded:
[T]he [sexual] molestations were intentional. Defendants
respond that even an intentional and wrongful act is not
excluded from coverage unless the insured acted with a
“preconceived design to inflict injury.” They contend
psychiatric testimony shows that molesters . . . often intend
no harm despite the depravity of their acts, and that the

49

See generally FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 8, at 58-65; JERRY
& RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 463-67.
50
See, e.g., Atl. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Tots & Toddlers Pre-Sch. Day Care Ctr.,
Inc., 571 A.2d 300, 303 (N.J. Super. 1990) (“While socially unacceptable, [the
insured sexual molester] argue[s] a pedophile or other sexual deviant may not
necessarily [subjectively] intend to cause his or her victims any injury, even though
that behavior may constitute criminal activity.”); see also Northland Ins. Cos. v.
Coconut Island Corp., 961 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D. Maine, 1997); Fire Ins. Exch. v.
Abbott, 251 Cal. Rptr. 620, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (similar subjective arguments
made by sexual abusers).
51
See, e.g., Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1989)
(holding that the sexual molester’s subjective argument “defied logic”); Mut. of
Enumclaw v. Merrill, 794 P.2d 818, 820 (Ore. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the
sexual molester’s subjective argument was “little short of absurd”); see also CNA
Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 666 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Ark. 1984) (“We agree with the view
expressed by the dissent in the Court of Appeals in this case, that for a stepfather in
such a situation ‘to claim that he did not expect or intend to cause injury, flies in
the face of all reason, common sense and experience.’”) (quoting CNA Ins. Co. v.
McGinnis, 663 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (Corbin, J., dissenting)).
52
J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K, 804 P.2d 689 (Cal.), cert. denied sub nom,
502 U.S. 902 (1991).
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molestation is often a misguided attempt to display love
and affection for the child.53
The court concluded:
We conclude there is no coverage as a matter of law. No
rational person can reasonably believe that sexual
fondling, penetration, and oral copulation of a five-yearold child are nothing more than acts of tender mercy . . .
The courts of many other states also have considered the
issue and, almost without exception, have held there is no
coverage.54
Because the subjective intent test is capable of reaching a
conclusion – that the molester intended no harm – that is anathema to
prevailing logic and public policy sensibilities regarding child abuse and
molestation, it has fallen into extreme disfavor over the last decade.
Accordingly, the “inferred intent” standard has emerged as the majority
view today.
3. The “Inferred Intent” Standard as Applied to Child Sexual
Abuse Cases
A substantial majority of courts have applied an “inferred intent”
standard to bar coverage in sexual molestation cases involving an adult
sexual predator and a sexually abused child, even when the insured sexual
molester asserts the absence of any subjective intent to harm the child.55
53

Id. at 693.
Id.
55
See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Abraio, 874 F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir.
1989) (applying Cal. law) (holding that there is an irrebuttable presumption of
intent to harm as a matter of law in child molestation cases); J.C. Penney, 804 P.2d
at 695 (“There is no such thing as negligent or even reckless sexual molestation.
The very essence of child molestation is the gratification of sexual desire. The act
is the harm. There cannot be one without the other. Thus, the intent to molest is, by
itself, the same as the intent to harm.”), cert. denied sub nom, Kelley v. J.C.
Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 502 U.S. 902 (1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589
N.E.2d 365, 369 (N.Y. 1992) (“[I]n the exceptional case of an act of child
molestation, cause and effect cannot be separated; that to do the act is necessarily
to do the harm which is its consequence; and that since unquestionably the act is
intended, so also is the harm.”). See generally Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
54
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The underlying public policy rationale for this “inferred intent” standard
when applied to child sexual abuse claims is premised on a state’s criminal
prohibition of sexual contact between an adult and a child,56 as well as the
reasonable expectations of the parties to coverage.57
Although a majority of courts have adopted and applied this
“inferred intent” standard in cases where the insured asserts a subjective
intent not to harm the minor victim, a more subtle issue is raised when the
insured asserts an incapacity to form any requisite intent. Some courts
have reasoned that if the nature and character of the act are such that an
intent to harm may be inferred, such as in cases involving the insured’s acts
of child sexual abuse, then any question of an inability to form this intent to
harm, whether it arises out of alleged mental disease or incapacity, or
whether it arises out of voluntary intoxication, is immaterial in resolving
the insurer’s obligation to coverage, and the insured’s intent to harm in

Co., 995 F.2d 457, 461-62 nn.5-6 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying Pa. law) (stating that
this majority “inferred intent” standard applied as a matter of law to child sexual
abuse claims has been adopted in Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin); see also
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1987); State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Davis, 612 So.2d 458, 463-64 (Ala. 1993) (also collecting cases from
other jurisdictions); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415, 418-19 (Colo.
1990), rev’g, 768 P.2d 731 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero,
589 N.E.2d 365, 368 (N.Y. 1992), rev’g, 561 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)
(also collecting cases from other jurisdictions).
56
See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Smith, 907 F.2d 900, 902 (9th Cir.
1990) (predicting Nev. law); Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1051, 1053
(Fla. 1989); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589 N.E.2d 365, 369 (N.Y. 1992);
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Abernethy, 445 S.E.2d 618, 620 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994);
Rodriguez v. Williams, 729 P.2d 627, 630 (Wash. 1986).
57
See, e.g., Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 457, 464 (3d Cir.
1993) (applying Pa. law) (“[T]he average person purchasing homeowner’s
insurance would cringe at the very suggestion that he was paying for [coverage for
liability arising out of his sexual abuse of a child]. And certainly he would not
want to share that type of risk with other homeowner’s policy holders.”) (quoting
Rodriguez ex rel. Brennan v. Williams, 713 P.2d 135, 137-38 (Wash. Ct. App.),
aff’d, 729 P.2d 627 (Wash. 1986)); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589
N.E.2d 365, 370 (N.Y. 1992); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d 581,
586 (W. Va. 1988) (similar holdings).
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such a context therefore is irrelevant.58 Other courts hold that, as a matter
of law, an insured may never assert a lack of capacity to form intent caused
by voluntary intoxication as a defense to the application of an intentional
act exclusion, regardless of the act committed.59 A minority of other courts
have held, however, that where an incapacity to form intent to harm is
alleged, that incapacity may render unintentional any harm caused by the
insured, so that such an incapacity must be considered by the finder of fact
when resolving the issue of any existence of intent to harm.60
In conclusion, under either the “objective” or “classic tort”
standard,61 or under an “inferred intent” standard,62 the overwhelming
majority of American courts have persuasively-- and correctly-- held that
an adult sexual molester of an abused child will not be entitled to coverage
under a liability insurance policy based upon its intentional acts
exclusion.63
58

See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Jenner, 874 F.2d 604, 605,
607 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying Cal. Law); Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So.2d
1051, 1053 (Fla. 1989); Pub. Emps. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rash, 740 P.2d 370, 373
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
59
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hampton, 433 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1988); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979).
60
This is the minority “Arizona rule.” See, e.g., Globe Am. Cas. Co. v.
Lyons, 641 P.2d 251, 254 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (“derangement of . . . intellect”);
Parkinson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979)
(voluntary intoxication); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Talhouni, 604 N.E.2d 689,
691-93 (Mass. 1992) (further explaining Worchester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day
Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958, 965 (Mass. 1990)). See Wiley v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 457, 465-67 (3d Cir. 1993), for the application of
Pennsylvania law to and a general discussion of these three judicial approaches to
the “inferred intent” rule when the insured asserts his or her incapacity for an intent
to harm.
61
See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
62
See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
63
See generally COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 4, at § 127:26; FISCHER,
SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 8, at 64-66; LONG ON LIABILITY, supra note 4, at
§ 11C:02[1]. Although the underlying rationale for applying an “inferred intent”
standard when the sexual abuse victim is a minor may not always apply when the
victim is an adult, a majority of courts nevertheless still apply this “inferred intent”
standard to adult sexual abuse victims, as well as to child sexual abuse victims.
See, e.g., W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Vago, 553 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990);
Rulli v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 479 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); see
also W. Nat’l Assur. Co. v. Heckler, 719 P.2d 954, 960 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986)
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C. THE “EXPECTED OR INTENDED” STANDARD APPLIED TO
INSURANCE CLAIMS BY EMPLOYERS AND SUPERVISORS OF
THE ABUSER
Most current insurance coverage claims involve the sexual
molester’s employer, supervisor, or religious organization who is allegedly
responsible under a legal doctrine of negligent supervision, negligent
hiring, negligent retention, or under a similar vicarious liability doctrine
based upon negligence principles, rather than based upon the intentional
acts of a sexual molester that were “expected or intended” by the insured.
1. The “Accident” Requirement
Most contemporary homeowners and general liability insurance
policies provide coverage only for accidental “occurrences.” For example,
a typical homeowner’s policy provides coverage for “bodily injury” or
“property damage” caused by an “occurrence.” Occurrence typically is
defined to mean “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general harmful conditions.”64 General liability
insurance policies likewise cover “bodily injury” or “property damage”
caused by an “occurrence,” where an “occurrence” generally is defined as
“an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions,
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured.”65
An “occurrence” under liability insurance coverage must be an
accidental event. It has been said that an “accident” is an unintended and
unanticipated event, and that it occurs without design, coordination, or
expectation.66 In other words, bodily injury or property damage that is the
(“[T]he nature of the act, its forcible and nonconsensual character, and the harm
that certainly results makes the inference of intent no less strong [than in a child
sexual abuse case]”).
64
See, e.g., Insurance Services Office Inc. [ISO] Form HO 00 03 04 91
[Homeowners Insurance].
65
See, e.g., Insurance Services Office Inc. [ISO] Form GL 00 00 01 73
[General Liability Insurance] (emphasis in original). See generally LONG ON
LIABILITY, supra note 4, at § 11C.02[1][a].
66
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steele, 74 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir. 1996)
(applying Minn. law) (“[An accident is] an unexpected happening without
intention or design.”); High Country Assocs. v. N. H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 478
(N.H. 1994) (“[W]e interpret ‘accident’ in the definition of ‘occurrence’ to mean
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probable, intended, or expected result of the insured’s actions is not injury
or damage that was caused by an accidental occurrence.67 Whether an
accidental event occurred for the purpose of liability insurance coverage
usually is considered from the viewpoint of the tortfeasor-insured.68
Decisions outside the realm of sexual abuse claims sometimes have
turned on the “neither expected nor intended” wording in the “occurrence”
clause in determining whether particular forms of misconduct qualified as
an “occurrence.” These decisions assume that if the resulting injury was
not expected or intended by the insured, coverage exists even if the
underlying tort, such as gradual pollution or long-term asbestos exposure
arguably was not what ordinary people would refer to as an “accident.”69
Such decisions do not treat “accident” as an independent
requirement for an “occurrence” to exist.70 Rather, they implicitly
conclude that the “expected or intended” clause does not narrow the
meaning of “accident,” but instead subsumes the term “accident.” A
circumstances . . . that were unexpected and unintended from the viewpoint of the
insured.”); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting
Co., 923 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Ore. 1996) ([T]he word ‘accident’ denotes an incident
or occurrence that happened by chance, without design, and contrary to intention
and expectation.”) (quoting Finley v. Prudential Ins. Co., 388 P.2d 21, 26 (Or.
1963)).
67
See, e.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Mach. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (“An ‘accident’ is an event which takes place without having been foreseen,
expected, or anticipated by anyone . . . . If an occurrence is the ordinary and
expected result of the performance of an operation, then it cannot be termed an
accident.”); Green Const. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1000,
1002 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (“An ‘accident,’ as that term is used in standard CGL
policies ‘means that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or
design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen.’”), vacated on other
grounds, 975 F. Supp. 1365 (W.D. Mo. 1996); Gassaway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 439
S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tenn. 1969) (“[D]efined accident as used in liability insurance
policies as an event not reasonably to be foreseen, unexpected and fortuitous.”).
68
See, e.g., Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Blazer, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1085 (D.
Nev. 1999); Agoado Realty Corp. v. United Int’l Ins. Co., 733 N.E.2d 213, 216
(N.Y. 2000).
69
E.g., Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 416 S.W.2d at
396, 400-01 (Tex. 1967) (holding that the negligent application of a pesticide that
had a cumulative toxic effect was an “accident”); see also King v. Dallas Fire Ins.
Co., 27 S.W.3d 117, 123 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
70
See Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 540, 548 (Md. 1996)
(negligence is deemed “accidental” so long as it causes damage that is unforeseen
or unexpected by the insured).
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number of decisions have followed this analysis in sexual abuse cases,
concluding that damage was not “expected or intended,” without
considering further whether what occurred would be regarded by anyone as
an “accident.”71
These decisions, however, do not confront the issue of whether the
term “accident” in the definition of “occurrence” possesses a meaning that
is independent of the “neither expected nor intended” clause. On the other
hand, a significant number of other courts – particularly when addressing
sexual abuse and molestation claims on public policy grounds – have
concluded that the term “accident” does have independent meaning. These
decisions, involving sexual abuse allegations, generally hold that, in
determining whether the sexual misconduct has resulted in an
“occurrence,” the threshold question is whether the alleged misconduct can
aptly be regarded as an “accident.” If it cannot, there is no further inquiry.
For example, as the Colorado Court of Appeals, in Mountain States
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hauser, recently observed, even if the insured’s
negligence in hiring the perpetrator is alleged as a cause of the victim’s
injuries, “it was not a risk covered by the policy since it was not an
‘accident.’”72 Citing decisions from California and New York, the court
held: “Negligent hiring/supervision [of a sexual molester] is not an
‘accident.’”73 The court explained further:
[The insured] cites no case where an intentional act of
sexual assault constituted an ‘“accident” or ‘“occurrence”
within the meaning of a comprehensive general liability
policy. Rather than resort to “head-spinning judicial
efforts at definition,” we conclude that the common
understanding of an “accident” does not include the
[sexual] assault that occur here.74
71

See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. White, 913 N.E. 2d 426, 431-32 (Ohio 2009)
(citing cases in other jurisdictions).
72
Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hauser, 221 P.3d 56, 60 (Colo. Ct. App.
2009) (citing Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Bay Area Cab Lease, 756 F.
Supp. 1287, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (cab company employee sexually molested a
passenger)).
73
Id. at 60 (citing Bay Area Cab Lease, 756 F. Supp. at 1289).
74
Id. The Hauser court indicated that absent an “accident” the “standpoint of
the insured-employer” was irrelevant. However, because the insured-employer
allegedly expected injury, the court did not need to decide whether a nonexpectation of injury has any relevance where the underlying event was not an
“accident.” Id. at 62.
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An accident is never present when a deliberate act is performed
unless some additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening
occurs which produces the damage, the court added.75 This analysis
assumes particular importance in “negligent hiring” and “negligent
supervision” cases (as in Hauser) where the policyholder usually asserts
the injuries were neither “expected nor intended” from its standpoint (as
distinguished from the molester’s standpoint). The “accident” requirement
also can limit coverage for abuse claims based on alleged
“misrepresentations” by a school or church that children would be safe
from abuse.76
It is difficult to predict how influential the Hauser approach will
be. Certainly, the alternate approach – which focuses exclusively on the
“expected or intended” clause – may be unwelcome in those jurisdictions
that claim to place particular emphasis on reading insurance contract
provisions as a whole, so that each provision is afforded meaning.77 But
75

Id.
John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 2009AP2266, 2010 WL
4723728, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2010) (“The cause of the plaintiffs’
injuries, the misrepresentation by the Archdiocese, cannot be characterized as
accidental. The affirmative representations of safety by the Archdiocese did not
occur by chance, nor was it unforeseen or unintended. . . .”).
77
See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 469 F.3d 1158, 1163
(8th Cir. 2006) (applying Ark. law) (“Different clauses of an insurance contract are
read together to harmonize all parts because it is error to give effect to one clause
over another when the two clauses are reconcilable.”); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Treesdale, Inc., 418 F.3d 330, 336 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying Penn. law) (“[Insured]
focuses on phrases that it believes are favorable to its interpretation and ignores all
of the other language that runs counter to its interpretation."); Premcor USA, Inc.
v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 400 F.3d 523, 529 (7th Cir. 2005), as amended on reh'g,
(Apr. 21, 2005) (applying Ill. law) (“Our task is to determine whether this
provision remains ambiguous when viewed in the context of the entire . . .
policy."); Herman Miller, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 162 F.3d 454, 455 (6th Cir.
1998) (applying Mich. law) ("Viewed alone, we could not say that the terms
'piracy,' 'idea misappropriation,' or 'unfair competition' could never constitute
patent infringement. However, to draw such an inference when considering these
terms within the policy as a whole construes them too broadly."); Silverball
Amusement, Inc. v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 842 F. Supp. 1151, 1159 (W.D. Ark.
1994), aff'd, 33 F.3d 1476 (8th Cir. 1994); Am. Guarantee and Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Shel-Ray Underwriters, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 325, 331 (S.D. Tex. 1993); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Hardnett, 763 So. 2d 963, 965 (Ala. 2000) ("The provisions of the policy
cannot be read in isolation, but, instead, each provision must be read in context
with all other provisions."); Van Ness v. Blue Cross of Cal., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 511,
76
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those court decisions that conflate “injury neither expected nor intended”
with “accident” seem to read the policy as if it defined “occurrence” as:
An accident, meaning an event, including continuous or
repeated exposure to conditions, causing property damage
or bodily injury that is neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured.
However, this questionable interpretation differs from how the clause
actually reads, which is:
An accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
conditions, resulting in property damage or bodily injury
that is neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of
the insured.
Thus, in the “occurrence” definition, as it actually reads, the clause
beginning “resulting in” modifies, and narrows, the definition of
“accident.” By analogy, the words “that is” within this clause have an
effect much like they would in a sentence reading: “I am looking to buy a

516 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 287
(Del. 2001) ("[A] court's interpretation of an insurance contact [sic] must rely on a
reading of all of the pertinent provisions of the policy as a whole, and not on any
single passage in isolation."); Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 622 A.2d
1074, 1076 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) ("[T]he meaning which arises from a particular
portion of an agreement cannot control the meaning of the entire agreement where
such inference runs counter to the agreement's overall scheme or plan.") (citations
omitted); Clarenden Am. Ins. Co. v. 69 W. Wash. Mgmt. LLC, 870 N.E.2d 978,
983 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Emp’rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Mich. Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 300 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Northbrook Ins. Co. v. Am.
States Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Ins. Co. of Pa. v. W.
Plains Air, Inc., 637 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Lindell v. Ruthford,
598 P.2d 616, 618 (Mont. 1979); Commercial Union Assur. Cos. v. Gollan, 394
A.2d 839, 842 (N.H. 1978); Atlas Assur. Co. v. General Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d
850, 852 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Allianz Underwriters
Ins. Co., 749 N.Y.S.2d 488, 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Little v. Blue Cross of W.
N.Y., Inc., 424 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Burgess v. N.C. Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 261 S.E.2d 234, 236 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Cincinnati Ins.
Co. v. CPS Holdings, Inc., 875 N.E.2d 31, 34 (Ohio 2007); Nat’l Union Fire Ins.
Co. v. Shane & Shane Co., 605 N.E.2d 1325, 1328 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992);
Eddystone Fire Co. No. 1 v. Cont’l Ins. Cos., 425 A.2d 803, 805 (Pa. Super. 1981).
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new car that is neither damaged nor defective.”78 No one reading this
particular sentence would conclude that the writer had made an offer to
accept an undamaged and non-defective used car. True, “undamaged and
non-defective” are essential characteristics of a new car – just as
“unexpected and unintended injury” are essential characteristics of an
“accident” – but the meaning is quite clear: the car must be new. In the
same interpretive manner, for an “occurrence” to be found, even
unintended injury must still result from an “accident.”
As one court has explained, the final clause to the “occurrence”
definition “makes it clear that not all injuries from an intended act will be
excluded, but only those injuries that were intended.”79 And as another
court has correctly observed: “There are two components that must be
shown to establish an ‘occurrence’ under the policy: (1) an accident; and
(2) personal injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from
the standpoint of the insured.”80
Courts that give independent meaning to the term “accident”
persuasively conclude that sexual abuse and molestation is not an
“occurrence,” even if such an injury was not expected or intended by the
supervisor-insured. In contrast, those judicial decisions that conflate the
two prongs of the “occurrence” definition do not explain how their
particular approach can avoid offending the interpretative rule, emphasized
in so many jurisdictions, that insurance contract provisions must be read as
a whole, giving meaning to the entire document.81
Had the “occurrence” definition merely provided that “occurrence”
means “property damage or bodily injury neither expected nor intended
from the standpoint of the insured” – omitting the “accident” predicate –
then whether the act itself was “accidental” would be beside the point. But
given that “occurrence” is defined as “an accident … resulting in damage
78

See generally. N. Crossarm, Inc. v. Chem. Specialties, Inc., No. 03-C-415C, 2004 WL 602648 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2004); Faris Mailing v. Dep’t of State
Revenue, 512 N.E.2d 480, 485 (Ind. T.C. 1987).
79
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. 1992); see also
United Pac. Co. v. McGuire Co., 281 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“Since
the word ‘event’ is not limited to fortuitous happenings, the phrase ‘not expected
or intended’ cannot be read as language confirming the meaning of the term; . . .
the phrase must be regarded as language of limitation, narrowing the coverage
otherwise provided by the word ‘event.’”).
80
Norwalk Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 1132,
1137 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Iowa Iron Works, Inc., 503
N.W.2d 596, 600 (Iowa 1993)).
81
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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neither expected nor intended by the insured, a different intent is apparent.
That is:
1. Something must happen that an
regard as an “accident;”
2. If an “accident” has occurred,
results in bodily injury that is
intended from the standpoint of
coverage.

ordinary person would
there is coverage if it
neither expected nor
the insured claiming

Nevertheless, the courts are still divided between those that grant
meaning to the term “accident” within the “occurrence” definition, and
those that focus exclusively on the “expected or intended” clause. Courts
following the former line of decisions are likely to regard claims arising
from sexual abuse and molestation as falling outside the subject of
insurance coverage, while those courts following the latter line of decisions
must determine whether the insured “expected or intended” the sexual
abuse.82
2. The “Objective” or “Classic Tort” Standard Applied to
Insurance Claims Arising from Negligent Hiring or
Supervision of a Molester
The crucial underlying legal requirement found in most clergy
negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent supervision cases is
largely based upon whether the priest or clergyman’s supervising church,
bishop, diocese, or other religious organization knew or should have known
of the offender’s sexual abuse toward minors.83 The courts have been far
from uniform in addressing this issue. As discussed earlier,84 for many
claims arising from sexual abuse, whether an “occurrence” has transpired
frequently is determined according to whether the injury caused by the
sexual misconduct was “expected or intended from the viewpoint of the
insured.” This test is derived from the final clause of the “occurrence”
definition, requiring that the injury has been neither “expected” nor
“intended.”

82

See generally infra Part II.B (involving the molester-insured); infra Part
II.C.2 (involving the supervisor-insured).
83
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
84
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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Only a few cases across the country have comprehensively
analyzed whether liability insurers can defeat coverage by asserting that,
based on their knowledge of the circumstances, an employer or supervisor
“expected or intended” injury to a sexual molestation victim.85 One
commentator notes that some courts have applied an objective standard of
what a reasonable supervisor-insured “knew or should have known,”
involving the “substantial probability” that certain consequences would
result; while other courts have applied a subjective standard involving what
a particular supervisor-insured actually “knew or believed.”86
A prime example of this objective standard is the case of Diocese
of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. et al.87
The particular
circumstances surrounding this liability insurance coverage dispute
involved a pedophilic priest, Father Adamson, who subjected several
The plaintiff,
children to prolonged periods of sexual molestation.88
Mrozka, sued the Diocese and Archdiocese, alleging they negligently and
recklessly supervised Adamson, allowing Adamson to sexually abuse
Mrozka when he was a minor. Both the Diocese and the Archdiocese
conceded negligence, but disputed their recklessness. “The jury awarded
Mrozka $821,250 in compensatory damages and, finding recklessness,
awarded $2,700,000 in punitive damages,” a punitive damage award that
was later reduced to $187,000.89 The Minnesota Court of Appeals
previously had found sufficient evidence “from which the jury could
conclude that Church officials repeatedly and knowingly placed Adamson
in situations where he could sexually abuse boys and then failed to properly
supervise him and disclose his sexual problem.”90
During the period Mrozka was sexually abused by Father
Adamson, the Diocese and the Archdiocese had standard occurrence-based
Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies from various insurers
covering, among other things, “an accident, including continuous or

85

See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 4, at 50.
Id.
87
Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8th Cir.
1996) (applying Minn. law).
88
See Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 858 F. Supp. 1407 (D.
Minn. 1994) (detailing facts surrounding Father Adamson’s accused sexual
molestation); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (same).
89
89 F.3d at 1389.
90
482 N.W.2d at 813.
86
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repeated exposure to conditions, which results in personal injury . . . which
is neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”91
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that although “an
insured has a reasonable expectation in securing a CGL policy that the
policy will cover some negligent acts, it does not necessarily follow that all
negligent acts are covered.”92 Accordingly:
[t]he issue then is whether a reasonably prudent person in
the position of the Diocese and the Archdiocese knew or
should have known that Adamson’s abuse of Mrozka was
substantially probable as a result of the continuing
exposure caused by their willful indifference. In defining
substantial probability, this court has stated, “[t]he
indications must be strong enough to alert a reasonably
prudent man not only to the possibility of the results
occurring but the indications also must be sufficient to
forewarn him that the results are highly likely to occur.”93
The case therefore was remanded to the federal district court to enter
judgment in accordance with this objective “reasonable person”
standard.94
On the other hand, an example of a subjective or “particular
insured” standard is found in the case of Roman Catholic Bishop of San
Diego v. Superior Court,95 where a parish priest, Father Omemaga,
sexually abused 15-year-old Jane D. The plaintiff alleged that the Roman
Catholic diocese and church negligently hired, retained, and supervised
Omemaga, since it knew or should have known of his dangerous
propensities as a sexual exploiter of children.
The church moved for summary judgment on the basis
[that] it was not negligent because it did not know and had
no reason to suspect Omemaga posed any risk to
parishioners prior to Jane’s report. In essence, the church
argued it had no civil duty to investigate its employees and
the constitutional requirement separating church and state
91

89 F.3d at 1389-91 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1392 (emphasis added).
93
Id. at 1391 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
94
Id. at 1399.
95
50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
92
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barred Jane’s civil action for negligent hiring and
supervision of a priest.96
As evidence of negligent hiring and negligent supervision of Father
Omemaga, the plaintiff submitted Bishop Robert Brom’s interrogatory
response stating that “depending on whether a priest is new to the Diocese
or whether he is known within the Diocese, the Chancellor of the Diocese
may ask priests … whether they have any past or present problems with
their celibacy, and whether anyone has ever made a claim of sexual
misconduct against them.” And “[a]lthough there were no detailed
guidelines how a priest demonstrates his fitness,” Father Thomas Doyle, a
canon law expert, and an expert in the field of sexual abuse of children by
clergy, testified “it is expected that a host bishop make specific inquiries as
to the priest’s background, his work record, and his character” and “Doyle
expected bishops to be ‘much more careful and even scrupulous when
investigating the qualifications of priests who will work in their
dioceses.”97 Moreover, there was also evidence that Omemaga had two
prior sexual relationships in the Philippines, and one sexual relationship in
San Diego with a parishioner, and Jane’s attorney argued that the church
was negligent in hiring Omemaga because, as part of the screening process,
the church failed to ask him “whether he had problems with his vows of
celibacy.”98
Nevertheless, the California Court of Appeal observed that Jane D.
did not have an actionable negligent hiring, negligent retention, or
negligent supervision claim against the Diocese under a subjective
“particular insured” standard. Opined the court: “Even if the church had
learned of Omemaga’s prior sexual affairs with adults, it is illogical to
conclude the church should have anticipated Omemaga would commit
sexual crimes on a minor.”99 The decision demonstrates how the subjective
standard varies from the objective standard exemplified in cases such as
Diocese of Winona. As one commentator notes, in jurisdictions that apply
96

Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 403.
98
Id. at 401, 405.
99
Id. at 405. But query: Why is it so “illogical” that a priest who has broken
his vow of celibacy with adults may also break his vow of celibacy with minors as
well? See also Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 79 Cal.
Rtpr. 2d 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that in an action for negligent retention
and negligent supervision of a priest who sexually molested a child, the
archdiocese failed to warn the victim of the priest’s propensity for engaging in
sexual misconduct with boys).
97

2011

CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE CASES

385

this subjective standard, “even the egregious facts in Diocese of Winona
likely would not be sufficient to trigger the expected or intended exclusion”
to liability insurance coverage.100
Which is the better-reasoned interpretive approach—the objective
standard as illustrated in the Diocese of Winona case, supra, or the
subjective standard as illustrated in the Bishop of San Diego case, supra?
It is submitted that the objective standard clearly is the betterreasoned interpretive approach for four compelling reasons:
First, the claims of negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and
negligent retention brought against church organizations and their
supervisors for the sexual abuse of minors by priests or other clergymen all
sound in negligence which traditionally is based upon an objective
“reasonable person” standard of care.101 Moreover, in a liability insurance
context involving claims of negligence, a court generally applies an “eight
corners rule”—that is, the court will compare the “four corners” of the
underlying tort complaint with the “four corners” of the insurance policy to
determine coverage.102
Second, the “objective” or “classic tort” standard for determining
intentional acts in liability insurance coverage disputes, or alternately the
“inferred intent” standard as applied to child sexual abuse cases, is
generally recognized in an overwhelming majority of states as opposed to
the minority “subjective” or “particular insured” standard, based upon
strong public policy reasons.103
Third, a substantial majority of courts have now recognized that the
crucial underlying requirement in negligent hiring, negligent retention, and
negligent supervision of clergy cases largely is based upon whether the
priest or clergyman’s supervising church, bishop, diocese, or other

100

Weinstein, supra note 4, at 50.
The law of negligence generally imposes on each person an obligation to
conform to a reasonable person of ordinary prudence standard, an objective
standard that is now well-established in American negligence law. See, e.g., W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (W. Page
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 258
(2000).
102
See, e.g., Pekin Ins. Co. v. Dial, 823 N.E.2d 986, 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(finding no duty to defend the insured in a sexual molestation case).
103
See generally infra Part II.B.
101
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religious organization knew or should have known of the sexual offender’s
abuse toward minors—which, again, is an objective standard.104
Fourth, and of primary importance, the crucial causation
requirement in both tort law and insurance contract law also requires the
application of an objective “efficient or predominant cause” interpretive
analysis, as is discussed in more detail directly below.
3. Reassessing the Crucial Causation Requirement in
Liability Insurance Coverage Disputes Involving Sexual
Abuse of Minors
The causation requirement is a crucial factor in both tort law105 and
insurance law,106 especially involving liability insurance coverage disputes.
104

See Cooke, supra note 4, at 1063 (“If a reasonably prudent person in the
position of the Church would expect or should expect that an employee is a danger
to innocent life, the church should bear responsibility for all resulting liability.”).
105
According to Professor William Lloyd Prosser, to establish a bona fide tort
action sounding in negligence, the plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) that the
defendant owed plaintiff a duty of due care to act in a reasonable manner toward
the plaintiff; (2) that defendant breached this duty of due care to the plaintiff; (3)
that defendant’s acts were the causal connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the resulting injury; that is to say, it was the cause in fact and the proximate
cause of plaintiff’s injury or loss; and (4) actual damage or loss occurred to the
plaintiff as a result of defendant’s actions. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 101, at
164-65. The proposed RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt. b (2010) states
that there are five elements to any prima facie case in negligence: (1) “duty”; (2)
“failure to exercise reasonable care”; (3) “factual cause”; (4) “physical harm”; and
(5) “harm within the scope of liability (which historically has been called
‘proximate cause’)” (emphasis added).
106
In an insurance law context, Professor Banks McDowell argues that the
following four factors need to be considered: (1) the coverage provisions of an
insurance policy; (2) the occurrence of the event; (3) the loss or damage; and (4)
the causal “connector” between the event and the loss. Banks McDowell,
Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 CONN. L. REV. 569, 575 (1988)
(emphasis added). McDowell goes on to state that causation “should be limited to
the connector between what, consistent with insurance terminology, may be called
an ‘occurrence,’ and the loss suffered by the insured . . . .” Id. at 575-76. See also
Sidney I. Simon, Proximate Cause in Insurance, 10 AM. BUS. L.J. 33, 35-36
(1972) (“The insurance rule is that only the proximate cause of the loss, and not the
remote cause, is to be regarded in determining whether recovery may be had under
an insurance policy, and the loss must have been proximately caused by a peril
insured against. . . . The proximate cause of loss or damage to an insured’s
property or injury to his person is not necessarily the last link in the chain of
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In an insurance law context, the courts are split on whether to apply
causation rules recognizing either: (1) the cause nearest the loss;107 or (2)
the efficient or predominant cause of the loss.108 As one of the authors of
this article previously has observed:
A growing number of American courts … have rejected a
strict immediate cause rule in favor of an efficient or
dominant proximate cause rule, analogous to a tort-based
proximate cause rule, in order to validate the reasonable
expectations of the insured policyholder to coverage.
Under this reasonable expectations hybrid of tort and
contract causation law, there will be coverage if a risk of
loss that is specifically insured against in the insurance
policy sets in motion, in an unbroken causal sequence, the
events that cause the ultimate loss, even though the last
immediate cause in the chain of causation is an excluded
cause.109
preceding events, but the procuring, efficient cause from which the effect might be
expected to follow without concurrence of any unforeseen circumstances.”).
107
See. e.g., Queen Ins. Co. of Am. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263 U.S.
487, 492 (1924) (involving a war risk marine insurance policy) (“[T]he common
understanding is that in construing these [insurance] policies we are not to take
broad views but generally are to stop our inquiries with the cause nearest to the
loss.”); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989,
1007 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying N.Y. law) (involving aviation insurance) (“These
cases establish a mechanical test of proximate causation for insurance cases, a test
that looks only to the ‘causes nearest to the loss.’”). See also Bruener v. Turin City
Fire Ins. Co., 222 P.2d 833, 834-35 (Wash. 1950) (involving automobile
insurance) (similar holding), overruled by Graham v. Pub. Emps. Mut. Ins. Co.,
656 P.2d 1077, 1081 (Wash. 1983) (involving a homeowners insurance coverage
dispute) (adopted the efficient or predominant proximate cause rule).
108
See, e.g., TNT Speed & Sport Ctr., Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 114 F.3d
731, 733 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Mo. law) (involving commercial property
insurance); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 697 A.2d 667 (Vt. 1997)
(involving automobile insurance). See generally Stempel, supra note 7, § 7.02;
Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, § 67[b].
109
Peter Nash Swisher, Causation Requirements in Tort and Insurance Law
Practice: Demystifying Some Legal Causation “Riddles”, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS.
PRAC. L.J. 1, 23-24 (2007) (citing as authority Graham, 656 P.2d at 1081 (Wash.
1983) (involving homeowners insurance)). See also John Drennon & Sons Co. v.
N.H. Ins. Co., 637 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (involving machinery and
equipment insurance).
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This is especially true with liability insurance coverage issues,
since in order to determine
whether an insurer has a duty to defend [or provide
coverage for] its insured in a lawsuit, a court should
generally apply an “eight corners rule”—that is, the court
should compare the four corners of the underlying tort
complaint with the four corners of the insurance policy and
determine whether the facts alleged in the underlying
complaint fall within, or potentially within, the insurance
policy’s coverage.110
Next, this crucial causation “connector” requires proof by the
plaintiff of the probability of harm—rather than a mere “possibility” of
harm—based upon defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff.111
Finally, when two or more defendants actively cause the plaintiff
harm, most courts will apply a “substantial factor” test, which holds that
those defendants who were a “substantial factor” and constituted the
“efficient or predominant cause” of the ultimate harm to the plaintiff,
within an unbroken casual chain of events, will be the cause-in-fact and the
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.112 This “efficient or predominant
If the clergy sexual abuse was the “efficient or predominant cause” of the
injury, and if it is excluded from coverage under an intentional acts exclusion in
the policy, then the insured will not be able to recover under the liability insurance
policy. This same result would also occur under “the cause nearest the loss”
interpretive analysis.
110
Pekin Ins. Co. v. Dial, 823 N.E.2d 986, 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding
there was no duty to defend the insured in a sexual molestation action).
111
See generally Keeton, supra note 101, at 269-72; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 430-433 (1965). See, e.g., Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire &
Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1391 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying Minn. law) (“The issue
then is whether a reasonably prudent person in the position of the Diocese and the
Archdiocese knew or should have known that Adamson’s abuse of Mrozka was
substantially probable as a result of the continuing [clergy sexual abuse] exposure
caused by their willful indifference. In defining substantial probability, this court
has stated, ‘[t]he indications must be strong enough to alert a reasonably prudent
man not only to the possibility of the results occurring but the indications also must
be sufficient to forewarn him that the results are highly likely to occur.’”) (citations
omitted).
112
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 432(2), 433, 435
(1965). See generally Dobbs, supra note 101, at 414-17, 447-51; Keeton, supra
note 101, at 263-68.
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cause” analysis is recognized in an insurance law context as well.113 But in
a liability insurance context, what “efficient or predominant cause” would
(or would not) constitute an “occurrence” in a causal chain of events
involving more than one defendant?
Since few cases to date have comprehensively analyzed whether
liability insurers can defeat coverage by asserting that a church
organization, employer, or supervisor negligently “knew or should have
known” of the “expected or intended” injuries to a sexual molestation
victim initially caused by a priest or clergyman, especially from a
necessary causation perspective, we need to analyze some analogous
liability insurance cases dealing with this crucial causation requirement.
For example, in the analogous case of Farmers Alliance Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Salazar,114 a homeowner’s insurer brought a declaratory
judgment action, seeking judicial determination that it had no obligation to
defend or indemnify either the insured son, Manuel Corrales, for his
negligent entrustment of his gun to a fellow gang member, or the insured
mother, Ofelia Salazar, for her negligent supervision of her 16-year-old son
Manuel, based on wrongful death claims arising out of her son’s
participation in the murder of another boy, Thomas Byus.115
The insurance company’s “duty to defend and indemnify Ms.
Salazar and Manuel Corrales turns on whether Thomas Byus’s death was a
‘bodily injury . . . caused by an occurrence’” under the homeowners’
liability insurance coverage. Farmers Alliance Insurance Company argued
that the murder of Thomas Byus, by firing the bullet into his head, was the
event that must qualify as an “occurrence.” Byus’s administrator in this
wrongful death action, however, “asks us to cast our focus further up the
causal chain to Ms. Salazar’s negligent supervision of Manuel and
Manuel’s negligent entrustment of the murder weapon to Jacob De
LaCruz.”116
In a case of first impression, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
applying Oklahoma law, stated:
Our search for “occurrence” policy case law addressing a
causal chain that begins with a negligent act or omission
113

See generally Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, § 67[b]; Stempel, supra
note 7, § 7.02; see also Keeton, supra note 100, § 82 (Liability Insurance and its
Impact on Tort Law).
114
77 F.3d 1291 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying Okla. law).
115
Id. at 1293-94.
116
Id. at 1295.
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and ends with an intentional tort has uncovered the
decisional equivalent of a famine. We have located no
cases addressing the issue facing us today. Therefore, we
begin our analysis with cases that might help by analogy or
deduction.
Of the scores of decisions interpreting
“occurrence” policies, two categories of cases prove
particularly instructive. The first category answers the
question of when an “occurrence” happens, and the second
focuses on where.117
The court then discussed the generally prevailing rule, recognized
by most courts, that “the time of an ‘occurrence’ generally is determined by
‘the time the complaining party was actually damaged,’” and “the location
of an ‘occurrence’ is determined by the place where the injury happened; it
does not matter that a precipitating event took place elsewhere.”118
Although these cases did not address the court’s causal link issue directly,
the court found their reasoning to be dispositive. Accordingly, the court
held in determining whether a bodily injury was “‘caused by an
occurrence’ the question of whether there was an ‘occurrence’ should be
resolved by focusing on the injury and its immediately attendant causative
circumstances.”119
Based upon the facts of this particular case, the “occurrence” was
when and where Jacob De La Cruz murdered Thomas Byus, which was an
intentional act, and therefore it could not qualify as an “accident . . . [that
was] neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”120
Consequently, the court concluded that it “need not reach the issue of
whether Ms. Salazar or Manuel Corrales actually intended or expected
Thomas Byus’s death, because intentional murder is not ‘an accident’
under the insurance policy’s ‘occurrence’ provision.”121
This same legal argument might also be applied in a liability
insurance context when a priest or clergyman intentionally sexually abuses
117

Id.
Id. at 1296 (citation omitted).
119
Id.
120
Salazar, 77 F.3d at 1297.
121
Id. Although the court did not directly address the negligent supervision
allegation involving Ms. Salazar in this particular case, the court may also have
utilized the same causation analysis found in analogous cases interpreting “Liquor
Liability Exclusions” or “Assault and Battery Exclusions” as discussed below. See
supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
118
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a minor, which clearly is not an “accidental” occurrence under the policy
coverage provisions.122
Other analogous cases have dealt with “Liquor Liability
Exclusions” or “Assault and Battery Exclusions,” which are conceptually
similar to the “Intentional Act Exclusions” involved in clergy sexual abuse
claims. For example, in the case of Property Owners Ins. Co. v. Ted’s
Tavern, Inc.,123 a tavern’s commercial general liability (CGL) insurance
policy contained an exclusion—exclusion 2(c)—concerning bodily injury
resulting from causing or contributing to the intoxication of a person, or
furnishing alcoholic drinks to someone who was under the influence of
alcohol.124 When a motorist was killed by a drunk patron, who was driving
home from the tavern, the personal representative of the deceased motorist
brought a wrongful death action against the tavern’s liability insurance
carrier, arguing that the Ted’s Tavern and its employees were liable under
the CGL policy for their negligent hiring, negligence training, and
negligent supervision, rather than coming under the policy’s liquor liability
exclusion 2(c). But the Indiana Court of Appeals disagreed with the
plaintiff’s argument, based upon relevant legal causation principles:
Regardless of the theories of liability a resourceful
attorney may fashion from the circumstances of this case,
the allegations [of negligently hiring, training, and
supervising the tavern employees] are general
“rephrasings” of the core negligence claim for
causing/contributing to [the patron’s] drunk driving. The
events outlined in [the plaintiff’s complaint] simply are
not wholly independent of “carelessly and negligently”
serving and continuing to serve alcoholic beverages to [the
impaired patron] when the defendants knew or should have
known he was intoxicated and soon thereafter could be
driving drunk. To the contrary, the… negligent hiring,
training, and supervision are so inextricably intertwined
with the underlying negligence [under the liquor liability
exclusion] that there is no independent act that would
avoid exclusion 2(c). Hence, while a valiant effort to
procure coverage, the creative pleadings of [negligent
hiring, negligent training, and negligent supervision of the
122

See supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.
853 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
124
Id. at 978.
123
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employees] cannot hide the reality that the immediate and
efficient cause of the injuries was drunk driving
precipitated by the negligent service of alcohol. As such,
exclusion 2(c) precludes coverage.125
Thus, the Ted’s Tavern court adopted an “efficient or predominant
cause” analysis, where the liquor liability exclusion—exclusion 2(c)—
barred any recovery from the liability insurance company, since the related
allegations of negligent hiring, negligent training, and negligent
supervision were not wholly independent of, and were inextricably
intertwined with, the liquor liability exclusion.
Allegations of misconduct have been deemed to be
“interdependent” with a negligence claim when the negligence claim
incorporated the facts alleged to support deliberate misconduct.126 Thus,
for example, if Count I of the complaint alleges that the insured knew the
molester presented a high level of risk of injury to children, and Count II of
the complaint “incorporates and realleges” the facts set forth in Count I,
then the court may conclude that the “negligence” count reflects an
“expectation” of harm as well.
This holding is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions as
well.127 A Delaware court, for example, considered a case in which,
following the forcible removal of a patron from an amusement park, the
patron sued the park alleging assault, battery, false imprisonment, and
‘injury with ill will, intent to injure or malice,” and also pled “negligent
supervision.”128 The court observed: “where negligence claims against an
employer such as negligent hiring, negligent training, and negligent
entrustment, are related to and interdependent on the intentional
misconduct of an employee, the “ultimate question” for coverage purposes
is whether the employee’s intentional misconduct itself falls within the
definition of ‘occurrence.’” Likewise, a Missouri court observed, in an
action against a bar owner for injuries inflicted by intoxicated patrons, that:
125

Id. at 983 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Scottsdale Ins. Co.
v. Lankford, No. 07C-06-254 RRC, 2007 WL 4150212 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 21,
2007), aff’d, 947 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2008) (similar holding).
126
See, e.g., Collins Holding Corp. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 666
S.E.2d 897, 900 (S.C. 2008).
127
See Bituminous Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Huttu, No. 4:06CV67TSLLAA, 2007 WL 188661, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 23, 2007).
128
TIG Ins. Co. v. Premier Parks, No. Civ.A02C04126JRS, 2004 WL 728858
(Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2004).

2011

CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE CASES

393

The damages arise from the assault and battery. Without
the underlying assault and battery, there would have been
no injury and therefore no basis for plaintiffs’ action
against Harverfield for negligence. The assault and battery
and Haverfield’s negligence are not mutually exclusive;
rather the acts are related and interdependent.129
Courts in Texas have applied this doctrine in several other cases as well.130
When a supervisor’s liability is stated to be on account of its own
negligence, but this negligence is alleged to be interrelated with deliberate
misconduct, the deliberate misconduct, according to these courts, becomes
determinative.131 When the negligent hiring or negligent supervision
claims require “proof of misconduct” by the offender, the only question is
whether the offender’s acts are covered under the definition of
“occurrence.”132
Accordingly, an emerging line of cases persuasively hold that
when the insured’s liability is “related to and interdependent on other
tortious activities,” the nature of that other tortious activity will determine
whether the insurance policy covers the insured supervisor.133 In Mt.
Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Stagebands, for example, claims of “negligent
design” (of a parking lot) did not permit a finding that injury was expected
or intended. The court observed:
There is no question Cortes’s injuries were caused by the
gun-shot – even if the parking layout was an after-the-fact
contributing and worsening cause. In sum, the fact that
[the insureds’] parking design negligence may have

129

Hunt v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 26 S.W.3d 341, 345 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
See State Farm Lloyds v. Borum, 53 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App. 2001); Folsom
Invs. Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 265 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Tex. App. 2000).
131
Cornhill Ins. PLC v. Valsamis, Inc., 106 F.3d 80, 87 (5th Cir. 1997)
(applying Tex. law) (citing to N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 336
(5th Cir. 1996) (applying Tex. law)).
132
Id.
133
See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 371 (5th Cir. 1998)
(applying Tex. law); Cornhill, 106 F.3d at 87 (no duty to defend employer for
negligent hiring and failure to provide safe workplace where employee sexually
harassed another employee); cf. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Stagebands Inc.,
636 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. R.I. 2009).
130
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affected [the victim] after he was shot does not make it
unrelated and independent of the assault.134
When courts have applied this analysis to negligent supervision claims in
the context of sexual abuse and molestation, they have held that the
resulting injury was not an “occurrence” within the meaning of a general
liability insurance policy:
If [the perpetrator] had not sexually molested the Isbell
daughters, Linda Isbell would have no claim for damages
against [the mother-defendant]. Thus, we find [her]
liability to be ‘related to and interdependent on’ the
tortious acts of [the perpetrator].
Because [the
perpetrator’s] underlying acts are not encompassed within
the definition of ‘occurrence,’ [the insurer] has no duty to
defend.135
These decisions reason that negligent hiring and supervision, in and of
themselves, are not actionable, and hence immaterial, absent the nonaccidental act of molestation.
Other cases are in accord with this persuasive and compelling
causation analysis. For example, in the case of Terra Nova Insurance Co. v.
Nanticoke Pines, Ltd.,136 a liability insurer brought an action seeking a
declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to defend or indemnify its
insured tavern keeper for claims asserted by Kevin Gibbs, who was shot by
the tavern’s security officer, John Hargett. The plaintiff argued that the
liability insurance coverage was premised on the negligent hiring and the
negligent supervision of the tavern’s security guard under the doctrine of
respondeat superior.137 The insurer argued, however, that it was not liable
under its “assault and battery” exclusion in the policy.
The federal district court, applying Delaware law, held that:

134

Stagebands, 636 F. Supp. 2d. at 148-49.
Am. Nat. Gen. Ins. Cos. v. Ryan, 274 F.3d 319, 325 (5th Cir. 2001)
(applying Tex. law); accord W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Embry, No. Civ.A. 3:04CV-47-H,
2005 WL 1026185 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 25, 2005); Nw. G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard,
518 N.W.2d 179, 184 (N.D. 1994).
136
743 F. Supp. 293 (D. Del. 1990).
137
Id. at 294.
135

2011

CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE CASES

395

based on the assault and battery exclusion, the complaint
does not allege a risk covered by the policy…. [T]he plain
language of the exclusion bars coverage for any claim
based on assault and battery….All the issues the complaint
raises about Nanticoke’s negligence and recklessness
[including allegations of negligent hiring and negligent
supervision] concern conduct of Nanticoke that helped
make the assault possible, and are thus fundamentally
premised on the assault itself.138
Delaware’s “fundamentally premised” causation analysis is
essentially the same as the “efficient or predominant cause” analysis
adopted in the Ted’s Tavern case, supra,139 and a number of other cases
also are in accord with this generally accepted causation analysis.140
On the other hand, policyholders might contend that the “expected
or intended” clause is not offended by affording coverage to a supervisorinsured, given that, in such a case, “the insured” claiming coverage is not
the perpetrator. The Terra Nova court noted, without deciding, this
particular distinction.141 Also, an Ohio court recently opined: “[T]orts like
negligent supervision, hiring, retention, and entrustment are separate and
distinct from the related intentional torts (committed by other actors) that
make the negligent torts actionable. Thus, in determining whether a policy
exclusion precludes coverage for that negligent act, we must examine the
injuries arising from the negligent act on their own accord, not as part of
the intentional act.”142 The court reasoned that the negligent act, standing
alone, was the “occurrence.”
Insurers might respond that, given the inevitable presence of
supervisors in connection with any such claim under a commercial liability
138

Id. at 297 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Lankford, No. 07C-06-254 RRC, 2007 WL
4150212, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. 2007), aff’d, 947 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2008).
140
See, e.g., Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. Thee Kandy Store Inc., 679 F. Supp. 476,
478 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (“Regardless of the language of the allegations, the original
cause of the harm arose from an alleged assault and battery”); Terra Nova Ins. Co.
v. North Carolina Ted, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 688, 691 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (similar
holding); see generally Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Validity, Construction,
and Effect of Assault and Battery Exclusion in Liability Insurance Policy at Issue,
44 A.L.R. 5TH 91 (1996) (reporting that the vast majority of cases are in accord
with this general causation principle).
141
Nanticoke Pines, 743 F. Supp. at 298 n. 9.
142
Safeco Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. White, 913 N.E.2d 426, 434 (Ohio 2009).
139
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policy issued to an organization, the “fundamentally premised” doctrine
properly serves to avoid nullifying the “expected or intended” clause.
Further, courts applying the “fundamentally premised doctrine” to
exclusions, consistently have supported their decisions as necessary to
defeat “artful pleading” by underlying plaintiffs.143 As stated in a decision
recently affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Lankford v. Scottsdale
Insurance Co., “[t]he purpose of Delaware’s ‘fundamentally premised’
analysis is to prevent an injured party from circumventing the clear terms
of an insurance policy by allying with the insured and by fashioning
expansive theories of liability.”144 The Lankford court cited an American
Law Reports annotation’s recognition of “the anomalous legal posture of
an insured and a victim, adversaries in one case, siding against an insurer
seeking to apply an … exclusion to the litigated claims.”145
In Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Lajoie, for example, the
Vermont Supreme Court rejected a claim for “negligent infliction of
emotional distress” arising from the insured’s alleged sexual abuse of a
minor as “simply a disingenuous attempt to create a factual dispute.”146
Courts should seek to prevent the absurdity, and possible fraud upon the
court, that might result if the law were to allow a superficial claim of
“negligence” to supersede factual allegations that reveal intentional and
deliberate conduct by the insured.147
Accordingly, this “efficient or predominant cause” interpretive
analysis may be applied—and, indeed, should be applied—to clergy sexual
abuse claims. For example, a number of courts have held that various
churches, bishops, dioceses, and other religious organizations may be held
tortiously liable for their negligent hiring, negligent supervision, or
negligent retention of a sexually abusive priest or clergyman if the church,
bishop, diocese, or other religious organization knew or should have known
of the priest’s or clergyman’s sexual misconduct.148 But in a liability
insurance context, if this negligent hiring, negligent supervision, or
negligent retention of a sexually abusive priest or clergyman was so
inextricably intertwined with, interdependent, and not independent of, the
priest or clergyman’s sexual misconduct—which was excluded under the
143

See, e.g., Winbush, supra note 140.
See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Lankford, No. 076-06-254 RRC, 2007 WL
4150212, at *8 (Del. Super. 2007), aff’d, 947 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2008).
145
Id. at *8 n.47 (citing Winbush, supra note 140, at 91).
146
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lajoie, 661 A.2d 85, 86 (Vt. 1995).
147
The distinction between actual “negligence” and the mere labeling of a
claim as “negligence” is discussed in further detail below. See infra Part II.E.
148
See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
144
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liability insurance policy’s intentional act exclusion, and which was the
“efficient or predominant cause” of the plaintiff’s sexual abuse claim—then
the supervising church, bishop, diocese, or other religious organization
should not be covered by its liability insurer under generally accepted tort
and insurance law cause-in-fact and proximate cause causation
principles.149
Consequently, if a priest or clergyman sexually abuses a minor,
this sexual abuse generally will be barred under a liability insurance
policy’s “expected or intended” exclusion, under either an objective or
“classic tort” analysis,150 or under an “inferred intent” standard as applied
to child sexual abuse cases.151 Likewise, if a supervisory church, diocese,
bishop, or other religious organization objectively knew or should have
known of the priest’s or clergyman’s sexual abuse of a minor—which was
the “efficient or predominant cause” of the minor’s sexual abuse claim—
and this negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of the sexually abusive
priest or clergyman was connected to and was not independent from the
priest or clergyman’s sexual misconduct, then liability insurance should not
cover such negligence under relevant cause-in-fact and proximate cause
principles either.
4. What is “Expected” Injury, and Does “Expected” have a
Meaning Independent from “Intended”?
As discussed above, the question whether an insured “intended”
injury has been regarded by a significant number of courts as governed by
an “objective” standard or, with children, an “inferred intent” standard.152
If a reasonable person would have foreseen injury, then, consistent with tort
law precedent, the insured’s state of mind will be deemed to reflect intent.

149

See supra notes 82-103 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Diocese of
Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying
Minn. law); see also Am. Commerce Ins. Co. v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185 (R.I. 2002)
(holding that a separate negligent supervision claim was not covered since it was
causally connected to the sexual molestation of a child, which was excluded from
coverage under the parties’ homeowners insurance policy). This same result
would apply if a particular jurisdiction applies a more traditional “cause nearest the
loss” interpretive analysis, rather than applying the modern and majority “efficient
or predominant cause” interpretive analysis.
150
See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
151
See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
152
See infra Part II.B.
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In interpreting “expected” or “intended” provisions, however, the
“expected” prong, inexplicably, is often overlooked. Yet it is as much an
interpretive hurdle to a finding of coverage as the requirement that the
injury would not have been “intended.” Thus, even when the injury was
not “intended,” a second question still remains: If injury was not
“intended,” might it nevertheless have been “expected”? The answer is
“yes,” when supported by operative facts, according to those courts that
have given independent meaning to both terms: i.e., “expected,” as well as
“intended.”
Some decisions, it should be noted, have deemed “expected” to be
synonymous with “intended.”153 A few courts have assumed there is no
difference between the terms “expected” and “intended” in determining
whether the “intentional acts exclusion” applies.154 Other courts, however,
have concluded that the terms “expected” and “intended” are not
synonymous.155 It has been observed: “Determining a person’s expectation
involves a different inquiry than does determining his or her intent.”156 If
only “intention” needed to be considered, the use of the word ‘expected’
would be mere surplusage, which is a result to be avoided in
interpretation.”157
Generally speaking, an insured “expects an injury if he or she is
subjectively aware that injury is substantially certain to result.”158
153

See, e.g., Poston v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 320 N.W.2d 9, 11-12 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1982).
154
See, e.g., Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 301 So.2d 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974); Jones v. Norval, 279 N.W.2d 388 (Neb. 1979); State v. Glens Falls
Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 101 (Vt. 1979); Poston v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 320 N.W.2d 9
(Wis. Ct. App. 1982).
155
See, e.g., Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. Murry, 370 N.E.2d 295, 299-300 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1977) (pointing out that if “intended” and “expected” were synonymous,
there would be no point in including them both within the language of the
intentional act exclusion); see also Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d
1052 (8th Cir. 1979) (applying Iowa law); Armstrong Cleaners, Inc. v. Erie Ins.
Exch., 364 F. Supp. 2d 797 (S.D. Ind. 2005); Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins.
Co. of Mo. v. Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Nw. Nat. Cas. Co. v.
Phalen, 597 P.2d 720 (Mont. 1979); Seymour v. Lenoir Cnty., 567 S.E.2d 799
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Abrams v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 67 P.3d 931 (Or. 2003).
156
N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Perron, 777 A.2d 156, 158 (Vt. 2001) (citing City of
Burlington v. Ass’n of Gas and Electric Ins. Serv., LTD., 751 A.2d 284, 288 (Vt.
2000)); Espinet v. Horvath, 597 A.2d 307, 310 (Vt. 1991).
157
Horvath, 597 A.2d at 310; see also Phalen, 597 P.2d at 726.
158
Perron, 777 A.2d at 158 (citing Horvath, 597 A.2d at 310); accord Jenkins
v. Koester, No. 268175 2007 WL 2429846, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007);
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However, given that the insured rarely will concede that he or she expected
harm, the analysis usually turns on whether, objectively, the insured should
be regarded as having expected injury.159 The Eighth Circuit, in Diocese of
Winona defined this standard as follows:
[U]nder the substantially probable test … if an insured is
alerted to the problem, its cause, and knows or should have
known of the likelihood of the problem’s recurrence, it
cannot ignore such problem and then look to its insurer to
reimburse it for the liability incurred by reason of such
inaction.160
Thus, even in jurisdictions that have not expressly recognized an
objective test for “intended” injury, coverage may be barred for insureds
that did not wish harm to anyone, if the insured expected such injury. A
prominent case concerning expectation of harm in the context of insurance
where injury is a “substantial probability” is the Eighth Circuit’s decision
in City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. There, the court
held that “substantial probability” means “[t]he indications must be strong
enough to alert a reasonably prudent man not only to the possibility of the
results occurring, but the indications also must be sufficient to forewarn
him that the results are highly likely to occur.”161 Similarly, California
courts have held that: “[t]he appropriate test for ‘expected’ damage is
whether the insured knew or believed its conduct was substantially certain
or highly likely to result in that kind of damage.”162
It is sometimes argued that giving the term “expected” its usual
meaning, and precluding claims where the insured “should have known”
Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 882 P.2d. 703, 721-27
(Wash. 1994).
159
Argento v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1497 (7th Cir. 1988)
(“whether [property damage] was expected is a subjective inquiry, but a subjective
expectation can be inferred from objective evidence that the injury was the natural
and probable result from the act.”) .
160
Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1392 (8th
Cir. 1996) (applying Minn. law) (citing City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1059 (8th Cir. 1979)); accord Baystate Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 451
N.E.2d 880, 882-83 (Ill. 1983); cf. Lutheran Benevolent Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Catholic
Risk Retention Grp., 939 F. Supp. 1506, 1513 (N.D. Okla. 1995).
161
City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1059 (8th
Cir. 1979) (applying Neb. law).
162
FMC Corp. v. Plaisted & Cos., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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the harm would occur, cuts too broadly in precluding coverage for a
“negligence” claim. However, in Diocese of Winona, the court explained
that giving meaning to the term “expected” bars coverage only for some,
but not all, negligence claims. “While an insured has a reasonable
expectation in securing a CGL policy that the policy will cover some
negligent acts, it does not necessarily follow that all negligent acts are
covered.… [T]here may be instances when, although an insured was
negligent, she knew or should have known that resulting damage was
expected.”163 Ordinary negligence has not been deemed sufficient reason
to conclude that sexual abuse was “expected” by a supervisor or employer.
In such instances, the “expected” prong has not been deemed to bar
coverage.164
The requisite level of “expectation” was well-explained in a
homeowners insurance case in which the underlying complaint alleged that
the parents had knowledge of their son’s deviant sexual propensities, and
that he was a “continuing danger” to the claimant.165 These facts, the court
held, showed that “as competent adults, [the insureds] would have at least
expected harm to result to [the claimants] as a result of their conduct.”166
Similarly, under New Jersey law, if a spouse, even if ignorant of the actual
abuse, has “special reason to know that it was likely to occur,” no insurance
coverage exists. “Although the bodily injury for which she was being sued
may have been unintended from her perspective … it was not unexpected;
consequently, it was not an accident from her perspective and it was
outside the coverage of the policy.”167
In a recent decision, an Ohio court of appeals observed that an
insured’s denial of intent to harm was irrelevant when the act in question
was “substantially certain to result in injury.”168 There, the court held:
163

Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1392 (8th Cir.
1996) (applying Minn. law) (citing Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714,
719 (8th Cir. 1981)).
164
See, e.g., Lutheran Benevolent Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Catholic Risk Retention
Grp., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1506, 1512-13 (N.D. Okla. 1995) (distinguishing ordinary
negligence, which may give rise to a covered “occurrence,” from gross negligence,
which may not); accord Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bower, No. 1:07 CV 254,
2010 WL 4630486 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 5, 2010).
165
W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 498 (W.Va. 2004).
166
Id. at 497.
167
J.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 762 A.2d 1062, 1064 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2000) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steele, 74 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir. 1996)).
168
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, No. L-09-1146, 2010
WL 3610451, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2010).
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Based upon the Oblates’ knowledge of Rapp’s history and
his need for supervision and ongoing treatment, the
Oblates’ decision to give Rapp unfettered access to
Assumption’s parishioners, without warning, was
substantially certain to result in additional incidents of
sexual molestation of boys. Accordingly, we find that the
Oblates’ actions did not cause accidental injury to Rapp’s
victim.169
“Rather,” the court concluded, “the injury to Rapp’s victim was expected,
i.e., substantially certain to occur, and, therefore, the Oblates’ actions were
not ‘occurrences’ pursuant to CIC’s policy.”170
Applied in this manner, the “expected” standard is akin to a gross
negligence standard.171 Thus, where the claimant alleged that the
perpetrator had a history of mistreating and assaulting female employees,
and the supervisor-insured knew of at least one incident where the
perpetrator had assaulted an employee, the court concluded the insured
“knew full well what was potentially going to happen with their son [the
employee-perpetrator] and the female employees and did not care.”172 The
insurer demonstrated that the perpetrator’s “conduct was foreseeable and
not unexpected” on the part of the supervisor. Thus, with a negligent hiring
claim, “foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff is a prime factor in the duty
analysis.”173 The court concluded: “Under such circumstances, we cannot
conclude that the negligent hiring and supervision … was an ‘occurrence’
or ‘accident’ within the meaning of the policy.”174

169

Id.
Id.
171
“Ordinary negligence” has been defined as “want of ordinary care and
diligence” where “gross negligence” is defined as the “want of slight care and
diligence.” See Lutheran Benevolent Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Catholic Risk Retention Grp.
Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1506, 1512 (N.D. Okla. 1995).
172
Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hauser, 221 P.3d 56, 58 (Colo. App.
2009).
173
Id. at 61 (citing Raleigh v. Performance Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 130
P.3d 1011, 1016 (Colo. 2006)).
174
Id. In light of the high degree of foreseeability required to establish
negligent hiring/supervision, the court indicated that injury in such cases may, by
definition, be “expected” (and thus ineligible for insurance coverage), though the
court did not need to decide the point in light of the allegations that the insured
knew of prior incidents.
170
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“The terms ‘expected’ and ‘intended’ are not synonymous…;
expectation is easier to prove…”175 “Intended” injury will always be
“expected,” but “expected” injury may not have been intended. This
distinction between “expected” and “intended” is of the greatest
significance where the insured was not the sexual abuser, and may not have
intended injury. For example, a religious institution might be deemed to
have “expected” its employee to sexually molest minors if that employee
had a significant history of inappropriate conduct concerning minors.
In sum, “expected” appears to present a lower threshold than
“intended,” coming into play in circumstances when the insuredsupervisor’s error is principally one of omission rather than of commission.
“Injury is ‘expected’ even when the damages are not accomplished by
design or plan, i.e., not ‘intended,’ but are ‘of such a nature that they should
have been reasonably anticipated (expected) by the insured.’”176 As the
Eighth Circuit concluded, “[t]he difference between damages that are
reasonably foreseeable and damages that are substantially probable is one
of degree of expectibility.”177
CONSIDERING
WHETHER
“NEGLIGENT
D. DECISIONS
SUPERVISION” CAN EVER BE AN “OCCURRENCE”
A significant number of courts have concluded explicitly or
implicitly that negligent supervision is, by itself, an “occurrence,”178 and
such courts will “examine the injuries arising from the negligent act on
their own accord, not as part of the negligent acts.”179
Decisions holding to the contrary, however, have reasoned that the
tort of negligent supervision requires, as an essential element, damage to a

175

Argento v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1497 (7th Cir. 1988)
(applying Ill. law).
176
Westfield Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Cmty. Bank & Trust Co., 804 N.E.2d
601, 608 (Ill. 2003).
177
Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1392
(8th Cir. 1996) (citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 719 (8th Cir.
1981)).
178
See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. White, 913 N.E.2d 426, 434 (Ohio 2009)
(“torts like negligent supervision, hiring, retention, and entrustment are separate
and distinct from the related intentional torts [committed by other actors] that make
the negligent tort actionable.”).
179
Id.
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third party.180 “The elements of a claim for negligent hiring are: (1) a
specific tortious act by the employee; (2) the employee’s incompetence or
unfitness; (3) the employer’s actual or constructive notice of the
employee’s incompetency or unfitness; and (4) injury.”181 Absent the
fourth element – “injury” – nothing of legal significance has “occurred.”
As was said in another context, “negligence in the air, so to speak, will not
do.”182 Hiring, supervision, and retention that fall short of the standard of
care, without causing injury, are of no legal consequence.
A line of decisions reasons that, in cases of negligent supervision
or hiring, the “accident,” for purposes of considering whether an
“occurrence” happened, remains the injury-causing event – such as sexual
molestation – rather than any precipitating negligence by the insured. The
term “accident,” it has been held, “unambiguously refers to the event
causing the damage, not the earlier [negligent hiring] creating the potential
for future injury.”183 Courts in Illinois and in the Eleventh Circuit have
observed that a claim for negligence against an insured-employer does not
transform a non-accident (sexual molestation) into an accident, even if the
insured-employer did not expect harm.184 In SCI Liquidating Corp. v.
Hartford Ins. Co., for example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
that allegations of intentional sexual harassment, assault, and battery
against a manager, which formed the predicate for a claim of “negligent
retention” by the employer, are not ‘accidents’ and therefore do not
constitute an “occurrence.” The insurance coverage inquiry, it has been
held, must “focus on the ‘immediately causative circumstances.’”185
Molestation, a deliberate act, may mean that allegations of mere negligent
supervision are irrelevant, because “[t]he intentional act interrupts the
causal chain between negligent supervision and injury.”186
180

Canatillo Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 99
F.3d 695, 705 (5th Cir.1996) (applying Tex. law).
181
White v. Consolidated Planning, Inc., 603 S.E.2d 147 (N.C. 2004), rev.
denied, 610 S.E.2d 717 (N.C. 2005).
182
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928), cited in Cooper
v. Eberly, 508 P. 2d 943 (Kan. 1973).
183
Maples v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 148 Cal. Rptr. 80, 84 (Cal. Ct. App.
1978), cited in Northern Sec. Ins. Co. v. Perron, 777 A.2d 161, 162 (Vt. 2001).
184
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nat’l Union, 772 N.E.2d 247, 256 (Ill. 2002); SCI
Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 1210, 1214-17 (11th Cir.
1999).
185
SCI, 181 F.3d at 1216-17 (applying Ga. law).
186
TIG Ins. Co. v. Premier Parks, No. Civ.A.02C04126JRS, 2004 WL
728858, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2004).
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In another case, the court considered a sexual assault lawsuit
brought against the owner of a cab company that had hired a cab driver
who sexually assaulted his customer. The court held that whether or not
the cab company “expected or intended injury” was beside the point. Its
hiring of the molester was not the accident. The cab company’s acts or
omissions “merely created the potential for injury … but was not itself the
cause of the injury.”187 And in a case of negligent supervision against a
woman whose son committed murder, the court reasoned: “[t]hough
myriad other events of an earlier time and different place may have
contributed to the claimed injury, to determine whether there was an
‘occurrence’ within the meaning of the policy we must focus on those
events directly responsible for the injury.”188
Each of these decisions reasons that hiring a bad actor, such as a
pedophile, may be negligence, but it is not an “accident.” Certainly,
negligent hiring may form part of the circumstances contributing to
deliberate injury. Nevertheless, negligent hiring is not an “accident” within
the ordinary use of that word, these courts observe, and therefore “sexual
abuse” claims do not give rise to an “occurrence.” As one court opined,
where abuse has been alleged, a negligent supervision claim does not exist
without the damage caused by the sexual abuse.189
E. CLAIMS IN WHICH NEGLIGENCE IS PLED ALONGSIDE FACTS
SHOWING ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OR INTENT: LOOKING
“BEYOND THE LABEL OF NEGLIGENCE”
An issue of critical significance with regard to an insurer’s duty to
defend the insured arises when a sexual molestation complaint pleads facts
showing specific knowledge on the part of a religious organization,
consistent with an expectation of harm, but adds a count for
“negligence” as well. Should such a count be regarded as defeating the
expectation of harm reflected by the complaint’s other allegations?
A considerable number of decisions acknowledge that when the
complaint alleges facts consistent with an expectation of harm, further
allegations that the insured “should have known” of the potential for injury,
187

Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Bay Area Cab Lease, Inc., 756 F.
Supp. 1287, 1289-90 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
188
Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Salazar, 77 F.3d 1291, 1296-97 (10th
Cir. 1996).
189
Canutillo Ind. Sch. Dist v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 99
F.3d 695, 705 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Tex. law).
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or that the insured acted “negligently and/or intentionally,” do not override
factual allegations indicating intent. It has been said that, even when a
complaint pleads a count for negligence, “we must look beyond the label of
negligence to determine if the insurer had a duty to defend.”190
Not all courts agree, and some have allowed a “negligence”
allegation to override allegations of specific knowledge. A good example
of this methodology is found in the Texas Court of Appeals decision in
Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co.191
There, the sexual abuse victim’s causes of action against the Diocese
included:
(1) failing to warn of known dangerous propensities;
(2) knowingly breaching and participating in breaches of its
fiduciary duties to plaintiff;
(3) fraud;
(4) acting with malice and conscious indifference; and
(5) conspiring to cover up incidents of priests sexually abusing
minors.
Notwithstanding these allegations, the Complaint also alleged the Diocese
was negligent in hiring and retaining the priest-molester “when it [knew or]
should have known of his dangerous sexual propensities.”192 Based on the
“should have known” allegation, the court concluded the insurer was
obligated to defend, because the latter allegations did not require the
Diocese to have known about the perpetrator’s sexual propensities for the
plaintiff to succeed. “Viewed from the Diocese’s viewpoint, if it did not
know of [the perpetrator’s] sexual propensities, then his molesting
[plaintiff] was both unexpected and unintentional, and [thus potentially]
within coverage.”193
In contrast, the vast majority of cases considering whether the mere
label of negligence overcomes facts demonstrating a higher level of fault
have concluded that when allegations of negligent supervision are
accompanied by allegations of deliberate misconduct, the supervisor190

Collins Holding Corp. v. Wausau Underwriters, 666 S.E.2d 897, 900 (S.C.
2008) (where insured distributed gambling machines equipped so as to permit
manipulation, thus violating laws protecting the public from excessive gambling,
the allegations failed to support a claim for negligent conduct).
191
Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 133
S.W.3d 887 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).
192
Id. at 895.
193
Id.
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insured is not entitled to coverage.194 Courts long have recognized that the
nature of the liability set forth in the complaint is to be “determined by the
quality and purpose of the transaction as a whole.”195 Courts “looking
beyond the label of negligence” examine the “‘quality and purpose’ of the
complaint as a whole, not simply the use of a word such as
‘negligence.’”196
In these decisions, the inclusion of a negligence count in the
complaint does not trigger coverage when “the facts alleged in the
complaint are inconsistent with unintentional conduct or injury.”197 The
nature of a tort action, such courts conclude, is not changed merely by
deploying the word, “negligence.”198 The focus is on the facts alleged
rather than a label of “negligence.”199
In this regard, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
observed that the choice of legal theories in the complaint is not important
in determining whether an insurance company has a duty to defend.
Instead, the question is whether the “conduct as alleged in the complaint is
at least arguably within one or more of the categories of wrongdoing that
the policy covers.”200 Likewise, in C.L. by Guerin v. School Dist. of

194

See, e.g., Colony Ins. Co. v. Events Plus, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1156
(D. Ariz. 2008).
195
Messersmith v. Am. Fid. Co., 133 N.E. 432 (N.Y. 1921).
196
Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Moser, No. 4:05CV00979 JLH, 2006 WL 827319, at *4
(E.D. Ark. 2006) (quoting Fisher v. Travelers Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 892 (Ark.
1966)).
197
Serecky v. Nat’l Grange Mut. Ins., 857 A.2d 775, 781 (Vt. 2004) (citing
TBH ex rel. Howard v. Meyer, 716 A.2d 31, 34 (Vt. 1998)).
198
Fisher v. Travelers Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 892 (Ark. 1966); Standard Fire
Ins. Co. v. Proctor, 286 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2003).
199
“We must focus on the factual allegations in [the underlying complaint]
and not on the legal theories asserted, and unless the complaint alleges facts within
the coverage of the policies, [the insurer] has no duty to defend of indemnify.”
Meyer, 716 A.2d at 34. See also Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pinacol Assur. Co., 425
F.3d 921, 929 (10th Cir. 2005); accord Colony Ins. Co. v. Events Plus, Inc., 585 F.
Supp. 2d 1148, 1154-55 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“To conclude otherwise would only
allow the parties to render such exclusions essentially meaningless through artful
pleadings and would allow them to circumvent the terms and intent of the policy
and its exclusions.”); Link Snacks Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 08-cv-714-slc, 2009
WL 3380383 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 20, 2009).
200
Curtis-Universal, Inc. v. Sheboygan Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., 43 F.3d
1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Wis. law). See also St. Paul Fire and Marine
Ins. Co. v. Hausman, 604 N.W.2d 908, 911-12 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (“We
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Menomonee Falls,201 the court concluded that an insurance company was
not obligated to defend an insured against a claim labeled “negligence” in
the complaint, even though the policy – like any standard liability
insurance policy – covered negligent conduct. The court observed that “the
facts alleged involved sexual abuse (which is intentional conduct by
definition),” and thus the complaint did not state a claim that would be
covered by the policy. The legal theory denominated in the complaint was
therefore irrelevant.
This approach may be particularly apt in sexual abuse cases
involving the alleged “negligence” of a supervisor or employer. In such
cases, courts have discounted nominal allegations of negligence when they
are side-by-side with allegations of actual knowledge or purposeful action.
Thus, in an insurance action brought by parents of the alleged molester, the
court held: “Although the word ‘negligent’ is used in their allegations
against [the parent-insureds], intentional conduct is actually described. For
example, the complaint alleges that Glen and Helen Stanley had actual
knowledge that Jesse possessed deviant sexual propensities and was a
continuing danger to [the victim], but that they permitted him to
continually sexually abuse and sexually exploit [the victim] [as a result of
their conduct].”202 These decisions analyze whether allegations such as
“should have known” override allegations of specific knowledge.
The logic is worth exploring. Consider the following hypothetical
allegations:
The Insured employer:
(1) knew the molester had molested minors before;
(2) knew the molester aimed to molest minors again;
(3) knew and/or should have known the molester was a threat to
minors.
In this example, does the inclusion of “should have known” in the third
allegation mean the insured did not expect molestation? Only if the first
two allegations are (improperly) overlooked. To illustrate, consider
another analogous example:

determine whether insurance coverage exists by focusing on the incident itself and
not the theory of liability.”).
201
C.L. and T.W. ex rel. Guerin v. Sch. Dist. of Menomonee Falls, 585
N.W.2d 826, 830 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998).
202
W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 498 (W. Va. 2004).
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The Apartment Building:
(1) Has its top floor on the eighth floor.
(2) Has an elevator with buttons one through eight.
(3) Contains up to eight, and at least four, stories.
Does the equivocal third paragraph permit the conclusion that the
building is less than eight stories high? Not in light of paragraphs one and
two. So too in the first example above, the equivocal “and/or should have
known” in paragraph three does not mean – in light of paragraphs one and
two – that something other than intentional harm has occurred.
Such cases may be contrasted with the common claim of
“negligence” involving a bouncer or similar employee of an insured tavern
employer, who batters a bar patron, subjecting the insured to liability. In
such cases, when the facts may equally suggest (i) an intent to injure, or (ii)
merely an intent to relocate the patron outside the establishment, courts
have found a potential “occurrence” under liability policies.203 The
difficulty of judging specificity of intent in a situation where persons may
or may not be acting to avoid injuries to third parties, rather than cause
injuries, explains why the “bar patron” cases, with some justification, tend
to find the alleged injury was neither “expected nor intended.”204 It is rare
in such cases to find specific facts demonstrating both expectation of harm
and intent to harm, in contrast to many clergy sexual abuse cases.
F. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS AND “NEGLIGENCE”
Clergy abuse lawsuits in particular often allege a conspiracy among
church officials to conceal, if not to permit, abuse by clergymen. Such
complaints may allege a fact-based pattern of concerted efforts. For
example, allegations against a religious order that supervised a priest
accused of molestation stated that the supervisors:
agreed or otherwise conspired to cover up
incidents of sexual abuse of minors by Salesian
priests and/or educators and to prevent disclosure,
203

E.g., Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Weiner, 636 A.2d 649 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994); cf. Gene’s Restaurant, Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 548 A.2d 246 (Pa.
1988).
204
See Sans, et al. v. Monticello Ins. Co., 676 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999) (shooting that occurred during a bar fight did not necessarily mean the
shooter “intended” injury).
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prosecution and civil litigation including, but not
limited to: failure to report incidents of abuse to
law enforcement or child protection agencies;
denial of abuse [they] had substantiated; aiding
criminal child molesters in evading detection,
arrest and prosecution; allowing criminal child
molesters to cross state and international borders
for purposes of gaining access to uniformed
parents whose innocent children could be sexually
abused; failure to warn; and failure to seek out and
redress the injuries its priests and/or educators had
caused.205
Conspiracy allegations do not reflect mere negligence, because the
tort of civil conspiracy involves “actions intended by the insured” and
therefore does not “meet the definition of ‘occurrence’” under the policy at
issue.”206 There is no such thing as a “negligent conspiracy.” There is,
rather, “a conscious, decision making [sic] element that takes civil
conspiracies out of the range of behavior encompassed within the meaning
of ‘occurrence.’”207
For these reasons, conspiracy allegations have generally been fatal
to claims for insurance coverage, even when the underlying complaint
includes allegations of “negligence.”208
G. THE “BODILY INJURY” REQUIREMENT
Standard commercial general liability policies provide coverage
only for “Personal Injury” or “Bodily Injury.” Under such policies, even if
injury was neither “expected nor intended,” and even if the injury was the
result of an “accident,” there is no coverage unless the claimant suffered
“bodily injury.”
Such injury sometimes is defined to mean: “bodily injury or if
arising out of bodily injury, mental anguish.” “Bodily Injury” frequently is
205

Nunnery v. Salesian Missions, Inc., No. 07-2091, 2008 WL 1743436, at *7
(D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2008).
206
State Bancorp Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 483 S.E.2d 228 (W. Va,
1997), quoted in W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 495 (W. Va.
2004).
207
Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376,
387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
208
See id.
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defined in commercial general liability policies to mean “bodily injury,
sickness, or disease.” In contrast, other standard form policies define
“bodily injury” to include mental harm, defining “bodily” or “personal
injury” as “bodily injury, shock, mental anguish, sickness or disease,
including death at any time resulting therefrom.”
Sexual abuse claims range from an abuser masturbating while in
proximity to a plaintiff, to instances of penetration, including penetration
resulting in physical damage. Sexual abuse involving clergy has included
penetration by objects, penile or digital penetration, vaginally or anally, as
well as oral copulation. Physical injury sometimes is alleged, though often
complaints allege harm limited to “anxiety, embarrassment, and emotional
distress.”
In considering whether the alleged sexual abuse equates to “bodily
injury,” a number of courts have concluded that emotional damages arising
from sexual molestation may constitute “bodily injury” under a commercial
liability policy.209 These courts have held that bodily touching alone is a
sufficient predicate to support coverage. Other courts, reasoning that
physical injury and physical touching are not synonymous, conclude that
emotional damage (even if arising from touching) is not “bodily injury.”210
They have held that bodily injury, including sickness and disease, “does not
include emotional distress, at least where, as here, the distress is not caused
by physical trauma.”211
Quite a few courts have held that various forms of touching and
fondling in the course of sexual abuse do not constitute “bodily injury.” A
2005 federal court decision catalogued insurance coverage cases
nationwide in which plaintiffs’ private parts had been grabbed, squeezed or
fondled, yet no “bodily injury” was deemed to have occurred. The court
held: “The phrase ‘bodily injury’ simply cannot be read as synonymous
with the phrase ‘physical contact.’”212 In 2008, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals reasoned that “bodily injury” had not occurred where a neighbor
molested a child by squeezing her chest through her clothes, and rubbing
209

Wayne Twp. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs v. Ind. Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205, 1210
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCranie, 716 F. Supp. 1440, 1443 (S.D.
Fla. 1989); Cnty. of Chemung v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 496 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1985).
210
Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Church Sch., 645 F. Supp. 628, 632 (E.D. Va.
1986); Chatton v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318, 323 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992).
211
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tozer, 392 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying Ind.
law).
212
Id.
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his hand up and down her leg.213 These touchings “did not include any
physical injury such as bruises, scrapes, or cuts.” Rather, the claim was
confined to “the physical, cognitive or emotional manifestations of the
effects of the sexual touching.”214 In insurance cases where the injuries
alleged are purely emotional or mental in nature, a number of courts have
held that “bodily injury” coverage is not available.215 In particular, that
reasoning may be difficult to assail when the policy defines “bodily injury”
as “bodily injury, sickness or disease,” with no reference to “mental
anguish.”
In contrast, physical penetration of the body has been deemed to
be a “violation of the bodily integrity of the victim, and therefore an
infliction of actual physical injury on her, even if not accompanied by
bleeding or broken bones.”216 A number of jurisdictions have adopted this
analysis.217 No court has concluded that physical penetration in the course
of sexual abuse would not represent “bodily injury” for purposes of
insurance coverage.
The decisions that require some actual physical injury, such as
penetration, as a predicate for insurance coverage, may be influenced by
the fact that certain insurance policy forms are available to cover emotional
damages, distress, and mental anguish. Policy forms that do not include
these forms of non-bodily harm more likely will be read to preclude
coverage in the absence of some bodily trauma caused by the sexual abuse.
III.

CONCLUSION

Clergy sexual abuse and molestation of minors constitutes a grave
contemporary social problem. But not all clergy sexual abuse claims can be
213

Hart v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 P.3d 565, 568 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008).
Id.
215
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mrs. B.G., No. Civ.A. 05-578, 2005 WL
3434137 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2005) (collecting cases).
216
United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Doe, 792 N.E.2d 708, 744-45 (Mass. Ct. App.
2003).
217
See Prof’l Staffing-A.B.T.S., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., No. 8:04-CV793T30EAJ, 2005 WL 2290243, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2005); Allstate Ins. Co
. v. Thomas, 684 F. Supp. 1056, 1059-60 (W.D. Okla. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Roefls, 698 F. Supp. 815, 818, 821 (D. Alaska 1987); J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v.
M.K., 804 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415, 417
n.5 (Colo. 1990) (en banc); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v .Gardipey, 434 N.W.2d 220
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988); N.N. v. Moraine Mut. Ins. Co., 450 N.W.2d 445 (Wis.
1990).
214
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compensated through liability insurance coverage, which commonly
excludes acts “that are expected or intended from the viewpoint of the
insured.”
In a majority of states today, liability insurance coverage for the
molester-insured generally is barred, either under an “objective” or “classic
tort” standard for determining intentional acts, or under an “inferred intent”
standard when applied to child sexual abuse cases.
The courts have not been uniform, however, in how they treat
liability insurance coverage disputes pertaining to the sexual molester’s
supervisory employer or religious organization, specifically when the
supervisor-insured is sued for the negligent supervision, employment, or
retention of a sexually abusive priest or clergyman, rather than based on the
molester’s intentional acts per se.
Some courts have held that an underlying insured “occurrence”
must also be “accidental,” and therefore “negligent supervision” of a sexual
molester can never be an “accident.”218
Other courts have applied an “objective” or “classic tort”
interpretive standard to liability insurance claims arising out of the
negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of a clergyman-molester,
including the prominent Diocese of Winona case.219
It is submitted that the objective Diocese of Winona approach
applied to liability insurance coverage disputes involving supervisoryinsureds of clergy sexual molesters is the better-reasoned interpretive
approach for the following reasons: First, the claims of negligent hiring,
negligent supervision, and negligent retention brought against church
organizations and their supervisors for the sexual abuse of minors by
priests or other clergymen all sound in negligence which traditionally is
based upon an objective “reasonable person” standard of care. Second, this
“objective” or “classic tort” standard for determining intentional acts in
liability insurance coverage disputes, or alternately the “inferred intent”
standard as applied to child sexual abuse cases, is recognized in an
overwhelming majority of states, as opposed to the minority “subjective” or
“particular insured” standard, based upon strong public policy reasons.
218

See, e.g., Mountain States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hauser, 221 P.3d 56, 60 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2009). But see contra Safeco Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. White, 913 N.E.2d
426 (Ohio 2009) (holding that torts like negligent supervision, hiring, and retention
are separate and distinct from the related intentional torts committed by the
original actor, such as a priest or clergyman-molester).
219
See Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8th Cir.
1996) (applying Minn. law).
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Third, a substantial majority of courts now recognize that the crucial
underlying requirement in negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and
negligent retention cases is based upon whether the priest of clergyman’s
supervising church, bishop, diocese, or other religious organization knew or
should have known of the sexual offender’s abuse toward minors—which,
again, is an objective standard. Fourth, and of primary importance, the
crucial causation requirement in both tort law and insurance contract law
also requires the application of an objective “efficient or predominant
cause” interpretive analysis. Thus, in a liability insurance context, if the
negligent hiring, negligent supervision, or negligent retention of a sexually
abusive priest or clergyman was so inextricably intertwined with, and not
independent of, the priest or clergyman’s sexual misconduct, then the
supervising church, bishop, diocese, or other religious organization should
not be covered under generally accepted tort and insurance law causation
principles.
In sum, the most commonly litigated issue, as discussed at length
in this article, is whether injury resulting from clergy sexual abuse and
molestation was “intended” or “expected” by the molester-insured and the
supervisor-insured. It is our conclusion that determining this issue
according to the “objective” insured test is the better-reasoned approach,
and is most in accord with generally accepted tort law and insurance law
principles. This means that when the supervisor-insured has knowledge
that harm was substantially likely to occur to the sexual abuse victim, then
coverage usually will be deemed to have been “intended.” However, this
would normally involve a gross negligence standard, rather than an
ordinary negligence standard, for precluding coverage.
The “intent” interpretive issue has dominated many liability
insurance coverage disputes, sometimes to the exclusion of other important
interpretive issues raised by liability insurance policy provisions. The most
important of these, which may need to be resolved regardless of whether an
insured “intended” injury or not, are: (1) whether the insured “expected”
injury; (2) whether the injury arose from an “accident”; and (3) whether
“bodily injury” occurred. Courts, policyholders, and insurers must also be
prepared to confront each of these issues in the context of insurance claims
for sexual abuse.
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the truth, regardless of what any other insurer might have done? Or is the
test an objective one focused on what a “reasonable insurer” would have
done in a similar situation?1
* Andrew Amer is a litigation partner with the firm of Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP. He received his undergraduate degree in engineering from Cornell
University and his law degree from the University of Pennsylvania. He has served
as national coordinating counsel for various insurers, has represented insurers and
reinsurers in coverage actions involving asbestos, pollution, nuclear radiation and
other mass tort claims, and is a frequent speaker at insurance and reinsurance
coverage seminars.
** Linda H. Martin is a litigation partner with the firm of Simpson Thacher &
Bartlett LLP. She received her undergraduate degree in government from Harvard
University, and her law degree from Duke University School of Law. Ms. Martin
has extensive experience in a broad range of large, complex commercial litigations
and international arbitrations. Many of her cases involve insurance issues, and she
has represented insurance and reinsurance clients at the counseling, trial,
arbitration and appellate levels. Both Ms. Martin and Mr. Amer extend their
thanks to Abigail A. Hazlett, Ryan A. Kane, Rita K. Maxwell, Sara A. Ricciardi,
Jeffrey Roether, C. Ryan Soots, Lindsay N. Thomas, and Jonathan S. Zelig for
their research and other support in the preparation of this note.
1
As discussed in some of the case law cited in this note, other considerations
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question on an insurance application called for subjective knowledge of an insured
or an objective fact; whether a misrepresentation was innocently or knowingly
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In 1937, the New York Court of Appeals directly answered that
question in Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., making clear that a
misrepresentation “is material where it appears that a reasonable insurer
would be induced by the misrepresentation to take action which he might
not have taken if the truth had been disclosed.”2 Thus, New York’s highest
court has determined that the test is an objective one, not dependent on
what the particular insurer at issue would have done.
The subjective-objective distinction has significant ramifications
on issues of proof in litigation (including in confidential arbitrations, where
the question often arises), and very often has the potential to be case
determinative. Under a subjective standard, the insurer claiming there is a
material misrepresentation must prove through witness testimony (such as
the testimony of its claims representative or underwriter who handled the
specific policy at issue), specific language in its own claims manuals, or
other similar evidence, that it would not have issued the policy on the same
terms but for the misrepresentation, regardless of industry practice or what
any other insurer would have done. By contrast, under an objective
standard, the test of materiality is whether a “reasonable insurer” would
have offered the same insurance on the same terms if there had been no
misrepresentation. Evidence regarding the particular insurer’s practices (or
vagaries) may be one piece of proof in determining the “reasonable
insurer” standard, but a “reasonable insurer” test also can be satisfied
without any evidence at all of the individual insurer’s practices.
Issues such as these become particularly significant if there are
missing witnesses or evidence about the particular insurer’s practices,
including evidence lapses that routinely arise with the passage of time. If
the underwriter who negotiated the specific policy is no longer with the
company, is deceased, or cannot be located, or if claims manuals from
years (or often decades) earlier cannot be located, an insurer will have a
very difficult time proving what it would have done in a specific situation,
with respect to a specific policy, if it had known a particular piece of
information. Similarly, given that claims often arise years after a policy is
written, written communications between the insured and the
insurer/underwriter—whether electronic or in hard copy—may no longer
exist, once again defeating any chance that an insurer can prevail if a
subjective test is applied. By contrast, where evidence of industry practice

made; or whether there is a causal connection between the misrepresentation and
later events, among other issues.
2
Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 7 N.E.2d 125, 130 (1937).
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can be introduced through the testimony of experts who have years of
experience in the industry at issue, these issues of proof can be overcome.
With such significance riding on this issue, it is not surprising that
the New York Court of Appeals—over 65 years ago—took pains through
its decision in Geer to make clear that under New York law, an objective,
“reasonable insurer” test is to be applied when determining if a
misrepresentation is material to an insurer in any particular case. Since
then, however, beginning with the subsequent 1939 enactment of New
York Insurance Law Section 149 (now codified as New York Insurance
Law Section 3105),3 the issue has devolved into a murky quagmire, with
disputed interpretations of legislative intent and inconsistent and usually
unreasoned pronouncements by lower courts, even though the Court of
Appeals has never veered from its “reasonable person” standard and New
York’s legislature has never clearly abrogated it. This article explores the
wayward history resulting in the current confusion among New York’s
lower courts. Despite this wayward history, however, given the clear and
unwavering direction from the New York Court of Appeals, which has not
been abrogated by any subsequent legislation, courts are obligated to use an
objective standard when applying New York law to determine if a
misrepresentation is material to an insurer in any particular case.
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SETS THE STANDARD FOR
MATERIALITY IN THE GEER CASE

In 1937, the New York Court of Appeals directly addressed the
question of what standard governs the question of whether a
misrepresentation in an application for insurance is material to an insurer in
any particular case. In Geer, the plaintiff sought recovery under a life
insurance policy after her husband died of carbon monoxide poisoning.
The insurer denied coverage on the grounds that the decedent had failed to
disclose certain material information in his application for insurance. The
application had required the decedent to state whether he had had any
treatment at any hospital within the past five years and to list all physicians

3

N.Y. INS. LAW § 3105 (McKinney 1984). In 1984, Insurance Law § 149 was
re-enacted as Insurance Law § 3105 but its provisions remained unchanged. For
purposes of simplicity, and because many of the cases cited in this article were
issued prior to 1984 and thus refer to § 149 rather than § 3105, this article will
refer to the statute as § 149. A fuller discussion of the specific provisions of
Insurance Law § 149 (now Insurance Law § 3105) is set forth in Part IV below.
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he had consulted over the past ten years.4 The decedent listed only one
physician on his insurance application and failed to disclose that, four years
earlier, he had visited another physician and was briefly hospitalized with
flu symptoms, after which he was temporarily diagnosed with paratyphoid
and ultimately with nervousness.5
The plaintiff-insured prevailed at trial, after the jury concluded that
the misrepresentation was not material to the risk because the fact that the
decedent visited a physician and was diagnosed with nervousness had no
effect on the risk of dying of carbon monoxide poisoning.6 On appeal, the
insurer took issue with the jury instruction on materiality, arguing that it is
entirely reasonable for an insurer to inquire into the medical history of an
insured and that the mere fact that such an inquiry was made on the
application establishes its materiality.7 The Appellate Division affirmed,
concluding that in light of the evidence, the trial court properly presented
the question of materiality to the jury as a question of fact and that the
jury’s determination was not against the weight of the evidence.8 In its
decision, the Appellate Division focused on the fact that decedent had been
forthcoming with information and that the evidence did not reflect any
intent “to suppress the truth or to conceal or evade facts.”9
The Court of Appeals (New York’s highest court) reversed,
concluding that the failure to disclose the information was a material
misrepresentation and, further, that the misrepresentation was material as a
matter of law. The Court reasoned that:
[W]here an applicant for insurance has notice that before
the insurance company will act upon the application, it
demands that specified information shall be furnished for
the purpose of enabling it to determine whether the risk
should be accepted, any untrue representation, however
innocent, which either by affirmation of an untruth or
suppression of the truth, substantially thwarts the purpose
for which the information is demanded and induces action

4

Geer, 7 N.E.2d at 126.
Id. at 126-27.
6
Id. at 127.
7
Id. at 131.
8
Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 288 N.Y.S. 359, 363 (N.Y. App. Div.
1936).
9
Id. at 360-62.
5
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which the insurance company might otherwise not have
taken, is material as a matter of law.10
Central to the Court’s analysis was its determination that an insurer
is free to choose the risks it will assume. As the Court explained:
[The] question in such case is not whether the insurance
company might perhaps have decided to issue the policy
even if it had been apprised of the truth, the question is
whether failure to state the truth where there was duty to
speak prevented the insurance company from exercising its
choice of whether to accept or reject the application upon a
disclosure of all the facts which might reasonably affect its
choice.11
Significantly, however, the Court did not limit its decision to the
question of whether a misrepresentation was or could be material as a
matter of law. Rather, the Court went on to address the central topic of this
article: whether materiality of a misrepresentation to the insurer should be
judged by an objective or subjective standard. The Court held that
“misrepresentations cannot defeat or seriously affect the insurance
company’s right to reject the application where a disclosure of all the facts
could not ‘reasonably’ affect the choice of the insurer.”12 The Court further
explained that “a misrepresentation through concealment of fact in regard
to a condition of health or physicians consulted . . . is material where it
appears that a reasonable insurer would be induced by the

10

Geer, 7 N.E.2d. at 127.
Id.
12
Id. at 129. It was then and is now settled law in New York that
“‘[r]easonable belief’ is an objective standard.” Donovan v. Kaszyski & Sons
Contractors, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 860, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Agway v.
Travelers Indem. Co., No. 93-CV-557, 1993 WL 771008, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6,
1993) (holding that policy notice provision formulated in terms of reasonableness
gives rise to an objective standard); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. North River Ins. Co.,
762 F. Supp. 566, 591 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds, 4 F.3d
1049 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Although North River’s expert stated that standard should be
subjective, his description of the test, based on reasonableness, clearly indicated an
objective one.”); People v. Perretta, 228 A.D. 420, 423 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930)
(noting that the use of an objective standard would require an examination of the
actions of a reasonable man).
11
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misrepresentation to take action which he might not have taken if the truth
had been disclosed.”13
In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that
its test was formulated “somewhat different from that approved in Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co v. Mechanics’ Sav. Bank & Trust Co. and Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Ontario Metal Products Co.” but that the test was nonetheless
“essentially the same” as in those cases.14 In Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., the
court discussed extensively the admission of evidence on the issue of
materiality through “witnesses who had been long engaged in the . . .
insurance business,”15 and a long line of cases handed down by English
courts on this question. The Penn Mutual court cited numerous instances
in which evidence was admitted through industry practitioners and experts
with significant knowledge on general underwriting practices, and while
various courts rejected the ability of an expert to opine on the ultimate issue
of whether a misrepresentation was “material”—a question the courts most
frequently determined had to be decided by the jury—few if any of the
courts questioned the propriety of admitting evidence of industry practice
through these experts.16 Thus, the Penn Mutual court determined as
follows:
A fair test of the materiality of a fact is found, therefore, in
the answer to the question whether reasonably careful and
intelligent men would have regarded the fact,
communicated at the time of effecting the insurance, as
substantially increasing the chances of the loss insured
against. The best evidence of this is to be found in the
usage and practice of insurance companies in regard to
raising the rates or in rejecting the risk on becoming aware
of the fact. If the rates are not raised in such a case, it may
be inferred that reasonably careful men do not regard the

13

Geer, 7 N.E.2d at 130 (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics’ Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 72
F. 413, 423 (6th Cir. 1896), and Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ontario Metal Prod. Co.,
[1925] A.C. 344 (P.C.) 351-52 (appeal taken from Can.)) (internal citations
omitted).
15
Penn Mut., 72 F. at 423.
16
See id. at 427-31. The Penn Mutual court also considered whether the rule
should be different among fire, health, life, or other types of insurance, ultimately
concluding that there was no reason for the rule to differ among these types of
insurance. See id. at 430.
14
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fact as material. If the rates are raised, or the risk is
rejected, then they do.17
And in Ontario Metal, the Privy Council, substantially concurring with the
lower court on most issues, stated the rule as whether “had the facts
concealed been disclosed, they would not have influenced a reasonable
insurer so as to induce him to refuse the risk or alter the premium.”18
Both the Penn Mutual and Ontario Metal courts applied an
objective, “reasonable insurer” test, which the Geer court then explicitly
endorsed in determining that an objective test governs under New York
law.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS
SUBSEQUENT YEARS

REAFFIRMS

GEER

IN

In the years following Geer, the New York Court of Appeals
passed over numerous opportunities to revisit, amend, or overturn Geer’s
objective standard. Just two years after the decision in Geer, the New York
state legislature re-codified the insurance law. Section 149 of the recodified insurance law, (which amended and replaced the former New
York Insurance Law Section 58 (1906)), included new provisions
governing materiality for misrepresentations in insurance contracts,19 and
some have suggested that these new provisions abrogated the holding in
Geer and provide that whether a misrepresentation is material to an insurer
must be determined using a subjective standard. These new insurance law
provisions and the cases that arose under them potentially set the stage for a
re-evaluation of the objective standard. Yet the New York Court of
Appeals never regarded the re-codification as a mandate to depart from the
objective standard. In each of the cases it considered following the passage
of Insurance Law Section 149, the Court of Appeals continued to cite Geer
17

Id. at 429. In reaching this holding, while the court stated that “[m]ateriality
of fact, in insurance law, is subjective,” this was because “it concerns rather the
impression which the fact claimed to be material would reasonably and naturally
convey to the insurer’s mind before the event, and at the time the insurance is
effected, than the subsequent actual causal connection between the fact, or the
probable cause it evidences, and the event.” Id. at 428. In other words,
“subjectivity” as used in this context, meant what could or might have happened if
events had happened differently, rather than something that could be objectively
determined after the fact.
18
Mutual Life Ins. Co., [1925] A.C. 344 (P.C.) at 351-52.
19
N.Y. INS. LAW § 149(3) (McKinney 1939).
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as good law. To this day, the Court of Appeals has not departed from the
objective standard for the materiality of misrepresentations it established in
Geer.
Since the enactment of Section 149, the Court of Appeals has
engaged in a decades-long discussion on the merits of finding materiality
as a matter of law, without ever changing its position that an objective, or
“reasonable insurer” test, should be applied in determining whether a
misrepresentation is material to an insurer. In Glickman v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 50 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1943), decided just four years after the
enactment of Insurance Law Section 149, neither the majority nor the
dissent even suggested that Section 149 had the effect of replacing the
objective standard endorsed by Geer with a new subjective standard. The
opinions instead focused on whether the omission of a condition unrelated
to the insured’s death ought to be found material as a matter of law. The
majority affirmed an appellate division reversal of the trial court’s decision
in favor of the plaintiff-insured, reasoning that any non-trivial ailment that
goes undisclosed should be found material as a matter of law.20 Although
the dissent referenced Section 149 as intended “to overcome the legal
affect” of Geer, it did so only with specific reference to whether materiality
should be determined as a matter of law or a question of fact, making clear
that this, and not any change to the objective standard test set out in Geer,
was the purpose of amending Section 149:
The purpose of the Legislature [in passing Insurance Law §
149] is not open to debate . . . . Whether a false
representation or suppression of a fact for which
information is requested by the insurer as a condition
antecedent to the completion of a contract of insurance
tends to diminish or increase the risk of loss and is material
to the risk or whether a breach of warranty, if one such
exists, materially increases the risk of loss are no longer
questions for the court but are now questions of fact which
must be determined as such . . . .21
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Milman, 50 N.E.2d 553 (N.Y. 1943),
a case decided the same day as Glickman, reversed a lower court decision
approving the rescission of a life insurance policy where the insured did not
disclose that he had consulted physicians for minor health issues. The
20
21

Glickman, 50 N.E.2d at 540.
Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
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Court ruled that a “reasonable construction of the scope of the disclosure
required” does not include minor ills that “do not impair [the insured’s]
general health.”22 The Court then explicitly reaffirmed the central holding
in Geer: that the relevant inquiry for materiality is whether the undisclosed
facts were ones which “might reasonably affect the choice of the insurance
company as to whether to accept or reject the application.”23
Thirty years later, in Vander Veer v. Continental Casualty Co., the
Court narrowly ruled to reverse a jury verdict in favor of the insured based
on a determination by the jury that there had been no material
misrepresentation.24 The questions presented to the Vander Veer Court
centered on (1) whether the plaintiff misrepresented his health as a matter
of law and (2) whether the misrepresentation was material as a matter of
law.25 The Court of Appeals found that each question should have been
decided as a matter of law, rather than be submitted to the jury.26 In
reaching its holding, the Court cited with approval to Geer for the
proposition that a failure to disclose is equivalent to a false affirmative
statement.27 The court did not comment or veer in any way, however, from
its holding in Geer that whether a misrepresentation is material to an
insurer must be determined by an objective or “reasonable insurer”
standard.28
The Court took similar action two years later in Leamy v. Berkshire
Life Ins. Co. where once again it ruled narrowly on the facts in determining
that the insured had made two material misstatements by failing to disclose
persistent fainting and dizziness, as well as a recent trip to the hospital.29
The Leamy Court cited Geer for the proposition that the question of
whether there has been a material misrepresentation may sometimes be
answered by the trier of fact.30 The Leamy court never commented,
however, on the endorsement of an objective standard in Geer, and the
Leamy ruling focused exclusively on the holding that the insured’s
misrepresentations were material as a matter of law.31
22

Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Milman, 50 N.E.2d 553 (N.Y. 1943).
Id. at 554 (emphasis added).
24
Vander Veer v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 312 N.E.2d 156, 157 (N.Y. 1974).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
See id.
29
Leamy v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 347 N.E.2d 889, 890 (N.Y. 1976).
30
Id.
31
Through its decisions in Vander Veer and Leamy, the Court of Appeals
clarified that although the materiality of a misrepresentation is typically treated as
23
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In L. Smirlock Realty Corp. v. Title Guarantee Co. the New York
Court of Appeals again reaffirmed Geer without directly reaching the issue
of the standard of materiality, citing to Geer with approval in support of the
majority’s finding that it was “manifest” that certain information “would
have affected defendant’s choice of insuring the risk covered by the policy
issued to plaintiff.”32
Although the Court of Appeals, since Geer and since the enactment
of Section 149, has not provided further detailed analysis regarding
whether materiality should be judged from an objective or subjective
standard, it never has disavowed the objective standard it so clearly
articulated and established in Geer. The Court instead has embarked on a
lengthy debate about whether materiality can be decided as a matter of law,
and repeatedly has cited Geer as good law.
III. THE GEER DISSENT SETS THE STAGE FOR UNCERTAINTY
The Geer court was not unanimous, with Judge Edward Ridley
Finch writing a vigorous dissent. Judge Finch voiced concern that the
majority’s test for determining materiality improperly treated nearly all
a matter of fact for the jury’s consideration under Section 149, materiality can be a
matter of law under certain circumstances. Without any further insight from the
Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division has construed these cases as allowing the
court to decide materiality as a matter of law “where the evidence concerning
materiality is clear and substantially uncontradicted.” Kroski v. Long Island Sav.
Bank, 689 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); see also Aguilar v. U.S. Life
Ins. Co., 556 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). The Appellate Division
recently has treated this as a subjective inquiry, finding materiality to be clear and
substantially uncontradicted when the insurer presents “documentation concerning
its underwriting practices, such as underwriting manuals, bulletins or rules
pertaining to similar risks, to establish that it would not have issued the same
policy if the correct information had been disclosed in the application.” Precision
Auto Accessories, Inc. v. Utica First Ins. Co., 859 N.Y.S.2d 799 (N.Y. App. Div.
2008); see also Shirmer v. Penkert, 840 N.Y.S.2d 796, 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007);
Curanovic v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 762 N.Y.S.2d 148, 151 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2003). Thus, while a subjective standard may be applied in determining
materiality for purposes of summary judgment — i.e., that there is uncontroverted
evidence that the particular insurer at issue would not have issued the particular
policy at issue under the same terms and conditions — a court or jury still is
obligated to apply an objective standard if the case proceeds past summary
judgment.
32
L. Smirlock Realty Corp. v. Title Guarantee Co., 418 N.E.2d 650, 653 (N.Y.
1981).
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misrepresentations, even those innocently made, as material.33 The dissent
flatly rejected the insurer’s contention that all misrepresentations or
omissions concerning health and consultations with physicians were
material as a matter of law.34 According to Judge Finch, such a test
unfairly prevented recovery by the insured and vitiated Section 58 of the
New York Insurance Law (the precursor to Section 149), which had been
enacted to protect insureds by providing that statements in an insurance
policy are, in the absence of fraud, representations and not warranties.35
Thus, Judge Finch viewed the majority’s holding that a material
misrepresentation could be proven as a matter of law simply by
demonstrating that the insurer had asked for the information violated
Section 58 and unfairly and unjustifiably give too much power to insurers
to determine materiality.
Notably, however, Judge Finch did not take issue with the
majority’s use of an objective, “reasonable insurer” standard for deciding
materiality of a misrepresentation. In fact, in his dissent, Judge Finch cited
with approval language from the same Sixth Circuit decision cited by the
Geer majority which held that “[a] fair test of the materiality of a fact is
found . . . in answer to the question whether reasonably careful and
intelligent men would have regarded the fact, communicated at the time of
effecting the insurance, as substantially increasing the chances of the loss
insured against.”36 The dissent also cited with approval the Privy Council’s
Ontario Metal Products decision referenced by the majority which set forth
a “reasonable insurer” standard as the proper test for materiality.37 A close
look at the opinions in Geer thus reveals that the conflict between the
33

Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 7 N.E.2d 125, 132 (N.Y. 1937).
In so doing, the dissent distinguished cases relied upon by the defendantinsurer on the grounds that they involved instances in which the insured or
beneficiary refused to waive the doctor-patient privilege, reasoning that
“[o]bviously the courts could not permit the insured or the beneficiary to argue that
the omission or misrepresentation was not material while he prevented the
insurance company from showing its materiality.” Id. at 134.
35
Id. at 126.
36
Id. at 132 (citing Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics Sav. Bank & Trust
Co., 72 F. 413, 429 (6th Cir. 1896)).
37
Id. at 133 (citing Ontario Metal Products Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. [1925]
A.C. 344 (P.C.) [351–52] (appeal taken from S.C.C.) (“[I]t is a question of fact in
each case whether, if the matters concealed or misrepresented had been truly
disclosed, they would, on a fair consideration of the evidence, have influenced a
reasonable insurer to decline the risk or to have stipulated for a higher premium.”)
(emphasis added).
34
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majority and dissent was limited to the extent to which materiality could be
considered a matter of law. By contrast, with respect to the question
addressed in this article—what standard should be applied in determining
whether a particular misrepresentation was material to an insurer in any
particular case—both the majority and the dissent agreed that an objective
or “reasonable insurer” standard applies.
IV. A NEW INSURANCE STATUTE RESULTS IN FURTHER
CONFUSION
In 1937, the same year that Geer was decided, the Insurance
Department of New York began an effort to re-codify the existing
insurance law and released tentative drafts of several proposed statutes.
This included an initial draft of what later would become Insurance Law
Section 149, which, while it was a new statutory provision, essentially
restated long-standing common law principles, including those set out in its
precursor, Section 58. In the two years between the issuance of Geer and
the enactment of Section 149, several New York courts cited Geer, but
without any substantive discussion of whether to apply an objective or
subjective standard to determine materiality of a misrepresentation to an
insurer.38 As enacted into law two years later, Section 149 provided in
relevant part as follows:
(a): A representation is a statement as to past or present
fact, made to the insurer by or by the authority of the
applicant for insurance or the prospective insured, at or
before the making of the insurance contract as an
inducement to the making thereof. A misrepresentation is
a false representation, and the facts misrepresented are
those facts which make the representation false.
38

See e.g., Wersba v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 1 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679
(N.Y. App. Div. 1938) (citing Geer to support its conclusion that a
misrepresentation was material as a matter of law); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of
U.S. v. Schusterman, 5 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938) (quoting Geer to
frame the issue of materiality as a determination of “whether the company has been
induced to accept an application which it might otherwise have refused,” and not
as a determination of “whether the company might have issued the policy even if
the information had been furnished.”); Woodworth v. Prudential Ins. Co., 13
N.Y.S.2d 145, 150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939) (citing Geer for the position that an
insured can “avoid the policy on the ground of misrepresentation as to a material
fact even though such misrepresentation was innocently made.”).
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(b): No misrepresentation shall avoid any contract of
insurance or defeat recovery thereunder unless such
misrepresentation was material. No misrepresentation
shall be deemed material unless knowledge by the insurer
of the facts misrepresented would have led to a refusal by
the insurer to make such contract.
(c): In determining the question of materiality, evidence of
the practice of the insurer which made such contract with
respect to the acceptance or rejection of similar risks shall
be admissible.39
While the legislature is empowered to overrule unpopular or
problematic court decisions if it so desires, it has become a subject of some
debate among legal commentators and certain lower courts whether the
enactment of Section 149 was, indeed, intended to overrule the two-year
old Geer decision and, if so, whether in whole or in part.
Those arguing that the legislature intended to overrule Geer point
to two factors. First, the statute refers throughout to “the insurer,” rather
than referring to “an insurer” or “the reasonable insurer.” Second, while an
early draft of the statute provided for admissibility of the practices of other
insurers (in addition to the practices of the particular insured at issue) for
the purpose of determining whether a misrepresentation was material to an
insurer, the statute as enacted only refers in subsection (c) to the
admissibility of the practices of “the insurer which made such contract,”
which some argue makes clear, or at least suggests, that only the practices
of the particular insurer at issue are relevant to determining materiality.
A. “THE INSURER” AND “A REASONABLE INSURER”
The repeated use throughout the statute of the phrase “the insurer,”
rather than “a reasonable insurer” or “a prudent insurer,” might suggest that
the legislature intended to impose a subjective standard for materiality,
rather than the objective standard established by the Court of Appeals in
39

N.Y. INS. LAW § 149 (McKinney 1939). Section 149 also contains a
subsection (d), which provides that misrepresentations that fail to disclose previous
medical treatment by applicants for life or accident and health insurance are
deemed to misrepresent that the applicant has not had the disease or ailment for
which he or she received treatment. If the insurer proves such a misrepresentation
in an action to rescind the insurance contract, then under certain circumstances the
misrepresentation is presumed material.
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Geer.40 And, indeed, some of the legislative history surrounding the
enactment of Section 149 suggests as much. A Historical Note to the draft
legislation asserts that “[s]ubsection 2 makes the ultimate test the effect of
the misrepresentations in inducing the particular insurer.”41 The Historical
Note directly addresses Geer, stating that “the majority opinion contains
language inconsistent with the rule of subsection 2 above, but the decision
in that case was based upon peculiar facts.”42
Notably, however, the Historical Note is internally inconsistent.
The Note states that the rule proposed in the draft legislation “is in accord
with the able dissenting opinion by Judge Finch” in Geer, in which he
“relie[d] upon the decision of the Privy Council of England.”43 The
commentators appear to suggest by this language that the statute conforms
with the Geer dissent but not the Geer majority. As discussed above in
Part I, however, the Privy Council decision cited approvingly by Judge
Finch (Ontario Metal) applied an objective standard of materiality, just like
the Geer majority.44 Moreover, since the Geer dissent did not take issue
with the majority’s imposition of an objective standard, but rather with the
majority’s determination that materiality could be determined as a matter of
law, the statement referenced in the Historical Note might be better read as
relating to the latter point.
Significantly, the leading commentary on Section 149, published in
1940 and endorsed by the then New York Superintendent of Insurance,
explains that the drafters intended Section 149 to codify existing “common
law principles long established in the field of insurance.”45 As an example
of the existing common law, the Commentaries cite to the following
holding in Cox v. C.G. Blake Co., 166 N.Y.S. 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1917):
The duty on the part of the assured to disclose material
facts is not limited to facts which have a direct bearing on
40

See Geer, 7 N.E.2d. at 127.
N.Y. INS. LAW § 149 (McKinney 1939) (Historical Note).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Ont. Metal Prod. Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., [1925] A.C. 344
(P.C.) [352] (appeal taken from S.C.C.) (“In this finding their Lordships
substantially concur, although they would have expressed the finding somewhat
differently and would have preferred to say that had the facts concealed been
disclosed, they would not have influenced a reasonable insurer so as to induce him
to refuse the risk or later the premium.”).
45
ABRAHAM KAPLAN & GEORGE I. GROSS, COMMENTARIES ON THE REVISED
INSURANCE LAW OF NEW YORK (“Commentaries”) 338 (1940).
41
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the extent of the risks or dangers, to which the subject of
the insurance will be exposed. All facts are material
which would affect the mind of a rational underwriter,
governing himself by the principles on which
underwriters in practice act, as to either of the following
points: First, whether he will take the risk at all; second, at
what premium he will take it.46
The test set out in Cox, phrased in terms of whether a fact would “affect the
mind of a rational underwriter,” clearly is objective in nature.
B. SUBSECTION (3) OF SECTION 149
While repeated references to “the insurer” in Section 149 have
raised questions, subsection (3) and its legislative history have raised even
more. As noted above, subsection (3) provides that in determining
materiality, “evidence of the practice of the insurer which made such
contract with respect to the acceptance or rejection of similar risks shall be
admissible.”47 This differs from the language originally proposed, which
allowed a court to admit evidence “of the practices of the insurer which
made such contract and of other insurers in reference to the making of
similar insurance contracts.”48
Some have argued that the omission in the enacted version of the
“and of other insurers” language precludes a court from admitting evidence
regarding industry custom and practice, thus negating an objective or
“reasonable insurer” standard.49 The Historical Note following the enacted
text provides some support for this argument, stating that “[u]nder the rule
laid down by the Privy Council of England the ultimate test is the effect of
the misrepresentation upon a ‘prudent insurer.’ Under subsection 3 above,
46

Commentaries at 340, citing Cox v. C.G. Blake Co., 166 N.Y.S. 294, 297
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1917) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47
N.Y. INS. LAW § 149(3) (McKinney 1939).
48
LOUIS H. PINK, INS. DEP’T OF N.Y., INSURANCE LAW REVISION OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK, TENTATIVE DRAFT § 63(4), at 143 (1937) (emphasis added)
(the italicized language, subsequently omitted, originally was released in a draft
under Art. VII § 63(4)).
49
See, e.g., Edwin W. Patterson, Misrepresentations by Insured under the New
York Insurance Law, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 241, 243 n.16 (1944) (arguing that the
“and of other insurers” language “was eliminated in order to avoid possible
confusion of the ‘individual insurer’ test, here adopted, with the ‘prudent insurer’
test”).
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proof of what a prudent insurer would have done . . . is not the conclusive
test.”50
However, once again the Historical Note does not clearly rule out
an objective test, saying only that a “prudent insurer” analysis is “not . . .
conclusive,”51 and in fact the Historical Note raises more questions than it
answers. The Historical Note provides that “proof of what a prudent
insurer would have done is merely evidence to show what the insurer in
question would have done,”52 although as just noted the enacted text makes
no reference to the admissibility of evidence relating to industry custom
and practice. The Historical Note also provides: “Subsection 3 gives the
plaintiff an opportunity to rebut the insurer’s evidence that it would have
rejected the application if the misrepresentation had not been relied upon,
by permitting the insured to show the practices of other insurers.”53 It is
interesting to consider why the Historical Note refers to the admissibility of
evidence relating to “practices of other insurers” when the enacted text
makes no such reference. Does this indicate that the insured can provide
evidence of industry practice only to rebut an insurer’s subjective showing
of materiality? One possible explanation is that the Historical Note relates
to the earlier draft of the subsection, and does not actually explain the
intent behind the statute as finally amended.
Another explanation may be found in the change from the use of
the word “may” to the use of the word “shall” in Subsection (3). Draft
statute Section 63 (a draft precursor to Section 149) provided that evidence
of the practices of other insurers “may be admitted in the discretion of the
trial court.”54 As enacted, the statute only provides the type of evidence
that “shall be admissible.”55 It is very possible that the legislature removed
reference to evidence of the practices of other insurers because they wanted
to keep its admission at the discretion of the trial court, but chose to ensure
the admissibility of evidence of the practices of the individual insurer by
making a definitive statement that it “shall be” admissible under all
circumstances.

50

N.Y. INS. LAW § 149 (McKinney 1949) (Historical Note).
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
PINK, supra note 48, at § 63(4) (emphasis added).
55
N.Y. INS. LAW § 149(3) (McKinney 1949) (emphasis added).
51
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V. PRACTICES OF OTHER STATES IN APPLYING AN
OBJECTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE TEST
The same issues of interpretation present in the New York courts
also exist in other jurisdictions. Several states have statutes with language
similar to New York’s, and courts in those states have interpreted their
statutes to support the use of an objective test in determining materiality.
While the statutory language in these states, as in New York, ostensibly
suggests a subjective test by focusing on the actions of “the insurer” in
question, the highest courts in these states nevertheless have concluded
their statutes support an objective test.56
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has provided the most
thorough analysis on the issue in York Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bowman,
746 A.2d 906, 909 (2000). Maine’s statutory text finds a misrepresentation
to be material when “the insurer in good faith” would have acted
differently “if the true facts had been known to the insurer as required” by
the policy or contract.57 Notwithstanding this language, Maine’s highest
court explicitly held that the test of materiality is whether disclosure by the
insured “would have influenced a reasonable insurer in deciding whether
to accept or reject the risk of entering into the contract, fixing the premium
rate, in fixing the amount of insurance coverage, or in providing coverage
with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss.”58 According to the
Supreme Court of Maine, the relevant inquiry did not involve the particular
instances of the loss in question, but rather an objective examination from
the point of view of the “reasonable insurer.”59 Indeed, the court noted that
while there is disagreement among jurisdictions with similar statutes as to
other issues relating to materiality, they all used an objective test, stating
that the “common factor [among these states] is that materiality is treated
as an objective test.”60
56

For the most part, these statutes do not contain a provision similar to §
149(3), regulating the admissibility of evidence of the practices of “the insurer.”
As discussed below, Michigan is a notable exception.
57
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2411(2) (1990) (emphasis added).
58
York Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 746 A.2d 906, 909 (Me. 2000) (emphasis
added).
59
Id.
60
Id. (citing Woods v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1493, 1497 (11th
Cir. 1985); Singer v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 512 So.2d 1125, 1128–29
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Central Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 529 P.2d 1213,
1216 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 416 P.2d
935, 941 (Okla. 1965); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 240 S.W.2d

432

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 17.2

Arizona’s insurance statute governing misrepresentations employs
a similar substantive form as that of Maine, also utilizing the phrase “the
insurer.”61 Consistent with Maine’s highest court, Arizona’s Court of
Appeals explicitly has held that the statutory language supports an
objective rather than a subjective test. The court in Valley Farms, Ltd. v.
Transcontinental Insurance Co., 206 Ariz. 349, 353 (Ct. App. 2004) stated
that the test for materiality “is whether the facts, if truly stated, might have
influenced a reasonable insurer in deciding whether to accept or reject the
risk.”62 The Ninth Circuit, in applying Arizona insurance law in Mutual
Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Morairty, 178 F.2d 470, 474 (9th Cir.
1950), also explicitly held that the test for materiality under Arizona law is
an objective one, explaining that the inquiry is to be examined from the
perspective of a “reasonable insurer.”63 More recently, in 2008, the
Arizona federal district court in Medical Protective Co. v. Pang, 606 F.
Supp. 2d 1049, 1058 (D. Ariz. 2008) reiterated the previous endorsement of
an objective test by holding that “materiality exists if the facts, if truly
stated, might have influenced a reasonable insurer in deciding whether to
accept or reject the risk.”64
Florida and West Virginia also have followed suit behind Maine
and Arizona in interpreting their respective statutory provisions regarding
materiality of misrepresentations as requiring an objective test, despite
references to “the insurer” and not “an insurer” or “reasonable insurer” in
the statutory language of each state.65 Courts in each of these states have
interpreted the provision as focusing on how a reasonably prudent insurer
644, 646 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 416 P.2d
935, 941 (Okla. 1965); Powell v. Time Ins. Co., 382 S.E.2d 342, 349–50 (W.Va
1989)).
61
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1109(3) (2010) (“The insurer in good faith
would either not have issued the policy, or would have not issued a policy in as
large an amount, or would not have provide coverage with respect to the hazard
resulting in the loss, if the true facts had been made known to the insurer as
required either by the application for the policy or otherwise.”).
62
Valley Farms v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 78 P.3d 1070, 1074 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003).
63
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Morairty, 178 F.2d 470, 474 (11th Cir. 1949) (“The
test of materiality is whether the facts, if truly stated, might have influenced a
reasonable insurer in deciding whether to accept or reject the risk; the insurer need
not show that it would have rejected the applicant had it known of the falsity of the
claim.”).
64
Med. Protective Co. v. Pang, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1058 (D. Ariz. 2008).
65
See FLA. STAT. § 627.409 (2005); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-7(c) (2006).
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would have proceeded if not for the misrepresentation.66 Georgia’s
statutory language mirrors that of New York, Florida, Maine, Arizona and
West Virginia in its use of the phrase “the insurer.”67 Both the Eleventh
Circuit applying Georgia law and the Court of Appeals of Georgia
definitively characterize the standard by which materiality is examined as
objective, stating that the “standard has been interpreted to be an objective
one.”68
Michigan is the only state which appears to use language similar to
Subsection (3) of New York’s Section 149 in its statute governing
materiality of misrepresentations.69 While historical decisions by Michigan
courts have interpreted M.C.L.A. § 500.2218 to require a subjective test,
the more recent trend is towards an objective test for determining
materiality. Older Michigan case law is explicit in its support of a
subjective test, describing the analysis as focused on the “reliance or nonreliance of the particular insurance company involved” and excluding
evidence of what other insurers, similarly situated, may have done.70
However, more recently, the highest court in Michigan has employed
plainly objective language, describing the inquiry as one analyzing the
decisions of a “reasonable” insurer.71 Thus, with respect to language in the
66

See Singer v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 512 So.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (“A misrepresentation is material if it does not enable a
reasonable insurer to adequately estimate the nature of the risk in determining
whether to assume the risk.”); Powell v. Time Ins. Co., 382 S.E.2d 342, 350 (W.
Va. 1989) (adopting a test for materiality of “whether a reasonably prudent insurer
would consider the misrepresentation material to the contract”).
67
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-7(b)(3) (2003) (“The insurer in good faith would
either not have issued the policy or contract or would not have issued a policy or
contract in as large an amount or at the premium rate as applied for or would not
have provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss of the true
facts had been known to the insurer as required either by the application for the
policy or contract or otherwise.”).
68
Am. Gen. Life. Ins. Co. v. Schoenthal Family L.L.C., 556 F.3d 1331, 1340
(11th Cir. 2009); Lively v. S. Heritage Ins. Co., 568 S.E.2d 98, 100 (Ga. Ct. App.
2002).
69
See MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 500.2218 (2008) (“In determining questions of
materiality, evidence of the practices of the insurer which made such contract with
respect to the acceptance or rejection of similar risks shall be admissible.”).
70
See Mannino v. Dominion Life Assurance Co., 539 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D.
Mich. 1982); Clark v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 447 N.W.2d 783, 785
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
71
See Oade v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of Mich., 632 N.W.2d 126, 131
(Mich. 2001) (The “inquiry under the statutory ‘materiality’ test is whether a
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Michigan statute similar to Subsection (3) of Section 149, the current trend
in Michigan law supports the conclusion that Michigan courts read their
statutory language as requiring an objective test when determining
materiality.
It therefore is clear from a survey of the case law of various other
states that courts in those states have applied an objective test when
determining materiality despite references to “the insurer” in their statute.72
VI. POST-GEER APPLICATION OF A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD
BY LOWER COURTS IN NEW YORK
A. POST-GEER RULINGS APPLYING NEW YORK LAW
Since the enactment of Section 149, many lower courts in New
York have departed from Geer’s objective standard, and instead have
determined materiality based on how the specific insurer at issue would
have acted if it had known the true facts. It is entirely unclear, however,
how these courts have determined which standard to apply, and even less
clear that they collectively could or have established a new regime of
subjectivity in New York. No court in New York, either appellate or
otherwise, has ever expressly stated that Geer no longer is good law on the
reasonable underwriter would have regarded [the plaintiff’s revised answers to the
health questionnaire] sufficient grounds for rejecting the risk or charging an
increased premium . . .”).
72
It is important to note that California courts, cited for their steadfast
adherence to the subjective test in determining materiality, have interpreted vastly
different statutory language when making that determination. Rather than leaving
the interpretative burden to their courts, the California legislature specifically
defined materiality as a subjective test inquiry. See CAL. INS. CODE § 334 (2005)
(“Materiality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and
reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication is
due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract, or in
making his inquiries.”); Superior Dispatch, Inc. v. Ins. Corp. of N.Y., 181 Cal.
App. 4th 175, 191 (2010) (explaining that the test of materiality is a “subjective
test view from the insurer’s perspective”); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Columbia
Cas. Co., 11 Cal. App. 4th 1176, 1189 n.4 (1992). The only other state which
appears to use language similar to that in the California statute is North Dakota.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-17 (2010) (“Materiality is to be determined not by
the event, but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the
party to whom the communication is due in forming the party’s estimate of the
disadvantages of the proposed contract or in making the party’s inquiries.”). While
still good law, the North Dakota statute has been cited only a handful of times.
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issue of applying an objective standard for determining whether a
misrepresentation is material to an insurer.
In fact, not one lower New York court appears to have conducted a
thorough analysis into Section 149’s ambiguous and inconsistent legislative
history.73 The lower court dockets frequently have encountered cases,
however, that involved the use of or reference to a subjective or objective
standard, even in cases where the standard itself was not at issue. Without
additional guidance from the highest court, the lower courts have wandered
and sometimes departed from the objective standard precedent of Geer.
The lower courts often wander and depart from Geer by using phrases like
“the insurer” instead of “an insurer,” but without even realizing they have
made a choice between two very different standards. Indeed, in many
cases, the lower courts have assumed the standard to be subjective without
actually justifying that assumption. Despite arguments from some
commentators, however, these lower court rulings do not amount to an
abrogation of Geer, nor do they constitute a justifiable shift away from the
objective standard.
There are several prominent examples among these cases. In
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Goldberger, the trial court rejected plaintiff
insurance company’s action to rescind defendant’s insurance policies when
it ruled as a matter of law that the misrepresentations made on plaintiff’s
applications were not material.74 The court opined that misrepresentations
could be material only if “knowledge by the insurer of the facts
misrepresented would have led to its refusal to issue the policy.”75 In
support of using a subjective standard, the court cites a 1944 note in the
Columbia Law Review entitled Misrepresentation by Insured Under the
New York Insurance Law.76 This note clearly is not an authoritative source
on the meaning of Section 149 and most certainly does not trump the law
set down by the New York Court of Appeals in Geer.
Other more recent New York cases where lower courts appear to
embrace a subjective test for materiality include rulings in Zilkha v. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. (“A misrepresentation is material if the insurer would

73

Of course, the Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York, also has not
conducted a thorough analysis of this issue since the enactment of Section 149.
74
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Goldberger, 155 N.Y.S.2d 305, 306 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1956).
75
Id.
76
Id. (citing Edwin W. Patterson, Misrepresentation by Insured Under the
New York Insurance Law, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 24 (1944)).
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not have issued the policy had it known the facts misrepresented.”)77 and
Feldman v. Friedman (“A fact is material so as to avoid ab initio an
insurance contract if, had it been revealed, the insurer or reinsurer would
either not have issued the policy or would have only at a higher
premium.”),78 both appellate level decisions handed down in 2001 and
1997, respectively.79 Because the courts fail to offer robust explanations of
their rulings, it is not particularly clear whether they have endorsed or
applied a subjective standard based on a thorough examination of the
legislative history and case law. In fact, in each of these cases—as appears
to be the case in decisions by many other courts—references to “the”
insurer, which arguably imply subjectivity, may simply be a loose choice of
words not intended to have any precedential or substantive meaning.
Indeed, these two appellate court decisions provide only a cursory
quotation to the term “the insurer” in the statutory text or cite to past
decisions that also use subjective language without explanation. None of
these sources constitutes a binding interpretation of the statute, and none of
them amounts to an abrogation of the standard set forth by the Court of
Appeals in Geer.
Another case which has engendered significant confusion among
lower courts is the Appellate Division’s decision in Aguilar v. U.S. Life
Insurance Company.80 In Aguilar, the court encountered an appeal of
summary judgment entered in favor of the insurance company, which had
moved to rescind the life insurance policy of plaintiff for failure to disclose
certain mental disorders.81 The court actually cited Geer throughout, yet
77

Zilkha v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 732 N.Y.S.2d. 51, 52 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001) (emphasis added).
78
Feldman v. Friedman, 661 N.Y.S.2d. 9, 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (quoting
Christiana Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 268, 278 (2d Cir.
1992)) (emphasis added).
79
For further examples see Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Remling, 268 A.D.2d
572, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (citing Insurance Law § 3105(b) and Gugleotti v.
Lincoln Sec. Life Ins. Co., 234 A.D.2d. 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), to support the
proposition that “for a misrepresentation to warrant the voiding of an insurance
policy, the misrepresentation must be material, meaning that had the insurer
known the truth, it would not have issued the policy.”) (emphasis added);
Gugleotti, 234 A.D.2d. at 514-15 (finding that revelation of scuba diving activities
would have resulted in a different classification of the insured by the insurance
company and permitting the insurance company to rescind the policy) (emphasis
added).
80
Aguilar v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 162 A.D. 209, 211 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
81
Id. at 209-10.
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also repeatedly referred to what “the insurer” would have done, seemingly
applying, based on Geer, a subjective test on materiality. Thus, the Aguilar
case quotes Geer for the proposition noting that a showing that the
misrepresentation “substantially thwarts the purpose for which the
information is demanded and induces action which the insurance company
might otherwise not have taken.”82 The court also includes the following
cite from Geer: “The question in such case is not whether the company
might have issued the policy even if the information had been furnished;
the question in each case is whether the company had been induced to
accept an application which it might otherwise have refused.”83 The
Aguilar court then “appl[ies] this test” and affirms the lower court.84 But
what test did the court apply, exactly? The language from Geer cited in
Aguilar cannot resolve the issue because it only tells half the story. Gone
from Aguilar is the language of the “reasonable” or “prudent” insurer that
featured so prominently in Geer and that is critical to the quotations lifted
out of context by the court in Aguilar. And deciding whether an objective
or subjective standard applies was not central to the issue decided by the
Aquilar court.
Even more problematic and egregious is the ruling in Greene v.
United Mut. Life Ins. Co.,85 in which the trial court rejected the jury’s
findings and granted a directed verdict in favor of the insured as to whether
material misrepresentations had been made. Here, the trial court directly
took on the question of “[w]hat constitutes a material misrepresentation
sufficient to justify an avoidance of the policy.”86 The trial court referred
to the Corpus Juris Secundum which stated “the test to be ‘whether
knowledge of the true facts would have influenced a prudent insurer in
determining whether to accept the risk or in fixing the amount of
premiums.’”87 The Greene court then continued, reaching a shocking
conclusion:
However, the test in New York has been laid down by its
Court of Appeals in Geer v. Union Life Ins. Co. . . . . It
gives a narrower test, it is not the test of what any other
82

Id. at 210-211 (quoting Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 261,
271) (1937)).
83
Id. at 211 (quoting Geer, 273 NY at 269) (emphasis in original).
84
Id.
85
Greene v. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. 38 Misc. 2d 728 N.Y.S. 2d 809, 815-16
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1963).
86
Id. at 731, 813.
87
Id. (citing 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 595).

438

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 17.2

insurance company would have done, but what the
particular insurance company might have done. It is not
the test stated in the dissenting opinion of that case,
quoting from an opinion in the Federal reports of Judge,
later Chief Justice TAFT, i.e. “whether reasonably careful
and intelligent men would have regarded the fact,
communicated at the time of effecting the insurance, as
substantially increasing the chances of loss insured
against.” Judge LEHMAN, speaking for the court,
declared the test to be “The question . . . is not whether the
company might have issued the policy even if the
information had been furnished; the question in each case
is whether the company might have issued the policy even
if the information had been furnished; the question in each
case is whether the company has been induced to accept an
application which it might otherwise have refused.”88
One has to wonder if the Greene court simply stopped reading the Geer
opinion after a few pages, and how it completely missed the fact that both
the majority AND the dissent cite to the decision by Justice Taft for the
same purpose, i.e., that an objective test applies in determining
materiality.89 Thus, as held in Geer and agreed by the Geer dissent, but
completely ignored by the Greene Court, under New York law:
[M]ateriality is a matter of degree and a misrepresentation
through concealment of a fact in regard to a condition of
health or physicians consulted, is material where it appears
that a reasonable insurer would be induced by the
misrepresentation to take action which he might not have
taken if the truth had been disclosed.90
While the Green court ultimately found enough evidence that the insured’s
misrepresentation was material and directed verdict in favor of the insurer,
its reference to Geer for application of a subjective standard is entirely
inexplicable.
88

Id. (citing Geer, 273 N.Y. at 269, 277) (emphasis in original; internal page
citations omitted).
89
Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics’ Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 72 Fed. Rep.
413 (1896).
90
Geer, 273 N.Y. at 272.
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B. COMMENTATORS
One group of commentators has suggested that New York lower
courts are correct to assume that Section 149 overrules the legal effect of
Geer in every capacity, including the use of a “prudent insurer” (or
objective) test for determining materiality of misrepresentations.91 These
commentators refer in a footnote, for example, to seven New York
Appellate Division decisions which purportedly “disregard Geer” and
In reaching their conclusion, the
incorporate a subjective test.92
commentators also rely heavily on the Appellate Division’s decision in
Giuliani v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 56 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1945), and the Historical Note to Section 149’s citation to Judge
Finch’s dissent in Geer, which the commentators purport, read together,
“makes clear” the legislature’s rejection of an objective test.93 The
authorities they cite cannot bear the weight the authors place upon them.
The Appellate Division cases cited by these commentators simply
do not support the proposition for which they are cited. In five of the seven
footnoted cases, the issue was not whether the materiality test was
objective or subjective from the perspective of the insurer, but rather
whether the insurer had sustained its burden on a motion for summary
judgment to establish materiality as a matter of law. In each of those cases,
the courts merely ruled that the insurer had not met its burden to establish
materiality as matter of law and that the issue remained one for the trier of
fact to decide.94 In the sixth case, the court actually cited with approval to
91

Richard Jacobs, QC, Lorelie S. Masters & Paul Stanley, LIABILITY
INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE BERMUDA FORM 239-40 (Hart
Publishing 2004).
92
Id. at 243; see Patterson supra note 49.
93
Id. at 239-40.
94
See Zilkha v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 732 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001) (“Here, there are issues of fact as to whether . . . any such alleged
misrepresentations were material.”); Carpinone v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 697
N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (“The materiality of an applicant’s
misrepresentation is ordinarily a factual question unless the insurer proffers clear
and substantially uncontradicted evidence concerning materiality, in which event
the matter is one of law for the court to determine.”); Campese v. Nat’l Grange
Mut. Ins. Co., 689 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (reinstating
complaint where “the [trial] court erred . . . in determining that the
misrepresentations were material as a matter of law”); Cutrone v. Am. Gen. Life
Ins. Co., 606 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (“Summary judgment was
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Geer in support of its holding and confirmed the trial court’s entry of
judgment against the insured on the jury’s finding that the insured’s
misrepresentation was material.95 Finally, in the seventh case, the court’s
decision does not even address whether the misrepresentation was material
or not under any standard.96
Moreover, this group of commentators highlight that the main
point of Section 149 was to treat the materiality of a misrepresentation as a
matter of fact for the jury’s consideration. As previously discussed, Judge
Finch’s dissent in Geer was based upon his disagreement with materiality
being treated as a matter of law.97 With respect to the subjective-objective
standard holding, Judge Finch was in absolute agreement with the majority
that a “reasonable insurer” (or objective) standard applies, and he
approvingly cited to cases (also cited by the majority) which applied an
objective standard.98
Finally, in Giuliani, also relied on by these commentators, the only
issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in treating materiality as
an issue of fact, and the court did not consider explicitly whether an
objective or subjective test should be used.99 The appellate court
recognized that prior to the enactment of Section 149, “the tendency of the
courts was to determine that every misrepresentation, except the most
trivial ones, was material and thus voided the policy.”100 Relying on
Section 149, the Giuliani court held that except in cases where
“misrepresentations and the facts misrepresented were so serious that their
very seriousness would establish their materiality as a matter of law,” the

properly denied, however, because defendant failed to meet its burden of
establishing the materiality of the misrepresentations in the reinstatement
application ‘sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing
judgment’ in its favor.”) (citations omitted); Sonkin Assoc., Inc. v. Columbian
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 541 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (affirming denial
of summary judgment where insurer had failed to establish “as a matter of law”
that insured’s misrepresentation was material).
95
Meagher v. Exec. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 607 N.Y.S.2d 361, 361-62 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994) (citing Geer, 273 N.Y. at 269).
96
Tennenbaum v. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd., 579 N.Y.S.2d 351-52 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992).
97
See supra Part III.
98
Id.
99
Giuliani v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 56 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (N.Y. App. Div.
1945).
100
Id. at 479.
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question of materiality should be a question of fact for the jury.101 Notably,
however, while Giuliani did not expressly address the standard that should
be used to determine materiality, it implied that an objective standard
should be used, stating that “it cannot be said as a matter of law that a
prudent insurer like the defendant would have or would not have rejected
the application.”102
The authorities cited by this group of commentators for the
proposition that the courts have established a subjective standard in New
York by openly disregarding Geer and embracing a subjective reading of
Section 149, in fact stand for the proposition that courts have departed from
Geer in only a single respect: that materiality should be treated as an issue
of fact. To argue that these authorities indicate Section 149 completely
superseded Geer in every respect and thus marked the end of the objective
“prudent insurer” standard is to extract more from these authorities than is
warranted.
Other commentators similarly have opined—although with less
specific analysis—that under New York law, a subjective test must be
applied in determining whether an insurer would have considered a
misrepresentation to be material.103 However, the key case they most often
cite, Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Lindenman, similarly does not support the
conclusion reached by these commentators. Rather, Lindenman addressed
only the issue of what evidence is needed to determine materiality as a
matter of law:
Whether there has been a misrepresentation, and whether it
is material are usually questions for the jury. However,
101

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
103
See Joseph K. Powers, Pulling the Plug on Fidelity, Crime and All Risk
Coverage: The Availability of Rescission as a Remedy or Defense, 32 TORT & INS.
L.J. 905, 915 n. 63 (Summer 1997) (“Materiality may be proven through evidence
of the insurer’s practice concerning similar risks or the insurer’s manuals (where
they exist), or testimony of qualified employees of the insurer, or where common
sense dictates that the misrepresentation was significant to the underwriting
process.”) (citing Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Lindenman, 911 F. Supp. 619, 62425 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)); see also Susan Koehler Sullivan & David A. Ring, Recurring
Issues in Rescission Cases, 42 TORT & INS. L.J. 51, 56 n. 27 (Fall 2006) (citing
Lindemnan for the proposition that “[m]ost states measure materiality from the
subjective viewpoint of the insurer.”). See also Edwin W. Patterson,
Misrepresentation by Insured Under the New York Insurance Law, 44 COLUM. L.
REV. 24 (1944).
102
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where the evidence is “clear and substantially
uncontradicted,” the court may determine it. . . . For the
court to determine materiality as a matter of law,
unequivocal evidence is required of the insurer’s practice
concerning similar risks, or the insurer’s manuals, or
“testimony of qualified employees of the insurer that the
insurer would not have issued the particular contract it did
if the facts had not been disclosed.”104
The Lindenman court determined that there was sufficient evidence
(including internal memoranda and uncontested underwriting guidelines of
the insurer) to find materiality as a matter of law, and to grant summary
judgment in favor of the insurer.105 The Lindemnman court never
considered, discussed, analyzed, or in any way addressed the standard that
would apply if the question of materiality was not decided as a matter of
law, but rather became an issue of fact to be determined by the jury at trial.
And, notably, as discussed above in Part IV, Section 149(3) only addresses
what evidence “shall” be admissible at trial, and never excludes other
evidence which “may” be admissible, such as practices of other
underwriters, expert testimony, and general industry practice.106
VII. THE BETTER READING: GEER REMAINS GOOD LAW AND
AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD APPLIES
The case law regarding the objective/subjective standard is far
from consistent. Although the majority of New York Appellate Division
decisions since Geer appear to apply a subjective standard for materiality,
others explicitly have stated that materiality should be determined
objectively.107 For example, in Horton, the court quoted Geer at length in

104

Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 911 F. Supp. at 624-25.
Id. at 626.
106
It also is interesting to note that at least one of these group of commentators
may not even appreciate the difference between the two standards, stating both that
Missouri applies a “subjective” standard, Sullivan, supra note 103, at 56 n. 27
(citing Coots v. United Employers Fed’n, 865 F. Supp. 596, 603 (E.D. Mo. 1994)),
while just sentences later stating that Missouri applies an “objective” standard. Id.
at 57 n.29 (citing Crewse v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985)).
107
See Horton v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 363 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1975); see also, Giuliani, 56 N.Y.S.2d. at 479 (finding that “it cannot be
105
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support of its decision to reverse the trial court’s denial of the defendant
insurer’s motion to dismiss on the ground of a material misrepresentation.
The court used an objective standard, stating that a misrepresentation is
material when a “reasonable insurer would be induced by the
misrepresentation to take action which he might not have taken if the truth
had been disclosed.”108
In addition, other jurisdictions and the federal judiciary have held
that, under New York law, materiality is determined by an objective test.
In Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 1990
WL 96400 at *1 (Del. Super. July 6, 1990), the Superior Court of Delaware
(citing Geer as relevant precedent) recognized that under New York law,
“fraudulent concealment can serve as a bar to recovery under an insurance
contract if the contract contains a representation made by the insured that is
false and material and that was relied upon by insurer in issuing the
policy.”109 The court provided a thorough analysis on misrepresentations
under New York law, providing in part: “Materiality is judged by an
objective standard; that is, would industry practice consider the allegedly
concealed information as material to an insurer’s decision to renew the
policy.”110 Similarly, the Southern District of New York twice has held
that the test for materiality under New York law is an objective one, and
depends on whether industry practice would consider the undisclosed
information material as to the insurer’s decision to participate in the
insurance contract.111
Despite the potential confusion created by the enactment of Section
149 and the inconsistent holdings of lower New York courts, there has been
one constant for applying an objective test: the New York Court of
Appeals. When a statute is enacted, it becomes the responsibility of the
said as a matter of law that a prudent insurer like the defendant would have or
would not have rejected the application.”) (emphasis added).
108
Horton, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 132 (quoting Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
273 N.Y. 261, 272 (N.Y. 1937)).
109
Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Nat’l Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No. 89C-SE35, 1994 WL 721653, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1994).
110
Id. at *3.
111
See John Jovino Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. 90 Civ. 7486, 1992
WL 176956, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1992) (“The standard by which materiality is
judged is an objective one.”); Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Fremont Indem. Co.,
745 F. Supp. 974, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“It remains to be seen whether under the
standard by which materiality is judged, an objective one, industry practice would
consider the [insured’s] loss projections as material to a reinsurer’s decision to
participate . . .”).
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courts to interpret the law. If the legislature believes the courts have
misinterpreted the law, the legislature can step in and make a correction.
The legislature never has expressly abrogated Geer’s objective standard of
materiality. Moreover, other jurisdictions as well as New York federal
courts and certain lower states courts in New York have concluded,
correctly, that New York law applies an objective standard of materiality.
Fundamentally, New York statutory law means what the New York
Court of Appeals says it means, and the New York Court of Appeals says
that a misrepresentation “is material where it appears that a reasonable
insurer would be induced by the misrepresentation to take action which he
might not have taken if the truth had been disclosed.”112 The Court of
Appeals continues to treat Geer as good law, and Section 149 did not
expressly abrogate, nor is it inconsistent with, this holding. It is time for all
courts and tribunals applying New York law to end the unnecessary
confusion, give precedential effect to the ruling of the New York Court of
Appeals, and consistently apply the objective standard set down by New
York’s highest court.

112

Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 261, 272 (1937).

THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MANDATORY MEDICARE
SECTION 111 REPORTING RULES AND ITS PRACTICAL
LEGAL AFFECTS – IS THERE A BREAK IN SIGHT?
Crystal L. Fraser*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Medicare is a health insurance program for people age 65 or older,
people under 65 with certain disabilities, and people of all ages with endstage renal disease.1 Medicare was originally considered a primary payer
system because “the private health insurance industry made its coverage
secondary to [M]edicare’s.”2 As a result, at its inception, Medicare was
considered “the ‘secondary’ payer only for medical services covered by
workers’ compensation, and the ‘primary’ payer for all other eligible
medical services provided to eligible participants.”3 In response to the
increasing financial burdens on the Medicare system and in an attempt to
shift the burden of costs to private sources, Congress enacted a series of
amendments to the Medicare provisions of the Social Security Act in 2007
which provided numerous circumstances under which Medicare was no
longer a primary payer.4 “Medicare Secondary Payer” (hereinafter “MSP”)

* Crystal L. Fraser, Esq. is a 2011 graduate of the University of Connecticut
School of Law. She is currently employed as an associate at the West Hartford
office of Seiger Gfeller Laurie LLP. A special thank you to Partner Mark Seiger of
Seiger Gfeller Laurie, for his assistance in selecting and researching this complex
subject.
1
Michael A. de Freitas, Annotation,Validity, Constriction and Application of
Medicare Secondary Payer Provisions of Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.A. §
1395y(b)) and Regulations Promulgated Thereunder, 126 A.L.R. FED. 553 (1995).
2
Id.
3
Christopher S. Berdy & W. Steven Nichols, The Medicare, Medicaid &
SCHIP Extension Act of 2007: A Practitioner’s Introduction to Resolving Personal
Injury Liability. Claims by Medicare Beneficiaries, 76 DEF. COUNS. J., Oct. 2009,
at 393, 394.
4
See id. §5; de Freitas, supra note 1; See also Sonja P. Morgan-Marshall,
Federal Medicare Secondary Payer Compliance and Now Mandatory Insurer
Reporting – What’s Next?, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Summer 2009, at 6 (“[M]edicare is
not expected to pay for medical services as long as payment ‘has been made, or
can reasonably be expected to be made, promptly, under a workmen’s
compensation law or plan of the U.S. or under an automobile or liability insurance
policy or plan (including self-insured plan) or under no-fault insurance”).
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is the term commonly used to refer to situations where the Medicare
program does not have primary payment responsibility.5 Today, Medicare
is the “secondary” payer in two circumstances. First,
Medicare is a secondary payer to [group health plans] for
Medicare beneficiaries who are eligible Medicare
beneficiaries . . . and who have [group health plan]
coverage on the basis of their own or their spouse’s current
employment with an employer that has [at] least twenty
employees for beneficiaries aged sixty-five or older, or at
least 100 employees for the disabled, or have end stage
Renal disease and who have [group health plan] coverage
on any basis.6
Second, Medicare is a secondary payer where certain other forms of
insurance are responsible for a Medicare-eligible individual’s health care
expenses.7 In this context, Medicare is essentially secondary where an
individual is treated for an injury or illness which is work-related, was
caused by an accident, or where either a no-fault insurance or group health
plan will cover such illness or injury.8
On December 29, 2007, President George W. Bush signed into law
the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 (hereinafter
“MMSEA”).9 Section 111 of MMSEA imposes onerous new reporting
requirements on liability (including self-insurers), no-fault and worker’s
compensation insurers with respect to Medicare beneficiaries who have
coverage under group health plan (hereinafter “GHP”) arrangements, as
well as for Medicare beneficiaries who receive settlements, judgments, or
other awards or payments from liability insurance (including self5

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MMSEA SECTION 111
MEDICARE SECONDARY PAYER MANDATORY REPORTING: LIABILITY INSURANCE
(INCLUDING SELF-INSURANCE), NO-FAULT INSURANCE, AND WORKERS’
COMPENSATION USER GUIDE, at 12 (2d ed.2009).
6
Berdy & Nichols, supra note 3.
7
Id. at 394-95 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2008); Memorandum
from Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Introduction to Section 111
Mandatory Medicare Secondary Payer Reporting. 1 (Feb. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MandatoryInsRep/Downloads/RevisedSection111022309.
pdf.).
8
Morgan-Marshall, supra note 4.
9
Roy A. Franco et al., Mission Impossible: Resolution of a Case with a
Medicare Claimant?, FOR THE DEF., May 2009, at 8.
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insurance), no-fault insurance, or worker’s compensation.10 The passage of
this new legislation reinforces the notion that the federal government is
intent on ensuring that Medicare is always treated as the payer of last resort
in these situations and is intended to provide Medicare with new and
additional tools to enforce this right. Under the MMSEA, parties
designated as “Responsible Reporting Entities” (hereinafter “RREs”), are
required to report certain information to the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (hereinafter “CMS”).11 In response to the enactment of
the Section 111 reporting requirements, it is imperative that RREs and
those parties who represent RREs in any capacity take significant and
proactive steps to reasonably consider the interests of Medicare when
resolving insurance claims involving current or future Medicare
beneficiaries; of utmost importance is developing a thorough understanding
of the Section 111 statutory scheme and how to comply with its tedious
reporting requirements.12
The MMSEA is a complicated web which has just recently begun
to be unraveled.13 CMS has been presented many questions which,
although the act was passed in 2007, remain without clear answers. As a
result, the implementation date for the reporting requirements has been
pushed back numerous times. The implementation date has already been
delayed two full years from the initial January 1, 2009 date; RREs are
currently expected to begin testing the reporting system on January 1, 2010
and to begin mandatory reporting in the first quarter of 2011.14 The purpose
of this Article is to provide detailed instructions on complying with the
Section 111 registration requirements and to analyze the new reporting
requirements and the significant issues they present for insurers and their
attorneys and to present a variety of solutions which, if acted upon by the
appropriate party or entity, will help ensure compliance with the
requirements and prevent the imposition of severe penalties.
Section II discusses RREs in greater detail, particularly regarding
who qualifies as an RRE. Additionally, it argues that one of the most
onerous tasks faced by the insurance industry is determining if an
10

42 U.S.C. §§ 1395y(b)(7)-(8) (2008).
Id.
12
See Berdy & Nichols, supra note 3, at 393-405.
13
It is important to note that this body of law is continuously changing and
developing. Indeed, from this paper’s initial drafting through its publication CMS
issued numerous updates and clarifications. As such, it is highly likely that after
publication certain areas will be further developed.
14
MMSEA 111 WHAT’S NEW, https://www.cms.gov/MandatoryInsRep/
04_Whats_New.asp#TopOfPage (last visited October 4, 2010).
11
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organization is or is not considered an RRE for Section 111 reporting
purposes. This section outlines the importance of making this
determination.
Section III briefly explains Medicare entitlement and eligibility and
argues that RREs may have extreme difficulty in obtaining the information
necessary to make a determination as to a claimant’s Medicare beneficiary
status. It concludes that RREs should make mandatory reporting of a
claimant’s social security number a prerequisite to receiving any settlement
or other form of payment and/or that defense counsel should include
requests for this information in interrogatories served on any plaintiff.
However, this section also highlights the particular difficulties presented by
“older” claims where some of the suggested solutions may be ineffective.
Section IV outlines the reporting process for RREs including
registering with CMS and detailing what information must be submitted to
CMS and when the information must be submitted. It argues that the use of
agents for reporting purposes by RREs may provide an additional point of
liability for the RRE and therefore concludes that RREs should not use
agents as a means of attempting to comply with the Section 111 reporting
requirements.
Section V discusses the penalties faced by RREs for noncompliance with the Section 111 reporting requirements. It argues that
imposing heavy monetary fines for non-compliance, particularly in the
scenario where a claimant has failed to provide the RRE with requested
information is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines
Clause and is therefore unconstitutional. As a result, this section concludes
that any penalties which may be imposed on an RRE should instead be
shifted to the claimant and/or the claimant’s attorney on a strong showing
from the RRE that the claimant has failed to provide the information
required by the RRE to ensure compliance with the Section 111 reporting
requirements. Section V further suggests a process which RREs should use
to ensure they have any information necessary to challenge any fines for
non-compliance with the Section 111 reporting requirements.
Section VI presents a variety of solutions to the numerous
problems presented by the Section 111 reporting requirements. In particular
it discusses the development of errors and omissions policies to protect
RREs from potential non-compliance; it suggests this solution as
particularly useful to self-insureds. Second, it discusses and advocates the
mandatory use of Medicare set aside arrangements, patterned after the
current requirement for workers’ compensation, for liability (including selfinsurance) and no-fault insurers as an alternative method of protecting
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Medicare’s financial interests and to the strict reporting requirements
advocated in the MMSEA.
II.

RESPONSIBLE REPORTING ENTITIES

The first major issue posed by the MMSEA is determining who
should be designated as an RRE. Section 111 requires only RREs to report
information to CMS. Medicare holds the RRE solely responsible for the
accurate and timely filing and reporting of claims and it is therefore critical
to identify the proper RRE.
However, the process of identifying who qualifies as an RRE has
proven difficult and confusing. For example, in the summer of 2009, ACE
USA, a retail operating division of ACE Group, offering property, casualty,
risk-management and accident and health insurance products through retail
brokers, released information advising that its insureds would be the RRE
for almost all policy types.15 In October 2009, ACE USA released the
following statement: “While we believe there is merit to the position that
our insured could be properly designated as the RRE for claims against
deductible liability policies, we recognize the information received from
CMS can be interpreted in several ways.”16 Therefore, in the October 2009
release ACE USA assumed responsibility as the appropriate RRE.17 These
two press releases clearly show the ambiguities in Section 111 and the
complications in interpreting its requirements.
A. GHP RRES
GHP RREs are generally insurers or third party administrators
(“TPAs”). A TPA is an entity that pays and/or adjudicates claims and may
perform other administrative services on behalf of the GHP, the plan or the
plan insurers.18 In instances where an insurer, an entity that, in return for
the receipt of premium, assumes the obligation to pay claims described in
the insurance contract and assumes the financial risk associated with such
payments, does not process GHP claims itself, but contracts with a TPA to

15

Press Release, ACE USA, Update Information: ACE and the Medicare,
Medicaid & SCHIP Extension Act (Summer 2009) (on file with author).
16
Press Release, ACE USA, Updated Information: ACE and the Medicare,
Medicaid & SCHIP Extension Act (October 5, 2009).
17
Id.
18
See § 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(7) (2008).
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perform such services, the TPA has the responsibility of reporting.19
Employers are Section 111 RREs for GHP purposes under only very
limited circumstances.
B. LIABILITY INSURANCE (INCLUDING SELF-INSURANCE) AND
NO-FAULT INSURANCE
For non-GHP purposes (liability insurance, self-insurance, no-fault
insurance or workers’ compensation), the RRE is the “applicable plan.”20
The term “applicable plan” means the “following laws, plans, or other
arrangements, including the fiduciary or administrator for such law, plan,
or arrangement: (i) [l]iability insurance (including self-insurance); (ii) [n]o
fault insurance; (iii) [w]orkers’ compensation laws or plans.”21 The Health
Care Financing Administration (hereinafter “HCFA”), which administers
Medicare, defines an applicable plan as “any arrangement, oral or written,
by one or more entities, to provide health benefits or medical care or
assume legal liability for injury or illness.”22
A non-GHP [RRE] is an employer or defendant’s insurance carrier
(i.e., workers’ compensation insurer, general liability insurer, or no-fault
insurer). For example, if an employer is self-insured for workers’
compensation or liability insurance, the employer may be an RRE.”23 An
insurance carrier may choose to handle claims processing on its own or to
outsource these responsibilities to another entity. However, this distinction
is irrelevant in relation to the determination of the RRE and an insurer is
considered an RRE regardless of whether or not it handles its own claims
processing.24
1. Liability Insurance
Liability insurance is defined in the regulations implementing the
MMESA as
19

Id.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 111
MANDATORY MEDICARE SECONDARY PAYER REPORTING (2009).
21
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8).
22
42 C.F.R. § 411.21 (2006).
23
Berdy & Nichols, supra note 3 at 399; OLLIS & CO., SECTION 111 OF THE
MEDICARE, MEDICAID AND SCHIP EXTENSION ACT OF 2007 (MMSEA), available
at http://ollisinsurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/section_111.pdf.
24
RRE Overview, http://www.piattconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_co
ntent&view=article&id=131&Itemid=91 (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
20
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Insurance (including a self-insured plan) that provides
payment based on legal liability for injury or illness or
damage to property. . . . Liability insurance payment
means a payment by a liability insurer, or an out-of-pocket
payment, including a payment to cover a deductible
required by a liability insurance policy, by any individual
or other entity that carries liability insurance or is covered
by a self-insured plan.25
Essentially, liability insurance (including self-insurance) “is coverage that
indemnifies or pays on behalf of the policyholder or self-insured entity
against claims for negligence, inappropriate action, or inaction which
results in injury to an individual or damage to property.”26 Liability
insurance includes the following: homeowners’ liability insurance,
automobile liability insurance, product liability insurance, malpractice
liability insurance, uninsured motorist liability insurance, underinsured
motorist liability insurance, etc.27
2. Self-Insureds
In Mason v. Am. Tobacco Co.,28 the United States District Court
interpreted “self-insured plan” as used in the Medicare as Secondary Payer
(hereinafter “MSP”) statute as involving an “entity that has assumed
posture similar to that of an insurance company.”29 The Code of Federal
Regulations defines a self-insured plan as “a plan under which an
individual, or private or governmental entity carries its own risk instead of
taking out insurance with a carrier.”30 The Health Care Financing
Administration has ruled that “the mere absence of insurance purchased
from a carrier does not necessarily constitute a ‘plan’ of self-insurance.”31
In determining the defendants’ status as possible “self-insured plans,” the
court in Mason stated that “one requirement for an entity to be a selfinsured plan is ‘the provider must establish a fund with an independent
fiduciary which is documented by a written agreement that includes legal
25

42 C.F.R. § 411.50 (2006).
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 5.
27
Id.
28
Mason v. Am. Tobacco Co., 212 F. Supp. 2d 88, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
29
Id.
30
42 C.F.R. § 411.50.
31
Medicare as Secondary Payer and Medicare Recovery Against Third
Parties, 54 Fed. Reg. 41716, 41727 (Oct. 11, 1989).
26

452

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 17.2

responsibilities and obligations required by State laws’ for payment of
medical expenses of those injured by its products.”32
In a May 2010 alert issued by CMS, CMS stated that it will
consider payments by sponsors of clinical trials for any injuries or
complications arising out of clinical trials to be self-insurance; as such, the
sponsors are considered to be RREs and must report these payments to
CMS.33 As early as 2004, CMS had maintained the position Medicare
would not make payments in situations where the clinical trial sponsor
agreed to cover payments not otherwise covered by another payer.34
However, CMS, until May 2010, consistently failed to give clarification as
to whether or not the sponsor’s agreement to make such payments
constituted a liability insurance plan.35 As such, prior to that date, sponsors
of clinical trials were unable to determine their status as RREs and begin
the required registration process. In the event CMS had not further
extended the initial reporting date, these sponsors would have faced severe
penalties. This situation illustrates the ongoing difficulty in determining
whether or not an entity has self-insurance and the problems that difficulty
presents.
3. No-fault insurance
The regulations implementing MMSEA define no-fault insurance
as
Insurance that pays for medical expenses for injuries
sustained on the property or premises of the insured, or in
the use, occupancy, or operation of an automobile,
regardless of who may have been responsible for causing

32

Mason, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 92 (quoting Mt. Diablo Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Ass’n, Dec. No. 96-D40, 1996 WL 862610, at *6 (P.R.R.B. July 1,
1996)).
33
Memorandum from Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., ALERT:
Clinical Trials & Liability Insurance (Including Self-Insurance), No-Fault
Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation (May 6, 2010), available at
http://www.cms.gov/MandatoryInsRep/Downloads/AlertClinicalTrailsNGHP.pdf.
34
Janice Ziegler et al., CMS Issues Section 111 Alert in NGHP Context
Regarding Clinical Trials, MONDAQ, June 17, 2010, http://www.mondaq
.com/unitedstates/article.asp?article_id=103200.
35
Id.

2011

MEDICARE SECTION 111 REPORTING RULES

453

the accident. This insurance includes but is not limited to
automobile, homeowner’s, and commercial plans.36
No-fault insurance is essentially a plan of “insurance that pays for
health care services resulting from injury to an individual or damage to
property in an accident, regardless of who is at fault for causing the
accident.”37
III.

MEDICARE
ENTITLEMENT,
ENROLLMENT

ELIGIBILITY

AND

As mentioned above Medicare, is a federal health insurance
program for people age 65 or older, people under 65 with certain
disabilities, and people of all ages with end-stage renal disease.38 It is
distinguishable from Medicaid, which consists of state run health insurance
programs designed to provide health insurance to low income pregnant
women, children under the age of 19, people 65 and older, people who are
blind, people who are disabled and people who need nursing home care.39 It
is possible to qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid; however, the
Section 111 reporting requirements concern only Medicare beneficiaries.40
Medicare is comprised of two “parts.” Medicare Part A, commonly
referred to as “hospital insurance,” helps a qualifying individual pay for
inpatient care received in a hospital, skilled nursing facility, or hospice,
and, if certain conditions are satisfied, home health care.41 The second part,
Medicare Part B, commonly referred to as “medical insurance” helps a
qualifying individual pay for “medically-necessary doctors’ services and
other outpatient care.”42 Medicare Part B also pays for certain preventative
services and services that may prevent an illness from progressing.43

36

42 C.F.R. § 411.50 (2006).
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 5, at 13.
38
de Freitas, supra note 1, at § 2a.
39
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., WHAT IS MEDICARE?, available at
http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/11306.pdf (last visited Oct. 4,
2010).
40
See id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.; Medicare beneficiaries may also choose to enroll in Medicare Part D,
which is Medicare’s prescription drug coverage plan or in Medicare Part C, which
are commonly referred to as “Medicare Advantage Plans.”
37
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A. DETERMINING A CLAIMANT’S MEDICARE BENEFICIARY
STATUS
Another issue for RREs involves determining the Medicare
beneficiary status of claimants. There are a variety of ways by which an
RRE may determine a claimant’s Medicare status. “An RRE can request
that the claimant provide his or her Health Insurance Claim Number, which
is the number on the claimant’s Medicare card. RREs may also obtain a
benefits statement from the Social Security Administration by searching
through the CMS-developed ‘Query System,’ or by using the claimant’s
first and last names, Social Security Number, and Social Security Consent
Form signed by the claimant.”44 In the alternative, rather than requesting a
claimant provide the information necessary to perform a query check, an
RRE may request the claimant provide information as to their Medicare
beneficiary status.45
Each method for determining a claimant’s Medicare beneficiary
status poses serious problems and highlights significant obstacles for
RREs. First, if the RRE requests the claimant provide it with information as
to its Medicare beneficiary status or social security number (hereinafter
“SSN”) and other information, the RRE may not always be able to rely on
the truthfulness or completeness of the claimant’s response to the RRE’s
For their part, claimants may decide to withhold that
request.46
information. CMS has provided space on the forms to be used by RREs in
requesting a claimant’s Health Insurance Claim Number (hereinafter
“HICN”) and SSN for a claimant to “explain the reason(s) for refusal to
provide requested information”; this indicates CMS’s awareness that
claimants may choose not to provide crucial information to RREs.47
Furthermore, an alert issued by CMS merely advises potential claimants
that it is appropriate for an RRE to request their SSN and/or HICN;
unfortunately for RREs, the alert does not advise or require compliance
with any such requests.48 In order for the Coordination of Benefits
44

Berdy & Nichols, supra note 3, at 399.
Kenneth R. Meyer & Genevieve M. Spires, Beware of Added Complications
in Claims Involving Medicare Beneficiaries, NEW JERSEY L. J. Sept. 28, 2009 at 2.
46
See id.
47
Richard L. McConnel, et. al, No Port in a Storm? Crucial Safe Harbor Still
in Doubt Under New Medicare Section 111 Reporting Requirements, INS.
COVERAGE 4, Dec. 4, 2009, at 3, 5.
48
Press Release, Collection of Medicare Health Insurance Claim Numbers
(HICNs), Social Security Numbers (SSNs) and Employer Identification Numbers
(EINs) (Tax Identification Numbers) – ALERT (April 6, 2010).
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Contractor (hereinafter “COBC”) to make a determination as to a
claimant’s Medicare beneficiary status it must be able to exactly match
either a Health Insurance Claim Number or SSN exactly and match at least
three of the four remaining criteria (first initial of the first name, first 6
characters of the last name, date of birth and gender) exactly.49 A claimant
who refuses to provide the requested information to an RRE therefore
makes it impossible for both the RRE and the COBC to make a
determination of the claimant’s Medicare beneficiary status. As a result, a
claimant who refuses to provide the requested information makes it
impossible for an RRE to comply with the Section 111 reporting
requirements.
An alternative method to obtaining beneficiary status includes
submitting “a query to CMS’ Coordination of Benefits Contractor to
determine whether a claimant is a Medicare beneficiary.”50 An RRE should
perform regular query checks through the “Query System” for every
claimant in an attempt to determine Medicare beneficiary status; this
includes performing a check at the inception of the claim and prior to any
settlement or payment. It is particularly important to perform multiple
query checks on claimants who were initially identified as not being
eligible Medicare beneficiaries because such a claimant’s status may
change over the course of processing the claim. The information required
to complete such an inquiry include: the claimant’s date of birth, SSN and
sex of the claimant.51 Therefore, completing an investigation into a
claimant’s Medicare status will likely involve the need to obtain the
claimant’s Social Security Number (hereinafter “SSN”).52 However, nonhealth group plans cannot compel a claimant to provide such information
and as noted above, in other instances the claimant may simply refuse to
provide this information.53 Also, as noted above RREs cannot rely on
claimant’s to receive honest or complete answers to requests for this
information. In a town hall teleconference held on October 22, 2009 CMS
advised insurers that a “claimant who is a Medicare beneficiary would have
an obligation to provide their HICN or SSN to the insurer, but that a
claimant who is not a Medicare beneficiary would not be obligated to

49

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 5, at 35.
McConnel et al., supra note 47.
51
Id.
52
Joe Herbers, Medicare Data Requirements to Boost Workers Compensation
Costs, PINNACLE NEWS, July 2009, at 1-2.
53
Id.; Kevin Quinley, Baring its Teeth, CLAIMS MAGAZINE, Oct. 6, 2009.
50
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respond,” though it is unclear what statutory or regulatory authority
supports this assertion.54
A solution to this problem is for claims handlers to include a
condition to their settlements which requires “that the claimant (or
claimant’s attorney) provide the Social Security number to enable the
settling party to comply with MMSEA.”55 Where a claimant commences a
lawsuit against an RRE to obtain payment, defense counsel should, in their
interrogatories, request the claimant reveal whether or not he or she is a
Medicare beneficiary or when he or she expects to begin receiving
Medicare benefits.56 Defense counsel may also use interrogatories to “seek
information about the plaintiff’s Medicare Identification Number, when
Medicare entitlement began, and whether any claim for the plaintiff’s
medical care related to the injuries alleged in the lawsuit have been paid by,
or filed with, Medicare.”57 However, these methods may not be successful
for an RRE’s existing claims and therefore a retrospective process should
be developed to gather the necessary data on existing claims. Specifically,
RREs must develop procedures to claims where settlements have been
reached but the RRE maintains ongoing responsibility for medicals, after
July 1, 2009 and for lawsuits in which discovery has closed.
In response to these troubling issues some industry professional
have advocated a “safe-harbor” provision that would apply to RREs that
have attempted in good faith to obtain the necessary information from
claimants but are unable to do so or are provided inaccurate information
regarding whether a particular claimant is receiving Medicare.58 It appears
that CMS has adopted a limited “safe-harbor” provision.59 In an alert
54

McConnel et al., supra note 47, at 5.
Quinley, supra note 53.
56
Sharon Caffrey et al, Medicare Secondary Payer Statute: New Reporting
Requirements for Products Liability and Toxic Torts Clients, 198 N.J.L. J. 868
(2009).
57
Id.at 869.
58
McConnel, et al., supra note 47, at 3-4 (A “safe-harbor” makes sense in the
context of liability insurers and self-insured entities that have no contractual
relationship with the claimant, do not control the claimant’s actions, and have no
legally enforceable means for obtaining information from the claimant.); Franco,
supra note 9, at 9.
59
See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Alert:
Compliance Guidance Regarding Obtaining Individual HICNs and/or SSNs for
Non-Group Health Plan (NGHP) Reporting Under 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8) (Aug.
24, 2009). However, a note to the Alert reads: “This process does not provide a
‘safe-harbor’ to any reporting entity attempting to use it to avoid reporting MSP
55
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published on its website, CMS advised that an RRE would be considered
“compliant” if it has obtained a copy of the form used to request necessary
information signed by the claimant.60 This limited “safe-harbor” provision
fails to address the scenario where an insured or self-insured transmits the
necessary forms for requesting the required information to the claimant but
the claimant fails or refuses to return the form. It is likely that many
claimants will simply disregard the insured’s or self-insured’s request for
the form because “claimants have little or no incentive to provide the
requested information to liability insurers or self-insured entities, and in
some circumstances, they arguably have an incentive not to make the
disclosure.”61 This will undoubtedly leave RREs liable for unreported
information which cannot possibly be obtained. CMS has indicated it may
shift its “safe-harbor” position by expanding the protections for insurers
and self-insured entities.62 However, as CMS representatives have advised
in their town hall teleconferences, the Liability Insurance (Including SelfInsurance), No-Fault Insurance and Workers’ Compensation User Guide
(hereinafter “User Guide”) and other written alerts produced by CMS are
the official source of information where discrepancies exist and as of the
drafting of this paper those sources contain no expanded “safe-harbor”
provision.
The safe-harbor provisions proposed by industry professionals pose
a different problem, i.e., that such a provision undermines the intent of the
Section 111 reporting requirements. The goal of Section 111 is to protect
Medicare’s future financial interests by ensuring that Medicare is, where
appropriate, the secondary payer. A “safe-harbor” provision would allow
certain claims to remain unchecked by the CMS system and therefore
leaves open the possibility that Medicare will make unnecessary payments
or will be ill-informed to collect reimbursements for past conditional
payments. As discussed below a solution to this problem with the safeharbor provision is to transfer the penalties to the party responsible for noncompliance.

data about an individual known to the reporting entity to be a Medicare
beneficiary.” Id.
60
Id.
61
McConnel et al., supra note 47, at 4.
62
Id. (In a town hall teleconference on September 30, 2009, CMS
representatives appeared to depart from the written guidance contained in the alert
and implied that the safe-harbor might extend more broadly if the insurer could
prove it has a “process” in place to obtain information from claimants and that the
request form was delivered to a specific claimant by certified mail or otherwise).
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REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

During the investigation of a liability claim, if the claimant is a
Medicare beneficiary, the RRE must place the CMS COBC on notice of the
loss.63 “An RRE does not need approval from the Medicare beneficiary to
make this notice.”64 “[T]he trigger to report involves whether there is an
expectation of making a payment. If there is no liability and no expectation
of making any type of payment, there is no duty to report.”65 Those
required to report under MMSEA were required to commence collection of
the data required for reporting prior to the testing of the reporting process
which is scheduled to commence on January 1, 2011.66
A. REGISTERING WITH CMS
Any RRE who has an expectation of making payments to a
claimant must register with CMS in order to comply with the Section 111
reporting requirements. As noted above, “[e]ntities who are RREs for
purposes of the Section 111 liability insurance (including self-insurance),
no-fault insurance, or workers’ compensation are not required to register if
they will have nothing to report.”67 CMS has an admittedly “hard” and
“complicated” registration and reporting process for RRE’s. Prior to
commencing the registration process, RREs must determine how they will
submit Section 111 files to the COBC and how many Section 111
Responsible Reporting Entity Identification Numbers (hereinafter “RRE
ID”) will be needed.68 An RRE who wishes to use different agents to
63

See 42 C.F.R. § 411.25(a) (2010).
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8)(A)-(B) (2006).
65
Franco, supra note 9, at 10; Meyer & Spires, supra note 45.
66
Alan Cooper, Will New Law Require Set-Asides for Medicare in P.I.
Cases?, VA. LAW. WKLY, Nov. 23, 2009.
67
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 23 (“For example, if
an entity is self-insured solely for the deductible portion of a liability insurance
policy but it always pays any such deductible to its insurer, who then pays the
claim, it may not have another to report. However, those who do not register
initially because they have no expectation of having claims to report, must register
in time to allow a full quarter for testing if they have future situations where they
have a reasonable expectation of having to report.”).
68
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 33 (“Only one Claim
Input File may be submitted on a quarterly basis for each RRE ID. Due to
corporate organization, claim system structures, data processing systems, data
centers and agents that may be used for file submission, RREs may want to submit
64
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submit workers’ compensation claims and liability and no-fault claims
must register twice to obtain two RRE IDs.69 An RRE who establishes
multiple RRE IDs must submit a quarterly Claim Input File for every RRE
ID formed, regardless of whether or not they have any reportable claims for
the reporting period.70
The registration process begins with the RRE entering the COB
secure website and providing basic information about the RRE and its
authorized representative.71 The authorized representative is “the person
who’s able to essentially legally bind the RRE to [a contract and the terms
and] requirements of the Section 111 reporting”; the authorized
representative is generally a person at the executive level in the
organization.72 The authorized representative is the person responsible for,
among other things, reporting, signing off on any information provided by
the RRE during registration and signing off on who an RRE appoints as its
account manager.73 Essentially, the authorized representative has “ultimate
accountability for the RRE’s compliance with Section 111 reporting
requirements.”74 Once CMS has received this information, a letter is mailed
US Post to the authorized representative; the letter will contain a personal
identification number (hereinafter “PIN”).75
Once the authorized representative has received the PIN, he or she
will provide that information to the account manager.76 The account
manager is the person who manages the day to day activities, including
processing and account information.77 The account manager may be an
employee of the RRE or, if the RRE chooses, may be an agent assigned the
reporting tasks.78 The account manager must then return to the COB secure
website to complete the account setup process. The account manager will
be required to provide information about themselves, develop their own
personal login ID and password, and set up the remainder of the RRE’s
more than one Claim Input File to the COBC on a quarterly basis and therefore
will need more than one RRE ID in order to do so.”).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Telephone interview with Bill Decker, Pat Ambrose, Barbara Wright, and
Bill Zavoina (Jan. 22, 2009).
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 31.
75
Telephone interview with CMS (Jan. 22, 2009).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 5, at 24.
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account information, which includes information relating to the agent that
will be used in the file transfer.79
Once the account manager has completed the second step in the
process, “the system will generate a profile report and issue that profile
report to [the] authorized representative via email.”80 The authorized
representative then reviews the information, signs the last page of the
report and returns it to CMS.81 Further, after account managers have
completed their step in the registration process they have the ability to
invite an unlimited number of individuals, both employees of the RRE and
outside agents, to become account designees.82 The account designees are
individuals who assist the account manager with the reporting process they
“are able to upload and transfer files, monitor file statistics and so on.”83
RRE’s were required to register with CMS by September 30, 2009,
however the complications in determining who is considered an RRE has
led to flexibility in this registration deadline.84 The registration process for
RREs will remain open indefinitely to allow for ongoing registration.85
Practitioners recommend registering with CMS as soon possible because
RREs are required to “test their abilit[ies] to upload files in early 2010” 86
and to begin making quarterly reports of all payments to all Medicare
beneficiaries in January 2011. CMS advises allowing an entire quarter of
testing prior to commencing mandatory reporting. Therefore, RREs who
failed to register prior to January 1, 2010 are likely to face penalties for
non-compliance. There is no exception to penalties for RREs who were
required and able to register prior to that date, but simply failed to do so.
RREs that are not prepared for the reporting process to begin face the
possibility of being fined for unreported claims.87
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Telephone interview with CMS (Jan. 22, 2009).
Id.
81
Id.
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Id.
83
Id.
84
Sharon Caffrey, et al., Have you Registered Under MMSEA? New Reporting
Obligations & Penalties for Medicare Secondary Payers, MONDAQ (October 19,
2009).
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CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 5, at 26.
86
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1. Foreign RREs88
As late as October 22, 2009, nearly a month after the initial
September 30, 2009 registration deadline, CMS had no registration process
available for foreign RREs and no guidelines as to what steps these entities
should take to ensure compliance with the Section 111 reporting
requirements.89 A foreign entity is “an entity that does not have a U.S.
address and/or a U.S. Tax Identification Number (TIN) or Employer
Identification Number (EIN).”90 CMS initially advised these RREs “what
[they] should do is wait.”91 On December 29, 2009, CMS finally released
registration guidance for RREs who are foreign entities. Foreign RREs are
advised by CMS to obtain a United States EIN by completing the Internal
Revenue Service SS-4 application.92 As a result of the late date at which
CMS released this information foreign RREs were not required to register
until April 1, 2010.93 However, it is important to note that this delay in
registration does not change the reporting requirements of foreign RREs;
foreign entities are required to follow the same registration and reporting
procedures as domestic RREs once they have obtained a U.S. EIN.94 The
delay was not anticipated to change the reporting date requirements
associated with Ongoing Responsibility for Medicals or with ‘Total
Payment Obligation to Claimant’ amounts.95 Therefore, foreign RREs were
expected to register at a later date than domestic RREs yet were required to

88

An interesting and yet unresolved legal issue surrounding foreign RREs is
whether or not CMS may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction on these RREs who
make direct claims payments to U.S. residents. See Federation of Regulatory
Counsel, Inc., Medicare Secondary Payer Reporting: Extraterritorial Applicability
of Requirements to Foreign Insurers, 21 FORC J. 2 (2010).
89
Telephone interview with CMS (Oct. 22, 2009).
90
Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Office of Financial
Management/Financial Services Group, ALERT: Registration Guidance for
Liability Insurance (Including Self-Insurance), No-Fault Insurance, or Workers’
Compensation Responsible Reporting Entities (RREs) Who Are Foreign Entities
(Dec. 29, 2009).
91
Telephone interview with CMS (Oct. 22, 2009).
92
See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 90.
93
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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gather and prepare their information for reporting to begin on the same date
as domestic RREs.
B. USE OF AGENTS FOR REPORTING PURPOSES
According to the CMS MMSEA Section 111 Medicare Secondary
Payer Mandatory Reporting: Liability Insurance (Including Self-Insurance),
No-Fault Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation User Guide (hereinafter
“MMSEA User Guide”), agents are not RREs “for purposes of the MSP
reporting responsibilities.”96 However, an RRE may “contract with an
entity to act as an agent for reporting purposes.”97 The RRE is responsible
for registering, reporting and filing and will designate the agent who will be
reporting during the registration process.98 It is important to note that an
RRE may not shift its Section 111 reporting responsibility to its agent,
whether the attempt to do so is by contract or otherwise. The RRE remains
the party solely responsible and accountable for understanding of and
compliance with the Section 111 requirements and for the accuracy of the
data submitted.99
While it is likely numerous companies and organizations will form
with the purpose of taking on the reporting responsibilities of RREs, it is
not advisable to procure an agent to satisfy reporting requirements. The use
of agents in the reporting process raises potential liability for the RRE
because the RRE lacks control over the reporting process engaged in by the
hired agent yet is still held responsible through monetary fines for any noncompliance with the reporting requirements. The RRE can ultimately be
liable for any and all misdoings and errors made by the agent during the
reporting process, a possibility that can be easily eliminated by an RRE
retaining, rather than delegating the responsibility of reporting.

96

Ctrs For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 22 (“Agents may
include, but are not limited to, data service companies, consulting companies or
similar entities that can create and submit Section 111 files to the COBC on behalf
of the RRE.”).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
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C. CLAIM THAT TRIGGERS A REPORTING REQUIREMENT AND
REPORTING THRESHOLDS
Whether or not a claim triggers reporting requirements depends on
the type of insurance in question. For liability lines of coverage, the
reporting requirements are triggered by any kind of payment made on or
after October 1, 2010 to a Medicare beneficiary for a claim or potential
claim as a result of bodily or person injury, and/or ongoing responsibility
for payment of medical services.100 For worker’s compensation and other
Ongoing Responsibility for Medicals (ORM) payments, CMS requires a
look back for ORMs paid from January 1, 2009, in which the file is closed
by the insurer, but can be reopened if further medicals are submitted.101
Certain claims can be excluded from the mandatory Section 111
reporting requirements because they do not meet the CMS-established
reporting thresholds. For liability insurance (including self insurance) and
workers’ compensation total payment obligation to the claimant
(hereinafter “TPOC”) the established thresholds are:
(a) For TPOCs dates of January 1, 2010 through
December 31, 2010, TPOC amounts of $0.00 $5,000.00 are exempt from reporting except as
specified in (d) below.
(b) For TPOCs dates of January 1, 2011 through
December 31, 2011, TPOC amounts of $0.00 $2,000.00 are exempt from reporting except as
specified in (d) below.
(c) For TPOCs dates of January 1, 2012 through
December 31, 2012, TPOC amounts of $0.00 $600.00 are exempt from reporting except as specified
in (d) below.
(d) Where there are multiple TPOCs reported by the same
RRE on the same record, the combined TPOC
amounts must be considered in determining whether
the reporting exception threshold is met.102

100

Press Release, MARSH & Am. Soc. For Healthcare Risk Mgmt., MMSEA
Section 111 Non-Grp. Health Plan Liab. Ins. (including Self Ins.), No-Fault
Insurance, and Workers’ Comp. Frequently Asked Questions 2 (2009).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 5.
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There are further situations where a case-by-case analysis must be
made to determine whether or not an entity is considered an RRE and
whether it must submit information on certain claims.103 For example, in
the context of reinsurance, stop loss insurance, excess insurance, umbrella
insurance, guaranty funds and patient compensation funds which have
some responsibility beyond a certain limit may be required to report claim
in certain situations. “The key in determining whether or not reporting . . .
is required for these situations is whether or not the payment is to the
injured claimant/representative of the claimant vs. payment being made to
the self-insured entity to reimburse the self-insured entity.”104 If the
payment is made to the self-insured in the form of a reimbursement then
the self-insured is the RRE. However, if the payment is made to the injured
claimant or her representative then the insurer is the RRE for reporting
purpose.105 It is therefore advisable in these situations to make payments to
a party other than the injured claimant or their representative. Development
of such a policy prevents those entities named above from becoming RREs.
D. WHAT TO REPORT
Initial reports made to CMS must include “information for all
claims involving a settlement, judgment, award or other payment made to a
Medicare beneficiary” after July 1, 2009 for ORM and January 1, 2010 for
TPOC.106 “The Claim Input File is the data set transmitted from a MMSEA
Section 111 RRE to the COBC that is used to report liability insurance
(including self-insurance), no-fault insurance, and workers’ compensation
claim information where the injured party is a Medicare beneficiary and
medicals are claimed and/or released or the settlement, judgment, award, or
other payment has the effect of releasing medicals.”107 When making that
report to the COBC, an RRE is required to obtain and report approximately
130 data points. These data fall into five distinct categories:

103

Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 75-78 (For example,
a payment made specifically as a one-time payment for defense evaluation does
not trigger the reporting requirement if made directly to the provider or other
physician; “[w]here there is a settlement, judgment, award or other payment with
no establishment/acceptance of responsibility for ongoing medicals, the RRE is not
requirement to report, etc.”).
104
Id. at 75.
105
Id.
106
Meyer & Spires, supra note 45.
107
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 34.
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(1) The Injured Party/Medicare beneficiary Information:
Includes identification information, date of injury,
cause of injury, venue, injury information, product
identification and insurance/self-insurance claim and
contact information
(2) Injured party attorney information []: includes detailed
attorney contact information along with attorney/law
firm TIN
(3) Settlement, Judgment, Award or Other payment
information []: includes amounts and dates for ongoing
responsibility for medical and total payment
obligations
(4) Claimant information, if other than injured party []:
includes contact information for estate or other
claimant in survival or wrongful death actions.
(5) Claimant (other than injured party) attorney []:
includes attorney contact information along with TIN.
108

Once the data is transmitted in the form of a Claim Input File,
COBC will use the file to determine whether or not a particular claimant is
considered an eligible Medicare beneficiary by matching the information
provided in the Claim Input File with already existing Medicare data.109
Initially, uncertainty surrounding reporting requirements existed
where an RRE had a claim in which it has an ongoing responsibility for
future medical requests, as of the implementation date, even where the
claim had been closed in the RRE’s records. In a January 2009
teleconference CMS indicated it was still looking at “how far back [it] will
require [RREs] to go in terms of cases that are already closed” as of the
implementation date.110 It now appears CMS will require RRE’s to report
any claims where an ongoing responsibility exists as of July 1, 2009,
regardless of when the RRE initially settled the claim.111 This will likely
require a significant look-back period and cause an already onerous process
to become more challenging.

108

Id. at 108-46.
Id.
110
Telephone interview with CMS (Jan. 22, 2009).
111
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E. WHEN TO REPORT
Claims information must be reported after the RRE assumes
ongoing responsibility for medicals or after a TPOC settlement has been
reached, or a judgment, award or any other payment has occurred.112 Claim
Input files must be submitted to COBC on a quarterly basis during an
RRE’s assigned 7-day file submission time frame.113 There is a grace
period when the settlement, judgment, award or other payment is made
within 45 days prior to the start of the seven-day file submission time
frame.114
Quarterly Claim Input File Submission Timeframes115
Dates
1st Month
2nd Month
3rd Month
01 - 07
08 - 14
15 - 21
22 - 28
V.

Group 1
Group 2
Group 3
Group 4

Group 5
Group 6
Group 7
Group 8

Group 9
Group 10
Group 11
Group 12

PENALTIES

Section 111 contains provisions which provide for serious
consequences upon the failure of an RRE to comply with its terms.116 The
statute states, “[a]n applicable plan that fails to comply with the
requirements under subparagraph (A) with respect to any claimant shall be
subject to a civil money penalty of $1,000 for each day of noncompliance
with respect to each claimant. . . .”117 At the present time it appears as
though insurers will be strictly liable under this section for failure to
comply with the reporting requirements.
In addition, CMS is entitled to recover penalties based on any other
available remedy. For example, RREs may be required to reimburse
112

Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 34.
Id. at 33. (RREs receive their Claim Input File submission timeframe with
the profile report sent after the COBC has processed their registration and account
setup.).
114
Press Release, MARSH & Am. Soc. For Healthcare Risk Mgmt., supra
note 100.
115
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 4, at 33.
116
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8)(E)(2008).
117
Id.
113

2011

MEDICARE SECTION 111 REPORTING RULES

467

Medicare for any conditional payments made. Section 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii),
states, in pertinent part, when Medicare makes a conditional payment for
medical services received as a result of an injury caused by another party,
the government has a right of recovery for the conditional payment amount
against any entity responsible for making the primary payment.118 A
conditional payment is: “A Medicare benefit payment made for any item or
service to which the exclusion for third-party payers applies, [which] is
conditioned on reimbursement to the appropriate Medicare Trust Fund
when notice or other information is received regarding a beneficiary’s
entitlement to payment under a primary plan.”119
In a recent decision, United States v. Harris, the United States
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia was asked to
examine the ability of CMS to recover monies owed by a beneficiary from
such beneficiary’s attorney.120 The court noted that to recover payment,
“the government may ‘bring an action against any or all entities that are or
were required or responsible . . . to make payment with respect to the same
item or service . . . under a primary plan.’”121 Primary plan is defined as a
group health plan or large group health plan and a workmen's compensation
law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan (including a
118

42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii). “In order to recover payment made under
this subchapter for an item or service, the United States may bring an action
against any or all entities that are or were required or responsible (directly, as an
insurer or self-insurer, as a third-party administrator, as an employer that sponsors
or contributes to a group health plan, or large group health plan, or otherwise) to
make payment with respect to the same item or service (or any portion thereof)
under a primary plan.” Id.; see also Cox v. Shalala, 112 F.3d 151, 154 (4th Cir.
1997) (“When such a conditional payment is made for medical care, the
government has a direct right of recovery for the entire amount conditionally paid
from any entity responsible for making primary payment.”).
119
70C AM. JUR. 2D Social Sec. & Medicare § 2473 (2009).
120
U.S. v. Harris, No. 5:08CV102, 2009 WL 891931, at *1 (N.D. W. Va.
March 26, 2009) (holding that Plaintiff’s attorney became liable to Medicare
immediately when he made payment to his client, a Medicare beneficiary. Mr.
Harris’ client in a personal injury case had received Medicare benefits in the
amount of $22,549.67. Mr. Harris settled the personal injury action for $25,000.
He then distributed the settlement proceeds without reimbursing Medicare for its
conditional payments. Medicare reduced its claim to $10,253.59, taking into
account Mr. Harris’ attorney’s fees, costs, and the amount of the settlement.
Having already disbursed the settlement funds, Mr. Harris ignored Medicare’s
rights. Thereafter, Medicare pursued Mr. Harris in court to recover its conditional
payment).
121
Id. at *3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii)).
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self-insured plan) or no fault insurance.122 The government may also
“recover under this clause from any entity that has received payment from
a primary plan or from the proceeds of a primary plan’s payment to any
entity.”123 Such an entity is defined as “a beneficiary provider, supplier,
physician, attorney, State agency, or private insurer that has received a
primary payment.”124 Under Harris, an attorney may be held liable for
monies due to CMS if her beneficiary client fails to make such payment.
However, it appears as though this situation has rarely arisen. A Freedom
of Information Act (hereinafter “FOIA”) request submitted to CMS
revealed on three instances in which “CMS or its agents took action to
recover conditional payments under the [MSP] Program.”125
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1395y, liability for conditional payments made
by Medicare can be further extended to the RRE. There are a variety of
methods by which an RRE may protect itself from lawsuits to recover
conditional payments. First, an RRE may make a payment directly to
Medicare for the conditional payments which have been made and then
make any remaining payment to the claimant. Second, the RRE may name
Medicare as an additional payee as a material term to the settlement
agreement. Alternatively, the RRE may establish a policy of refusing
liability payments to claimants who fail to provide the required
information.
The case of Breitkopf v. Krieger126 illustrates how these methods
may be used in practice. In Breitkopf, the parties entered into a settlement
agreement under which they agreed Medicare’s rights had to be
protected.127 However, a dispute between the parties arose as to whether
Medicare or CMS could appear as a payee on the settlement draft.128 The
claimant demanded a portion of settlement immediately, however, the
insurer did not want to disburse the settlement proceeds for fear of the
possibility that Medicare would pursue a claim against it if conditional
payments were not repaid within 60 days.129 The judge ordered half the
money be paid to the claimant and the other half be placed in an escrow
122

42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A).
Id.
124
42 C.F.R. § 411.24(g)(2006).
125
Hart v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 676 F. Supp. 2d 846, 852 (D.
Ariz. 2009).
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No. 09-1890 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2009).
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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account to be distributed to Medicare upon determination of the amount of
conditional payments that had been made.130
Under an agreement where Medicare is listed as an additional
payee to the settlement agreement, the plaintiff’s or claimant’s attorney or
the claimant would be required to obtain CMS’ endorsement on the check
before distributing or depositing the funds. This would provide CMS with
the opportunity to recoup any monies owed to it for conditional payments
made. Defense counsel and insurance companies should ensure that the
naming of Medicare as an additional payee is a material term to the
settlement agreement and that the claimant and/or plaintiff is aware of this
term. In the recent decision in Tomlinson v. Landers,131 an insurer issued a
settlement draft which included CMS as a payee after learning the Plaintiff
was a Medicare beneficiary. The court rejected a Defendant’s Motion to
Enforce a Settlement on the ground that there was no “meeting of the
minds” because the parties’ settlement agreement did not include naming
CMS as a payee.132 Under Tomlinson, it is essential that insurers and their
attorneys include such a term in the settlement agreement.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
A significant Eighth Amendment constitutional issue is raised by
the imposition of heavy fines on RREs for non-compliance, particularly in
situations where the RRE is unable to obtain the required information from
claimants. The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”133 The Excessive Fines Clause “limits the government’s power
to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind ‘as punishment for some
offense.’”134 “The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the
Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of
the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that
it is designed to punish.”135 In Bajakian the Court held a punitive forfeiture
is violative of the Excessive Fines Clause if the forfeiture is “grossly
130

Id.
No. 3:07-cv-1180-J-TEM, 2009 WL 1117399 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2009).
132
Id. at *3-5.
133
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
134
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993).
135
United States v. Bajakian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (Forfeiture of
$357,144 in case, based on “solely a reporting offense” when defendant failed to
declare that he was transporting more than $10,000 in currency out of the country,
held constitutionally impermissible).
131
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disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offense.”136 Imposing a
fine of $1,000 per day is arguably disproportional to the offense when
imposed on an insured or self-insured that is unable to obtain necessary
information from the claimant. Here again, shifting the burden of the
penalties to the beneficiary would alleviate an issue created by the Section
111 reporting requirements.
B. PROCESS FOR AVOIDING PENALTIES IMPOSED BY CMS
RREs must take care to develop intensive methods for providing
claimants with any necessary forms and documenting all communications
with the claimant. For example, the RRE should deliver any required forms
to the claimant via certified mail; this method will allow the RRE to
develop a record of communications with the claimant. If a response is not
received on the initial attempt, the RRE should again attempt to deliver the
form via the same method and should document each attempt to deliver the
form. Instituting these types of comprehensive practices may allow the
RRE to bring possible challenges to any fines imposed upon it in relation to
those non-cooperative claimants.
C. SITUATIONS WHERE PENALTIES SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON
CLAIMANT
As discussed above, there are likely to be situations where a
claimant refuses to provide accurate and complete information relating to
Medicare beneficiary status, including their HICN and SSN, to an RRE. An
RRE should not be held responsible for its non-compliance with the
Section 111 reporting requirements where the RRE has made multiple
attempts, in good faith, to retrieve the necessary information from the
claimant and can show the claimant is acting to hinder recovery of such
information and to prevent a determination of the claimant’s Medicare
beneficiary status. The burden of proof should be placed on the RRE to
establish its good faith attempts to collect the necessary information and
that the claimant has hindered that collection.
Where a RRE is able meet its burden it should be excused from
monetary liability as to that particular claimant. However, Medicare should
not be prevented from collecting monetary fines in this circumstance;
instead, the penalties which are to be imposed on the RRE should be
shifted to the claimant and/or their representative for their interference with
136
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Medicare’s ability to recoup any conditional payments, to ensure its
position as secondary payer for future payments and/or to achieve the
overall goal of protecting Medicare’s future financial interests. Unlike the
safe-harbor provisions which have been advocated by some industry
professionals, which merely relieve all parties of liability, shifting the
burden of financial penalties to the party responsible for non-compliance
will serve the overarching goal of the Section 111 reporting requirements.
Furthermore, shifting the burden to the claimant may provide an incentive
for future claimants to comply with information requests sent by RREs.
Therefore, shifting the financial burden will not only protect RREs from
unreasonable penalties, but will result in a more effective process for CMS,
RREs and claimants.
VI.

HELPFUL SOLUTIONS
A. ERRORS & OMISSIONS INSURANCE POLICIES

The insurance industry has begun to offer new products in response
to the reporting requirements. For example, American Empire Surplus
Lines Insurance Company (hereinafter “American Empire”), a member of
the Great American Insurance Group, has launched an errors and omissions
(hereinafter “E&O”) liability insurance product specifically designed for
Medicare statutory compliance.137 E&O insurance is “an agreement to
indemnify for loss sustained because of a mistake or oversight by the
insured.”138 Essentially, E&O coverage provides protection “in the event
that an error or omission . . . has caused financial loss . . . .”139 In regards to
American Empire’s new E&O product, Bob Nelson, American Empire’s
President and Chief Operating Officer stated:
Our new policy, which provides E&O coverage for
Medicare Statutory Compliance, is designed to help all
entities who choose to self-insure their workers’
compensation or third party liability exposures. The new
Extension Act legislation has wide-ranging consequences
137

Press Release, Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins., Am. Empire Surplus Lines
Ins. Co. Launches E&O Liab. Ins. For Medicare Statutory Compl. (Nov. 9, 2009).
138
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
139
Glenda Wertz, The Ins and Outs of Errors and Omissions Insurance, INS.
J.,
July
19,
2004
available
at
http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/west/2004/07/19/features/44745.htm.
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to these employers, who may soon be confronted with
demands from Medicare for reimbursement for claims they
thought were settled.140
The use of an errors and omissions policy will be particularly
useful for self-insureds, particularly those that are small companies, where
their new Section 111 reporting requirements will seem particularly
onerous. An errors and omissions policy like the one discussed above will
reduce the risk associated with self-insureds by ensuring coverage where
any compliance mistakes are made by the self-insured which would
otherwise result in the imposition of heavy fines.
RREs should take into consideration numerous factors in
determining whether or not to purchase an E&O policy to protect against
non-compliance with the reporting requirements. For instance, in the event
an RRE uses an agent as discussed above, it is important to discern whether
the E&O policy will cover mistakes made by the agent. Further, as with
any type of insurance, RREs must consider what this type of E&O policy
will cost.
B. MEDICARE SET ASIDE ARRANGEMENTS
The central goal behind the new reporting requirements enacted
through MMSEA is to provide Medicare with additional tools by which to
seek reimbursements for Medicare claims. Completing CMS-approved setaside arrangements, commonly referred to as MSAs, will effectively serve
this purpose. A Medicare set-aside is “an allocation for future payments
under an insurance claims settlement designated exclusively to pay for
medical services that would be covered by Medicare if the injury/illness is
not covered by a private insurance program.”141 Medicare set-asides are
currently required only in workers’ compensation settlements.142 The
widespread use of Medicare set-asides in other settlement agreements will
ensure that Medicare’s interests are being reasonably considered by the
parties. The advantage of a Medicare set-aside arrangement is that when
the set-aside amount has been completely exhausted, Medicare will become

140

Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins., supra note 137.
A Closer Look: Medicare Set-Aside Arrangements Become an Issue for
Risk Managers, WORKPLACE STRATEGIES (MARSH, Global Offices) 2005, at 1.
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See id.
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the primary payer and will be responsible for all future Medicare-covered
expenses related to the injury.143
Under the current Medicare set-aside scheme for workers’
compensation claims the following requirements must be met:
(1) The claimant is currently a Medicare beneficiary and
the total settlement amount is greater than $25,000; OR,
(2) The claimant has a “reasonable expectation” of
Medicare enrollment within thirty (30) months of the
settlement date and the anticipated total settlement amount
for future medical expenses and disability/lost wages over
the life or duration of the settlement agreement is expected
to be greater than $25,000.144
The amount of a set-aside arrangement varies on a case-by-case basis and
should be approved by CMS. The approval process would allow CMS to
evaluate the extent to which its interests are being considered and advise
the parties as to what adjustments, if any, must be made in their
computations. In computing the amount to be “set-aside” the parties should
consider: “all future medical expenses (including prescription drugs),
repayment of any Medicare conditional payments, previously settled
portions of a workers’ compensation claim, life expectancy, inflation,
administrative fees, wages, and attorney fees.”145
There are no current requirements that MSAs be used in the
context of non-workers’ compensation claims, including personal injury
liability claims. However, using MSAs for these types of claims appears to
be the most prudent way to protect Medicare’s interests for future expenses
143

Berdy & Nichols, supra note 3, at 397.
Id. at 396 (citing Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Workers
Compensation
Medicare
Set-aside
Arrangement,
available
at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/WorkersCompAgencyServices/04_wcsetaside.asp#TopOf
Page); see id. (A claimant may have a “reasonable expectation” of Medicare
enrollment when the individual (1) has applied for Social Security Disability
Benefits; (2) has been denied Social Security Disability Benefits but anticipates
appealing that decision; (3) is in the process of appealing and/or refiling for Social
Security Disability Benefits; (4) is 62 and six months old; or, (5) has an End Stage
Renal Disease condition but does not yet qualify for Medicare.).
145
Id. Conditional payments are those payments made by Medicare to a
provider for health care services. “Medicare can and will seek reimbursements
from GHPs and non-GHPs for conditional payments made if it determines those
payments were the responsible of a primary payer.” Id. at 395.
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and to protect RREs against future liability and fines. A system of MSA for
personal injury liability claims could closely resemble the system currently
in place for workers’ compensation claims. If any scenario listed above
exists, a set-aside arrangement would be an appropriate option.146
VII.

CONCLUSION

In an attempt to “protect its future financial interests,” Medicare
has imposed stringent new reporting requirements on liability (including
self-insurance), no-fault and workers’ compensation insurers. These new
reporting requirements present a variety of obstacles which make strict
compliance difficult for these entities. Lack of strict compliance can lead to
the imposition of stiff monetary penalties on these entities, as well as
liability for any other remedies available to CMS. The simplest way to
avoid liability is for the RRE to retain reporting duties within itself, not to
outsource that responsibility to agents. That is because RREs may not
transfer its duty to report, that is, it will always be liable for errors and noncompliance, regardless if it actively participates in the actual reporting
process.
Affected entities need to take care to ensure they determine the
proper RRE for reporting purposes and that the RRE makes any and all
attempts to ensure compliance. Ensuring compliance with the reporting
requirements will be particularly difficult because the RRE must rely
heavily on the trustworthiness and cooperation of the claimant who for all
intents and purposes has little incentive to honor any information requests
from the RRE. For this reason, the burden of penalties should be shifted
from the RRE who attempts in good faith to the uncooperative claimant
who through his or her actions is essentially interfering with Medicare’s
right to protect their interests.
As CMS works through the implementation of the mandatory
reporting requirements, more “alerts” and information are sure to come.
Until then, the hurdles and obstacles faced by RREs and their attorneys will
remain great. And until then, entities involved in the liability (including
self-insurance), no-fault, and workers’ compensation insurance industry
must be sure to determine their status as an RRE and comply with the
current reporting requirements.
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DOWN THE ROAD TO PERDITION: HOW THE FLAWS OF
BASEL II LED TO THE COLLAPSE OF BEAR STEARNS AND
LEHMAN BROTHERS
John F. Rosato*
“For the last two decades, the Basel Committee keeps coming back to the
same basic question: How much bank capital is enough?”1
I.

FDIC Chairman, Sheila Bair

INTRODUCTION

It is often said that a wise farmer should “never let a fox guard the
henhouse.” Echoing such sentiments, the U.S. FDIC Chairman, Sheila
Bair, warned, “There are strong reasons for believing that banks left to their
own devices would maintain less capital, not more, than would be prudent.
. . . In short; regulators can't leave capital decisions totally to the banks. We
wouldn't be doing our jobs or serving the public interest if we did.”2
Chairman Bair made these comments in response to the proposed U.S.
adoption of the 2004 Basel Accord (Basel II), which allows banks to
develop statistical models for quantifying their individual capital
requirements.3 Despite Chairman Bair’s cautionary words, the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) became the first Federal
agency to adopt the Basel II framework in late 2004.4
Under heavy pressure from broker-dealers such as Lehman
Brothers the SEC adopted the Basel II framework through its Consolidated
Supervised Entity (CSE) program.5 At its inception, the CSE program had
* J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law, 2011; M.B.A., University of
Connecticut School of Business, 2011; B.A. in Political Science and History,
University of Richmond, 2007. I would like to thank Professor Patricia McCoy for
her feedback and assistance.
1
Sheila Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks at the 2007 Risk
Management and Allocation Conference (June 25, 2007) (transcript available at
Factiva) [hereinafter Sheila Bair, Remarks].
2
Id.
3
Id. (“When will the Americans finish the rule? . . . . We are working on it.
We want a consensus on appropriate safeguards that will allow our banks to
implement Basel II.”).
4
See SEC Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, 17
C.F.R. § 240 (2009) [hereinafter Alternative Net Capital Rule].
5
See Alternative Net Capital Rule, supra note 4; Letter from Joseph
Polizzotto, Gen. Counsel, Lehman Brothers, Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://edgar.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s72103/lehmanbrothers03082004.htm. [hereinafter Lehman Brothers
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seven participants: Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers,
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, and Citigroup.6 In particular,
Lehman Brothers championed the CSE program as generally increasing
competitiveness and aligning U.S. regulations with the European Union.7
Fundamentally, these broker-dealers assured regulators that despite capital
requirements being calculated internally, adequate risk-management
policies and advanced statistical modeling would ensure that proper levels
of capital would be maintained.
Despite the promise of the CSE, by March of 2008 three of the five
participating firms had at least $30 of debt to every $1 in assets.8 Such
ratios are far in excess of the SEC’s standard limit of $15 in debt to every
$1 in assets.9 Yet, even in the face of such alarming levels of leverage, the
broker-dealers continued to assure the markets that they were in
compliance with the CSE standards. On March 11th, three days before the
collapse of Bear Stearns, SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox, stated that he
had “a good deal of comfort” about the capital cushions being maintained
by CSE participants.10 Despite such assurances, by the end of September
2008 all but two of the original CSE participants had dissolved or been
acquired.11 More alarmingly, September 15th, 2008, the day Lehman

Letter] (“Lehman Brothers applauds and supports the Commission in establishing a
voluntary alternative method of computing net capital for certain broker-dealers. . .
.”).
6
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC’S OVERSIGHT
OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED
ENTITY PROGRAM iv, Report No. 446-A at iv (September, 2008) [hereinafter OIG
Report].
7
See Lehman Brothers Letter, supra note 5.
8
Ben Protess, Flawed SEC Program Failed to Rein in Investment Banks,
PROPUBLICA, Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.propublica.org/article/flawed-sec-programfailed-to-rein-in-investment-banks-101.
9
OIG Report, supra note 6, at ix.
10
Boyd Erman, The Fed Rushes in as Wall Street Teeters, GLOBE AND MAIL
(Toronto), Mar. 12, 2008, at B1.
11
Robert Schroeder, Goldman, Morgan to Become Holding Companies:
Companies get Access to Fed Lending in Exchange for Oversight,
MARKETWATCH, Sept. 21, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/goldmansachs-morgan-stanley-to-become-bank-holding-companies. The remaining two
firms, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley applied to be bank holding companies,
which effectively removed them from SEC oversight. Id.
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Brothers filed for bankruptcy, surpassed 9/11 as the costliest day in Wall
Street’s history.12
Such events make Chairman Bair’s words seem prophetic. The
public is still left wondering what happened, and how regulators could have
been so wrong? In an attempt to answer these questions, this Note will
investigate the flaws of Basel II’s capital requirements by examining the
collapse of the investment banks Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
Section II will discuss the relevant background and underlying
principles of capital regulation. This information will lay the foundation
for understanding how the Basel Accords operate. After establishing these
basic principles, section III will outline the regulatory frameworks of the
Basel I and Basel II accords. Next, section IV will explore how the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) applied the Basel II standards
to investment banks and how the SEC rule contributed to the collapse of
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Connected to the collapse of Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, section V will explore how the SEC failed to
fulfill its regulatory obligations under the Basel II framework and how
global regulators can avoid similar mistakes. Finally, this Note will
conclude by recommending that global financial regulators reconsider the
adoption of the advanced approach in light of the recent financial crisis,
and return to a simpler form of regulation.
II. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A. WHY WE REGULATE INVESTMENT BANKS
In their simplest form, investment banks are financial intermediaries
that pool money raised from investors, and invest that money in securities
ranging from corporate stocks and bonds to mortgage-backed securities.13
However, unlike depositors in a commercial bank, investors in an
investment bank are not guaranteed a specific return and can theoretically
lose their entire investment in the company.14 In return for this additional
risk, investment banks offer portfolios with a far broader range of
investments and thus, rewards, than traditional commercial bank deposits.
12

Niall Ferguson, The Descent of Finance, HARV. BUS. REV., Jul. 1, 2009,
http://hbr.org/2009/07/the-descent-of-finance/ar/1.
13
RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 555 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009).
14
Id.
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Some argue that investment banking is nothing more than a for-profit
business similar to any other commercial enterprise.15 As a result, the
advocates of this position assert that investment banks should be subject to
the same regulatory oversight as any other business.16 Such oversight is
often relaxed or entirely nonexistent. Nonetheless, every nation in the
world subjects investment banks to some form of advanced regulatory
supervision.17 What is the reason for such regulation?
In 1911, Justice Rousseau Angelus Burch provided a clairvoyant
answer when he described the economic role of banks as being
“indispensible agencies through which the industry, trade and commerce of
all civilized countries and communities are now carried on.”18 Though
Justice Burch was specifically referring to commercial banks, his logic
applies to investment banks as well. At the beginning of 2008, investment
banks held assets in excess of $13 trillion (23% of total U.S. household
financial assets).19 Given investment banks’ prominent role in creating and
maintaining wealth, it should be of little surprise that the proper
functioning of the investment banking industry is in the interest of every
nation. Like the failure of a commercial bank, the failure of an investment
bank carries greater significance than the failure of most other commercial
enterprises. Not only does an investment bank’s failure destroy the wealth
of its investors, it erodes the public’s confidence in the financial system as
a whole, which reduces the flow of credit and, thus, commerce.20
Accordingly, in order to preserve the flow of commerce and protect the
wealth of households, nations impose regulations that seek to minimize an
investment bank’s exposure to a variety of risks.21
Today, financial regulatory schemes are based on several primary
principles. First, regulators control entry into the banking industry through
15

PETER WALLISON, WHY DO WE REGULATE BANKS? 2 (Am. Enter. Inst.,
August, 2005) available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050729_18781FSOAug
05_g.pdf.
16
Id.
17
For list of nations, see INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REPORTS ON THE
OBSERVANCE
OF
STANDARDS
AND
CODES,
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp?sort=topic#BankingSupervision (last
visited May. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Observance Standards].
18
Schaake v. Dolley, 118 P. 80, 84 (Kan. 1911).
19
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 14.
20
Id.
21
L. Jacobo Rodriguez, International Banking Regulation: Where’s the
Market Discipline in Basel II?, POLICY ANALYSIS, Oct. 15, 2002, at 3, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa455.pdf.
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the issuance of licenses and impose penalties on institutions that fall out of
compliance with the requirements of entry.22 Second, regulators generally
impose capital requirements that force banks to hold minimum levels of
money in reserve.23 Finally, regulators attempt to impose market discipline
on the financial industry through the public disclosure of financial
information, which permits investors and depositors to assess the risk
associated with a particular bank.24 This Note is primarily concerned with
the second principle, minimum capital requirements.
B. THE DEFINITION OF CAPITAL
When regulators refer to a bank’s capital they are referring to the
“financial cushion that depository institutions maintain to shield themselves
from unanticipated losses.”25 In its simplest terms, capital is the amount by
which financial institution’s assets exceed the institution’s total liabilities.26
Core capital primarily consists of retained earnings and shareholder’s
equity.27 It is a generally accepted principle of financial regulation that the
larger a financial institution’s capital, the more likely the institution will be
able to repay its investors and avoid failure.28 In addition, forcing financial
institutions to hold a minimum level of capital helps incentivize reasonable
risk-taking on the part of the company’s shareholders.29
22

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE
PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION, §§ 1-2 (1999) (Discussing the
essential elements of an effective regulatory system and licensing as core
principles
of
banking
regulation),
available
at
http://www.rbi.org.in/upload/publications/pdfs/10115.pdf.
23
Id. at § 3 (discussing capital requirements as core principles of banking
regulation).
24
Id. at § 5 (discussing the disclosure of financial statements as a core
principle of banking regulation).
25
PATRICIA MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL PRUDENTIAL
REGULATION OF BANKS AND THRIFTS § 6.03 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2009).
26
Capital is the “net worth of a business; that is, the amount by which its
assets exceed its liabilities.” InvestorWords.com, Capital, http://www.invest
orwords.com/694/capital.html (last visited April 12, 2011).
27
Equity Capital is “[i]nvested money that, in contrast to debt capital, is not
repaid to the investors in the normal course of business. It represents the risk
capital staked by owners through purchase of the firm’s common stock.”
Businessdictionary.com, Equity Capital, http://www.bis.org/press/p981027.htm
(last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
28
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 252.
29
MCCOY, supra note 25.
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The simplest form of capital regulation is called a “debt-to-capital
ratio.” For investment banks, the debt-to-capital ratio represents the ratio of
total debt to total equity capital. A higher ratio indicates that the
investment bank has more risk associated with its portfolio of
investments.30 For instance, suppose that an investment bank has $310 in
assets, $300 in debt, and $10 in equity capital ($310 in assets - $300 in
debt). By dividing total debt by total equity capital we arrive at a leverage
ratio of 300/10 or 30-to-1. However, this simple measure of an investment
bank’s capital adequacy assumes that all assets are equally suited to
providing an effective capital cushion. This assumption fails to account for
each asset’s level of risk and risk of default. To solve this obvious flaw,
financial regulators developed “risk-adjusted” capital standards.31
C. RISK-ADJUSTED CAPITAL STANDARDS
To adequately account for each individual asset’s unique risk
profile, international financial regulators employ “risk-adjusted capital
standards.” This type of capital adequacy standard, pioneered in the 1988
Basel Accord (Basel I), requires that banks hold a level of capital
commensurate with an asset’s credit risk.32 For instance, would you rather
place your money in a bank that maintains investments in U.S. Treasury
bonds or commercial bonds? Naturally, one favors the bank that invests in
U.S. Treasury bonds because U.S. sovereign debt is backed by the full faith
and credit of the American people. Similarly, banking regulators need to
make judgments about the stability and value of a bank’s assets when
calculating the appropriate level of capital that should be held. In the
above scenario the bank investing in U.S. Treasury bonds would be
required to hold no additional capital, while the bank investing in
commercial bonds would be required to hold a more capital in reserve.
This discrepancy results from the varying level of confidence that
regulators have in the stability of the underlying asset. Since the bank’s
investment in Treasury bonds has few risks and a relatively stable value,
regulators have a great deal of confidence that such an asset will act as an
effective financial cushion to absorb a bank’s unanticipated losses.
30

Id.
See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND
SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT
AND
CAPITAL
STANDARDS
(1988),
available
at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf?noframes=1 [hereinafter BASEL I].
32
Id. at 7-8.
31
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However, the bank’s investment in commercial bonds is inherently more
risky. Commercial bonds are susceptible to interest rate fluctuations, the
creditworthiness of the debtor company, and a host of other issues that
threaten their stability and valuation. As a result of this additional
uncertainty, regulators have significantly less confidence in the commercial
bonds acting as an effective financial cushion. Accordingly, the primary
result of employing risk-adjusted capital standards is to force banks with
riskier portfolios of assets to hold larger amount of capital in reserve.33
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING
REGULATION
A. BASEL I
In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel
Committee) completed the Basel I accord, which establishes a framework
for measuring capital adequacy for internationally active banks.34 Basel I,
which has since been adopted by more than 100 countries, was developed
in response to several financial crises during the 1980’s.35 The goal of
Basel I is to stabilize the global banking system through uniform capital
adequacy standards and to reduce regulatory competition by establishing
common regulations for all banks.36 Basel I accomplishes these goals by
utilizing a risk-adjusted capital framework, focusing on the measurement of
a bank’s capital adequacy in relation to its credit risk.37 Basel I was later
amended to also account for market risk.38 At the heart of Basel I is a
three-step process: 1) determining total capital 2) determining riskweighted assets; and 3) determining the risk-adjusted capital ratio.39
33

See MCCOY, supra note 26.
BASEL I, supra note 31.
35
RODRIGUEZ, supra note 21, at 7.
36
BASEL I, supra note 31, at 1 (“[T]he new framework should serve to
strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system;
and…have a high degree of consistency in its application to banks in different
countries with a view to diminishing an existing source of competitive inequality
amount international banks.”).
37
Id. at 8.
38
W. Ronald Gard, Article, George Bailey in the Twenty-First Century: Are
we Moving to the Postmodern Era in the International Financial Regulation with
Basel II?, 8 TENN. J. BUS. L. 161, 183 (2006).
39
CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 259-65 (discussing three phase process
for calculating a bank’s capital adequacy).
34
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1. Total Capital: Tier 1 and Tier 2
Since not all forms of capital provide an effective cushion against losses,
Basel I divides a bank’s total capital into two tiers.40 Tier 1 (Core) capital
is the preferred form of capital and consists of common equity shares, noncumulative preferred shares, and holdings in consolidated subsidiaries.41
Because of its preferred status, regulators require that 50% of a bank’s
Tier 2
capital requirements be satisfied with Tier 1 assets.42
(Supplementary) capital accounts for all other non-preferred forms of
capital.43 Tier 2 capital commonly includes hybrid capital instruments,
subordinated debt, and general loan-loss reserves.44
Using these tiers, Basel I establishes limits and restrictions on the
composition of a bank’s total capital. Most prominently, Basel I limits Tier
2 capital to 100 percent of Tier 1 capital.45 In other words, if a bank has
$500,000 in Tier 1 capital and $1 million in Tier 2 capital, the bank’s total
capital can only be $1 million ($500,000 in Tier 1 capital and $500,000 in
Tier 2 capital). Additionally, Basel I limits subordinated debt to 50 percent
of Tier 1 capital.46 For instance, if a bank has Tier 1 assets of $500,000 and
subordinated debt of $1 million, the bank’s total capital cannot exceed
$750,000 ($500,000 in Tier 1 capital and $250,000 in subordinated debt).
After appropriately sorting a bank’s assets and applying the requisite
restrictions, a bank’s total capital can be determined by simply adding Tier
1 to Tier 2.47
2. Risk-Adjusted Assets
Next, Basel I values a bank’s “risk-adjusted assets” by dividing a
bank’s total assets into four broad categories or “buckets.”48 Each bucket is
assigned a specific conversion factor or “risk-weight” that is tied to the

40

See BASEL I, supra note 31, at 3-7 (discussing the constituent elements of
capital).
41
Id. at 14-15.
42
Id. at 3-4.
43
Id. at 4-6.
44
Id. at 14.
45
BASEL I, supra note 31, at 14.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
RODRIGUEZ, supra note 21, at 8.
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credit risk associated with the assets contained in each category.49
Specifically, the four buckets and their associated risk-weights are: 1) cash
and government securities-0 percent; 2) interbank claims-20 percent; 3)
debt secured by real property-50 percent; and 4) all other obligations,
including corporate debt-100 percent.50 Once a bank’s total assets have
been appropriately sorted into the above categories, the dollar value of each
category is multiplied by the conversion factor.51 The resulting dollar
amounts represent the risk-weighted asset value for each category. For
instance, if a bank has $100,000 in mortgages (debt secured by real
property), the risk-weighted value of those mortgages is $50,000 (100,000
multiplied by the conversion factor of 50 percent).
In addition, Basel I also provides mechanisms for drawing
otherwise off-balance-sheet obligations, such as letters of credit, into total
risk-adjusted assets for purposes of capital adequacy.52 Once again, offbalance sheet obligations are grouped into the same four buckets, and
multiplied the by the conversion factors: 0 percent, 20 percent, 50 percent,
and 100 percent.53 By summing the risk-weighted value of categories 1-4
we can calculate a bank’s total risk-weighted asset value.
3. Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio
Finally, Basel I sets the ratio of minimum capital to risk-weighted
assets at 8 percent,54 of which Tier 1 capital must be at least 4 percent.55
For instance, if a bank has total risk-weighted assets of $100,000, the bank
would be required to hold a minimum of $8,000 in capital ($100,000 x .08).
At least $4,000 of the $8,000 capital charge would need to be Tier 1 capital
($100,000 x .04). However, Basel I assumes that national bank regulators
will require banks to operate with capital levels in excess of the 8 percent

49

Id.
Id. at 8 tbl. 1.
51
Id. at 8.
52
BASEL I, supra note 31, at 19.
53
Id. at 25 (“Once the bank has calculated the credit equivalent amounts,
whether according to the current or the original exposure method, they are to be
weighted according to the category of counterparty in the same way as the main
framework…”).
54
Id. at 13.
55
Id.
50

484

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 17.2

minimum.56 Internationally active banks had until 1992 to bring their
capital reserves into compliance with this ratio.57
4. Criticisms of Basel I
While Basel I represents an elegantly simple way of calculating a
bank’s risk-adjusted capital, the accord has been plagued by problems.58
First, the use of broad risk categories and risk-weights incorrectly assumes
that all assets within a single category are equally risky.59 For instance,
under Basel I the government bonds of Greece are assumed to be equally as
risky as the government bonds of the United States.60 As the current
sovereign-debt crisis in Greece demonstrates, it is not only imprudent, but
incorrect to assume that the same level of risk is associated with each
individual asset in a particular risk group. Additionally, Basel I’s broadbrush risk categories encourage banks to invest in riskier assets within a
given risk category.61 For instance, since all mortgages have a .50 riskweight,62 banks have an incentive to hold riskier (higher paying) mortgages
without holding a commensurate amount of additional capital. These
limitations were of great concern to global regulators who feared that the
Basel I framework had not adequately accounted for the riskiness of a
bank’s assets.63 As a result, the Basel Committee began work on a revised
capital adequacy framework in 1999.64
B. BASEL II
In an effort to correct the pitfalls of Basel I, the Basel Committee
released a revised capital adequacy framework known as Basel II in 2004.65
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Id. at 2.
Gard, supra note 38, at 178.
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RODRIGUEZ, supra note 21, at 9.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 10.
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Id. at 8 tbl. 1.
63
Id. at 11.
64
See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, A NEW
CAPITAL
ADEQUACY
FRAMEWORK
(June
1999)
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs50.htm; see also MCCOY, supra note 26.
65
See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL
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The new accord is based on three pillars: I) minimum capital requirements
for credit risk, market risk, and operation risk; II) Guidelines for effective
supervisory review; and III) market discipline through enhanced public
disclosures about capital adequacy.66 This Note will primarily focus on
how Pillars I and II contributed to the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers.
Though Basel II represents a significant departure from Basel I,
key elements of Basel I were retained.67 For instance, Basel II still utilizes
risk-adjusted capital standards, the 8 percent capital ratio, and the
classification of capital into Tier 1 and Tier 2.68 However, Basel II does
introduce significant changes to how the risk may be calculated under Pillar
I.69 In an effort to correct the “one size fits all” approach of Basel I, Basel
II sets up two approaches to calculating a bank’s minimum capital
requirement, the “standardized approach” and the “advanced approach.”70
1. Pillar I: The Standardized and Advanced Approaches
The standardized approach is best understood as a modified version
of the basic risk-adjusted capital requirements in Basel I. The Basel
Committee decided to leave this approach intact as an option for banks that
may not be able to comply with the significantly more complex advanced
approach.71 Under the standardized approach, the concept of sorting assets
into risk categories or “buckets” remains, but the number of buckets is
increased.72 Additionally, the standardized approach now forces banks to
take a standard capital charge to account for market risk.73 Finally, the
standardized approach ties the risk-weights assigned to each “bucket” to
the external credit-rating of the borrower as issued by companies such as
Standard & Poor’s.74 By tying the risk-weight to the market-based credit
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK, COMPREHENSIVE VERSION (June 2004)
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf?noframes=1 [hereinafter BASEL II].
66
Id. at 2.
67
MCCOY, supra note 25 at § 6.03[2].
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
BASEL II, supra note 66, at 15, 48; MCCOY, supra note 26 at § 6.03[2].
71
MCCOY, supra note 25, at § 6.03[2]a.
72
BASEL II, supra note 66, at 15, 23 (discussing individual risk categories and
associated risk-weights); MCCOY, supra note 25, at § 6.03[2]a.
73
MCCOY, supra note 25, at § 6.03[2]a.
74
BASEL II, supra note 65, at 19-27 (discussing the assessment of credit risk
using the ratings from “external credit assessment institutions”).
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ratings, it is hoped that banks will be less inclined to engage regulatory
arbitrage.75
By making these modifications, the Basel Committee hoped to
correct the problems of Basel I and preserve the basic risk-adjusted capital
framework for the banks that chose to utilize it. However, for the largest
internationally active banks the Basel Committee developed a far more
complex form of capital adequacy standards aimed at providing banks with
great flexibility.76
The Basel Committee’s goal in developing the advanced approach
was to give weight to the qualitative differences in banks’ [risk
management] choices.77 The advanced approach permits the largest
internationally active banks to estimate their own levels of risk or “riskweights” by utilizing their own internal value at risk (VaR) statistical
models.78 The advanced approach is based on the assumptions that banks
are better informed about their own risk profiles than regulators, and that
banks have a natural incentive to avoid undue losses.79 It was hoped that
the additional flexibility provided by the advanced approach would help
banks realize more consistent profits through improved capital
deployment.80
i.

Understanding the Value at Risk Statistical Model

Value at risk models (VaR) “measure the risk of a portfolio of
assets by estimating the probability that a given loss might occur.”81 Put
differently, VaR models tell us that there is an X percent probability that a
portfolio will lose more than X dollars over a certain period of time.82
Under Basel II, banks using the advanced approach are required to develop
75

MCCOY, supra note 25, at § 6.02[2]a.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE, CAPITAL STANDARDS FOR BANKS: THE EVOLVING
BASEL ACCORD 398 (Sept. 2003) http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin
/2003/0903lead.pdf [hereinafter FRB Capital Standards].
77
Gard, supra note 38, at 189.
78
See BASEL II, supra note 65, at 48-112 (discussing the mechanics and
requirements of the “internal ratings-based approach”).
79
MCCOY, supra note 26, at § 6.03[2]b.
80
Gard, supra note 38, at 189-90.
81
The Risks of Financial Modeling, VaR and the Economic Meltdown:
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Investigations & Oversight, 111th Cong. 59
(Sept. 2009) (Statement of Richard Bookstaber, Risk Manager, Bridgewater
Associates) [hereinafter Risks of Financial Modeling].
82
Id.
76
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VaR models that have a confidence levels of 99 percent, meaning that the
model is incorrect only 1 percent of the time.83 To construct a basic VaR
model a risk-manager would take the following steps: 1) identify all the
assets held in a portfolio; 2) obtain the daily returns for each individual
asset for the past 250 trading days (one year); 3) aggregate the returns for
each individual asset to obtain the return for the entire portfolio over the
past 250 trading days; 4) order the daily portfolio returns from highest to
lowest to develop an estimate of the daily value at risk at the 99 percent
confidence level, and 5) smooth the results by fitting the returns to the
Normal distribution function and incorporating additional risk variables.84
However, like all mathematical equations, VaR models have
limitations. For instance, a properly constructed VaR model needs to
include variables that account for the probability of inherent risks, such as
the risk of default.85 A failure to input such variables or to input correct
probabilities can result in an ineffective model that permits a financial
institution to make imprudent investment choices. Additionally, VaR
models are dependent upon the assumption that the past trading history for
an asset is a reasonable representation of how the asset will trade in the
future.86 For instance, if the 250 trading day sample only includes a
positive trading cycle, a very low probability of decline will be included in
the model’s predictions. Additionally, since VaR models operate at the
99% confidence level there is still a 1% chance that the model is
completely incorrect.87 A huge limitation of the VaR model is that it does
not tell you whether the 1% represents a catastrophic or minor market
event.88 Thus, one should not be lulled into a false sense of security by the
fact that VaR models employ advanced statistics. The quality and accuracy
of VaR models will inevitably vary based on the quality of the inputs and
those constructing it.
2. Pillar 2: Supervisory Review
Pillar 2 of the Basel II accord outlines four supervisory principles
to guide regulators in participating countries.89 The guidelines are meant to
83

See BASEL II, supra note 65, at 73.
Risks of Financial Modeling, supra note 81.
85
Id. at 59-60.
86
Id. at 60.
87
Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at MM24.
88
Id.
89
See BASEL II, supra note 65, at 158-72 (Discussing the supervisory review
process).
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ensure that all regulators require that, “banks have adequate capital to
support all the risks in their business… [and] to encourage banks to
develop and use better risk management techniques in monitoring and
managing their risks.”90
The four principles are that: 1) banks should have a process for
assessing their overall capital in relation to their risk profile and strategy
for maintaining their capital levels; 2) regulators should review and
evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies as well
as their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory
capital ratios. Regulators should take appropriate action if they are not
satisfied with the results of this process; 3) regulators should expect banks
to operate above the minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have the
ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum; and 4)
regulators should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from
falling below the minimum levels required to support the risk
characteristics of the particular bank.91
The principles on supervisory review are an important aspect of
achieving the uniform implementation of the accord. Such guidelines are
necessary, because Basel II gives each member nation latitude in
determining how to implement the framework.92 In addition, the added
regulatory complexity of Basel II requires adequate supervision in order to
compensate for the added flexibility given to banks.93 As the recent
financial crisis has shown us, without proper regulatory oversight, riskmodels can be approved without proper inspection and banks may be
allowed to dip below minimum capital requirements before enforcement
action is taken.
C. THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM
In 2003, the European Union (EU) issued the Financial
Conglomerates Directive, which required that financial conglomerates
operating with the EU be supervised by either EU financial regulations or
90

Id. at 158.
Id. at 159-65 (discussing the “four key principles of supervisory review”);
Rodriguez, supra note 21, at 14.
92
Id. at 2 (“[T]he framework also allows for a limited degree of national
discretion in the way in which each of these options may be applied, to adapt the
standards to different conditions of national markets.”).
93
Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of
Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L.
REV. 127, 188 (2009).
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by a set of substantially equivalent rules.94 Given the comprehensive
nature of the EU financial regulations, the major U.S. investment banks
preferred to be regulated by the SEC.95 Unfortunately, the Gramm-LeachBliley Act of 1999 created a regulatory void in the U.S. for systemicallyimportant investment bank holding companies.96 Nevertheless, major
investment banks pressured the SEC to fill the regulatory void in order to
avoid the exacting EU regulations.97 In response to this pressure, the SEC
created a voluntary supervision option for broker-dealers known as the
consolidated supervised entity (CSE) program.98 The CSE program
incorporated the three pillars of Basel II, and allowed the SEC to supervise
broker-dealers on a consolidated basis, including their holding companies
and affiliates.99 The goal of the program was to permit the SEC to monitor
the systemic risks to U.S. regulated investment banks posed by their
unregulated affiliates.100
As part of the CSE program, an investment bank could apply to the
SEC for an exemption from the Commission’s standard net capital rule.101
After obtaining such an exemption and agreeing to consolidated
supervision, the investment bank was permitted to compute its required
capital using an “alternative method” that complied with the Basel II
capital standards.102 However, unlike Basel II, participating financial
institutions would be required to maintain an overall Basel capital ratio of

94

Report of Examiner Anton R. Vukas, at 1484, In re Lehman Brothers
Holdings, 433 B.R. 133 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-13555) available at
http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/VOLUME%204.pdf
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Examiner’s
Report].
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Id.
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Id.
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See Lehman Brothers Letter, supra note 5.
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See Examiner’s Report, supra note 94, at 1484-85.
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OIG Report, supra note 6, at 2-3.
100
Id. at viii (“The regime is intended to allow the Commission to monitor for,
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not less than the Federal Reserve’s 10 percent well capitalized standard.103
Based on the specific risk qualities of its assets, a firm’s internal risk
modeling could require it to maintain a capital ratio well above the 10
percent minimum.104
Investment banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers
favored the adoption of the CSE program, because they believed that their
superior risk-management systems would result in lower capital
requirements.105 However, Alan Greenspan aptly pointed out in 2002 that
“all risk-management strategies rest on uncertain forecasts and the models
underlying the frontier approaches . . . depend on key assumptions that rest
on fragmentary or indirect evidence . . . To be sure, even the most
sophisticated risk models will never be a complete substitute for
experienced judgment.”106 Unfortunately, Mr. Greenspan’s concerns were
validated on March 14th, 2008, the day Bear Stearns declared bankruptcy.
IV. THE COLLAPSE OF BEAR STEARNS AND LEHMAN
BROTHERS
On March 14th, 2008, J.P. Morgan acquired Bear Stearns in a
federally orchestrated and assisted effort to save the financial markets from
imminent peril.107 At the time of its acquisition, Bear Stearns had a debtto-equity ratio of 33 to 1.108 Similarly, prior to its collapse on September
15th, Lehman Brothers’ debt-to-equity ratio reached a high of 32 to 1.109
Such ratios are in stark contrast to the SEC’s standard net-capital rule,
which only permits a debt-to-equity ratio of 15 to 1.110 Yet, despite these
103

Id. at 3 (“The CSEs are required to maintain an overall Basel capital ratio
of not less than the Federal Reserve’s 10 percent ‘well capitalized’ standard for
bank holding companies.”).
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BASEL II, supra note 66, at 211.
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OIG Report, supra note 6, at 4.
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Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve, Remarks at the Conference
on Bank Structure and Competition, Chicago, IL. (May 10, 2002)
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speexhes/2002/20020510/default.htm.
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See David Ellis & Tami Luhby, Bear Stearns Bailout Keeps Firm Afloat,
CNNMONEY.COM, March 14, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/14/news/co
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OIG Report, supra note 6, at 19.
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Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), 89 (May
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alarmingly high rates of leverage, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers
reportedly never fell below the 10 percent capital minimum of the CSE
program.111 How could these firms have been allowed to reach such high
rates of leverage and how could the SEC have maintained confidence in the
capital adequacy of these firms? The section below will demonstrate how
flaws in VaR modeling, non-compliance with Basel II principles, and
failures in SEC oversight helped diminish each firm’s capital adequacy and
contributed to their collapse.
A. FAILURE OF VAR MODELING (PILLAR I)
As previously discussed, the central innovation of Basel II is the
advanced approach for calculating capital adequacy. Essential to the
operation of the advanced approach is the VaR statistical model, which
allows banks to calculate the risk associated with a particular portfolio of
assets. However, as mentioned above, VaR models contain several
assumptions that, if not recognized, will result in a distortion of the model’s
results. Specifically, the models will yield imprecise risk measures, which
will adversely affect the level of capital held by the financial institution. It
was precisely a lack of attention to the VaR model’s assumptions and thus,
its limitations, that helped drive Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers to the
brink.
One of the basic assumptions underlying any statistical model is
that all of the variables are properly included. In a risk model such as VaR,
this means that all of the known assets in a portfolio and their associated
risk assumption are included.112 For instance, if a bank were to construct a
risk model for a portfolio of mortgage-backed securities, it would be
essential that variables such as home prices, interest rate fluctuations, and
delinquency rates were included. Such variables represent only the most
basic forms of risk associated with mortgage-backed securities and are
essential to producing models that yield accurate results. Yet, Bear
Stearns’ VaR models for mortgage-backed securities failed to adequately
account for both the natural fluctuation in home prices and delinquency
rates.113 As a result, in the months leading-up to its collapse, Bear Stearns’

111

Id. at viii-ix.
Risks of Financial Modeling, supra note 81, at 3.
113
OIG Report, supra note 6, at 23.
112

492

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 17.2

risk-modeling floundered.114 Because of these inconsistencies, internal
memos suggest that the trading-desks began to ignore the advice of riskmanagers.115 Internal confidence in risk-modeling was further eroded when
Bear Stearns abruptly replaced an experienced risk-manager, which
resulted in the further disruption of the company’s risk-management
structure.116
Additionally, and potentially most critically, VaR models need to
have sufficient historical trading and valuation data in order to accurately
project future results.117 For instance, if a financial institution’s VaR model
only contained data during a stable or positive market trend, the model may
not accurately forecast potential downswings in valuation. Unfortunately,
VaR models at most financial firms included historical trading data that did
not adequately capture the volatility of the assets.118 As a result, though the
VaR models were operating correctly, they were not accurately projecting
the risk of future downturns in asset valuations.
Because of the above and other limitations of VaR models, it is
essential that they are adequately “stress-tested.”119 Since the VaR models
operate at the 99% confidence level, there is still a 1% chance that the
model is completely incorrect.120 However, a huge limitation of the VaR
model is that it doesn’t tell you what can happen during the 1% of the time
when it is wrong.121 Thus, to assess whether the 1% represents a
catastrophic failure or a small blip, stress testing puts the model through a
series of hypothetical stresses to see how it will react. For instance, for a
portfolio of corporate bonds a bank might place the VaR model through a
test involving a dramatic change in interest rates. Though both Bear
114
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Stearns and Lehman brothers did test their VaR models under certain
historical scenarios, (including the 1987 stock market crash in the case of
Lehman)122 there is evidence that the models were not properly designed.
For instance, at Bear Stearns the VaR model for mortgage-backed
securities was never tested for a potential collapse in home prices.123 As
recent events have shown, such a test would have been critical to highlight
potential flaws in how the model was constructed. Similarly, at Lehman
Brothers management deliberately excluded risks to its real estate
investments from firm wide stress tests.124 Thus, Lehman’s VaR models
were never tested for economic shifts in the real estate market. These
examples help demonstrate why adequate stress-testing is needed and why,
if not conducted, firms cannot adequately prepare for the catastrophic 1%.
Murphy’s Law tells us that “anything that can go wrong will go
wrong.” Unfortunately, the above represents a perfect example of this
concept. The limitations of VaR modeling have been well documented
since it was first created by J.P. Morgan in the early 1990’s.125 Yet, both
Bear Stearns and Lehman brothers failed to take notice of these limitations,
choosing instead to be lulled into complacency by the sirens song of
mathematics. Not only did these firms ignore the flaws contained in VaR
modeling, they also failed to take the necessary steps to help mitigate those
risks. Thus, as critics of the Basel II advanced approach warned,126 Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers touted the superiority of their risk
management systems, while in reality they were woefully unprepared.
These inadequacies not only led Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers to
collapse, but led the global financial system down the road to perdition.
B. LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH BASEL II CAPITAL ADEQUACY
STANDARDS (PILLAR I)
Beyond the proper management of VaR models, Bear Stearns and
Lehman Brothers demonstrated a troubling record of compliance with CSE
and Basel II standards for calculating capital adequacy. The CSE program
requires that a participating financial institution “calculate capital adequacy
consistent with the international standards adopted by the Basel Committee
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on Banking Supervision.”127 While both Bear Stearns and Lehman brothers
complied with these standards on paper, serious lapses in compliance with
the requirements resulted in questionable levels of capital being
maintained.
In particular, Bear Stearns exhibited a troublesome pattern where
each division of the company maintained separate VaR numbers for each
portfolio of assets.128 For instance, while the trading desk might have one
set of VaR numbers, another division might be working with a completely
different set of numbers for the same exact portfolio.129 The inconsistency
in VaR numbers between divisions undoubtedly diminished the
effectiveness of the risk management infrastructure and prevented adequate
“enterprise wide” risk assessments from being made. Such a state of affairs
is of particular note, because it violated Basel II standards, and would have
allowed Bear Stearns to choose the most favorable VaR numbers for
calculating its capital charges.130 Thus, though one division might have
VaR numbers to suggest that the asset presented significant risks, requiring
a higher capital charge, the company could chose to disclose a set of VaR
numbers that painted a completely different picture. Such behavior is not
only risky; it is fraudulent and inconsistent with the spirit of the CSE and
Basel II.
Additionally, Bear Stearns failed to comply with Basel II by failing
to markdown stressed assets in order to forestall the resulting capital
charges.131 For instance, when the market value of an asset declines, banks
are required to “markdown” or reduce the value of the asset as it is
recorded on their books.
Bear Stearns attempted to avoid the
corresponding capital charges by delaying such markdowns. This behavior
is particularly incentivized during periods of market turmoil, because the
cost of raising new capital can be expensive and can send a negative signal
to the market.132 Additionally, if a firm were to sell the asset, it might also
incur additional capital charges as the value of its assets declined in relation
to its debts. Thus, under Basel II, firms have a “perverse incentive to delay
markdowns” to avoid additional and potentially costly capital charges.133
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Finally, at Lehman Brothers a series of “Repo 105” transactions
resulted in questionable capital charges being made.134 A Repo 105
transaction is an accounting maneuver that allows short-term loans to be
temporarily classified as a sale.135 The cash obtained through these "sales"
are then used to pay down debt, allowing the company to appear to reduce
its debt-to-equity ratio by temporarily paying down liabilities.136 In order to
artificially reduce its capital charges and improve its debt-to-equity ratio in
late 2007 and early 2008, Lehman Brothers use Repo 105 transactions to
temporarily remove debt from its balance sheets.137 Prior to its collapse,
Lehman Brothers undertook “$38.6 billion, $49.1 billion, and $50.38
billion of Repo 105 transactions at the ends of fourth quarter 2007, first
quarter 2008, and second quarter 2008 respectively.”138 Such behavior is in
direct contravention of Basel II and the CSE program, since it allowed
Lehman Brothers to illegitimately reduce its debt-to-equity ratio and
corresponding capital charges.
The above series of events only corroborates Chairman Bair’s
predictions that banks have a natural tendency to hold less capital rather
than more. Instead of choosing to comply with Basel II and CSE standards,
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers used loopholes and outright tricks to
delay the inevitable. Such behavior resulted in the systematic manipulation
of capital ratios, and shows a complete disregard for the stability of the
financial system. Yet, the above problems with VaR calculations and the
deliberate manipulation of capital charges also demonstrate why Basel II
and the CSE program contain guidelines for adequate regulatory
supervision.
V. FAILURE OF SEC OVERSIGHT (PILLAR II)
Basel II requires that regulators “review and evaluate banks’
internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies as well as their ability
to monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory capital ratios.”139
Additionally, Basel II requires that regulators “expect banks to operate
above the minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to

134

See Examiner’s Report, supra note 96, at 732-34.
Id. at 732.
136
Id. at 733-34.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 733 n. 2852.
139
BASEL II, supra note 67, at 209.
135

496

CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 17.2

require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum.”140 In fact, the
CSE program required that participants submit to regular inspections of the
internal risk management control systems and gives the SEC the power to
require a participant to maintain a capital adequacy ratio of at least 10
percent.141 Yet, despite being aware of many deficiencies in CSE
compliance, several documented incidents demonstrate how the SEC failed
to use the powers at its disposal to enforce compliance.142
So what happened? Was the SEC asleep at the switch? Were the
powers given to the agency inadequate? Sadly, the answer seems to be
twofold. First, the agency seems to have fallen victim to the same market
euphoria and sense of infallibility that plagued the very firms it regulated.
Second, the SEC severely understaffed the CSE program, limiting its
ability to effectively police participating financial institutions.
One of the major components of Basel II and the CSE is that firms
utilizing the advanced approach submit their VaR models to regulators for
approval.143 Such a review process allows the regulating agency to assess
the adequacy of the risk models before approving a firm’s use of the
advanced approach.144 Yet, on several occasions, the SEC approved
applications to become part of the CSE program prior to the firm’s VaR
models being reviewed.145 In fact, in the case of Bear Stearns the SEC
never issued a formal approval of the firm’s VaR modeling.146 To make
matters worse, internal memoranda reviewed by the inspector general of
the SEC suggest that the SEC was aware of the inadequacy of Bear
Stearns’ risk management systems, but blindly accepted executives’
assurances that the systems would be updated and corrected.147 It is unclear
what might have been motivating the SEC to not properly review VaR
models, but one thing is certain, the failure to do so set the CSE program
down an ominous path from the beginning.
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In another documented occurrence, the SEC became aware of
inconsistencies in the VaR numbers being submitted to the agency by Bear
Stearns.148 As discussed above, Bear Stearns was maintaining multiple sets
of VaR calculations for the same portfolios of assets and using the most
favorable of these numbers to calculate its capital charges. Bear Stearns
officials were unable to account for the inconsistencies, but appear to have
assured the inspectors that they were taking corrective action.149 Nothing
in the OIG’s report suggests that the SEC pursued these inconsistencies
further.
Even after the collapse of Bear Stearns the SEC failed to take prompt
corrective action against Lehman Brothers. For instance, in 2008 the SEC
became aware that Lehman Brothers had characterized a multi-billion
dollar deposit with Citigroup (made as a precondition to continued banking
relations) as a liquid cash deposit.150 Given that the deposit could not be
withdrawn without adverse effects upon Lehman’s day-to-day business
operations, the SEC disagreed with Lehman’s characterization.151
However, instead of forcing Lehman Brothers to properly classify the
deposit, the SEC took no enforcement action.152 Instead, the SEC
discounted the risk posed by the deposit’s mischaracterization and
characterized it as an “illiquid asset” for internal calculations only.153 As a
result, Lehman Brothers was effectively permitted to manipulate its debtto-equity ratio and corresponding capital charges. Such behavior not only
misled the investing public as to Lehman Brothers’ financial health, it was
a patent violation of the CSE program and Basel II standards.
Finally, in the months leading up to the collapse of Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers, the SEC seemingly took little notice of the rapidly
shrinking capital adequacy ratios and rapidly rising leverage ratios at each
firm.154 In fact, the SEC took no action between 2006 and 2008 as Bear
Stearns’ capital adequacy ratio fell from 21.4 percent to just 11.1 percent
by March 2008.155 While the CSE program and Basel II require that the
agency take prompt corrective action to ensure that a firm operates with
levels of capital above the minimum requirements, the SEC allowed Bear
Stearns to come dangerously close to the 10 percent capital adequacy
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minimum without so much as a written warning. It was not until two weeks
before the March 14th collapse of Bear Stearns that the SEC sent a letter
recommending that the firm raise additional capital.156 How could the SEC
have been so blind?
The answer to the above question is twofold. First, the SEC was
simply caught up in the pro-market that plagued the very firms they
regulated. Despite being aware of numerous violations, the SEC simply
failed to act. In fact, one commentator described the SEC as succumbing
“to the anti-regulation climate of recent years. Too many of its members
just did not believe in regulation.”157 Such comments, in combination with
the SEC’s relaxed pursuit of known violations suggest a culture of
complacency that bred inaction.
Moreover, an inspector general’s report notes that since its
inception, the CSE program had a “small number of staff.”158 In fact, even
in 2008, the CSE program only employed seven inspectors, two in
Washington, D.C., and five in the New York regional office.159
Considering that these inspectors were charged with reviewing dozens, if
not hundreds of VaR models per firm, it is hard to believe that adequate
inspections occurred. Such a conclusion is buttressed by the fact that in
September 2008 the CSE program had not conducted any inspections in 18
months.160 Even six months after the collapse of Bear Stearns, only three
inspections were in progress to “assess the adequacy of the implementation
of firms’ internal risk management policies and procedures.”161
The SEC’s failure to adequately comply with Pillar II of the 2004
Basel Accord should be a warning to global regulators. A failure to
adequately police the use of the advanced approach will inevitably lead to
inadequate levels of capital being maintained. However, adequate
supervision requires not only promulgated regulations, but adequate
staffing with the necessary expertise to evaluate the complicated VaR
models. Most importantly, regulators need to remain skeptical of executive
assurances that compliance will be forthcoming. As Basel II requires,
agencies need to act swiftly to correct violations of regulations.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The above arguments point in favor of scrapping Basel II’s
advanced approach, which allows financial institutions to set their capital
requirements according to their internal risk modeling. The spectacular
failure of the VaR models to predict or adequately protect against the
current financial crisis makes entrusting capital regulation to proprietary
risk-modeling seem hopelessly misguided. In particular, the dismal record
of the SEC’s CSE program provides a warning to international regulators to
reverse their recent adoption of the Basel II framework. Instead,
international regulators should renounce the advanced approach and adopt
the intermediate approach proposed by U.S. regulators in 2005 (Basel
IA).162
Although the Basel Committee could revise the advanced approach
to provide further guidance to international regulators (which the
committee has already done),163 the fundamental limitations and flaws of
the advanced approach cannot be overcome. More detailed audit standards
would simply increase the cost of both compliance and regulation.
Additionally, as recent history has shown us, any updated guidance would
require constant revision as the financial sector continued to evolve and
develop new products. Moreover, more specific rules would only increase
the burden on regulators who are already understaffed, overworked, and
inexperienced. Basel II already requires regulators to review numerous risk
models for a single institution, not to mention back-testing and stresstesting the very same models. Again, as the SEC experiment has shown,
regulators whose resources are stretched have an incentive to be less
rigorous.
Yet, even armed with sufficient resources, the advanced approach
contains the worst elements of both rules and standards. Basel II gives
international regulators a wide measure of discretion in deciding which
banks may use the advanced approach and whether the firm’s risk
management systems satisfy the standards of Basel II. Such opaque and
flexible standards make it difficult to compare the compliance of regulators
in one nation versus another. This lack of transparency provides an
incentive for regulators to forgo regulatory action so as to provide the
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banks of their own country a competitive advantage. Though regulators
attempted to forgo regulatory action under Basel I, their actions were easily
discovered due to the simplicity of the regulatory framework.
Alternatively, Basel IA represents an intermediate approach to
financial regulation that combines the best elements of Basel I and Basel II.
Fundamentally, Basel IA provides meaningful improvements to the risk
sensitivity of Basel I, while imposing minimal increases in regulatory
burdens. To increase the risk sensitivity of Basel I, Basel IA significantly
increases the number of risk-weight categories.164 The addition of more
risk-weight categories solves Basel I’s greatest flaw (the “one-size-fits all”
approach) by permitting financial institutions to adjust their capital ratios
based on the institution’s specific risk profile. Yet, by abandoning Basel
II’s advanced approach in favor of a standardized method for calculating
capital adequacy, Basel IA also reduces the burdens placed on global
financial regulators. No longer would regulators be forced to police dozens
of firm-specific statistical models that are often complicated and beyond
the comprehension of the average regulator. Instead, under Basel IA
regulators would be free to calculate capital adequacy using a standardized
formula that naturally adjusted to the risk-profile of each financial
institution. Because of their simplicity, the regulations included in Basel
IA are easier to understand and thus, facilitate compliance by financial
institutions and adequate auditing by regulators. Further, the Basel IA
standards are also more transparent; it would not only be easier for
regulators to audit a financial institution, but would be easier for
competitors and regulators in other countries to check whether there is
adequate compliance. Finally, Basel IA’s simpler rules allow regulators
and interested parties to more adequately assess the credit and market risks
posed by individual institutions. By adopting the Basel IA framework,
global regulators will help to establish a sustainable path to global financial
stability.
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